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 SCIENTIFIC REPORT 
                                                     
1  Article 67 of the coordinated Law of 10 July 2008 on hospitals and other 
healthcare institutions (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Hospital Act’) provides 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There is an international trend for hospitals to become part of larger care 
networks rather than to function as single entities. Also in Belgium the 
number of collaborations between hospitals has vastly increased during the 
last decade. The reasons for collaboration vary and include financial 
pressure (e.g. the common exploitation of shared services such as a HRM 
department), government regulations (e.g. cardiac care programmes), 
sharing scarce human resources (e.g. interventional radiology) and 
providing patient-centred integrated care. Following the new regulation 
guidelines in the Action Plan of the minister of Social Affairs and Public 
Health (April 2015), hospitals have to become part of a larger care 
collaboration,1 in which they will need to join forces to better coordinate and 
integrate patient care across hospital boundaries and enhance task 
distribution. Possible examples of such collaboration and task distribution 
are the concentration of highly-specialised services, such as rare cancers, 
in reference centres2, 3 or the rationalisation of general care services such 
as maternity services.  
As mentioned in several policy documents1-3 the collaborations and 
governance structures in the current Belgian Hospital Act1 are not sufficient 
to guide these new developments. New governance models are needed to 
support hospital collaborations that facilitate task distribution and the care 
coordination across hospital boundaries. The overall goal is to provide better 
quality of care in an efficient way. This study aims to identify governance 
models that support collaborations enhancing task distribution and cost-
effective care and to define recommendations for the Belgian legislator to 
adjust the current Hospital Act accordingly. We focus on collaborations 
between hospitals involving at least clinical services (e.g. cardiac care 
programme) and/or major medical equipment and not only focusing on 
collaborations for support services (e.g. IT, maintenance, etc.).  
 
that special norms can be enacted for hospital groups, mergers and 
associations of hospitals. 
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In order to investigate which legal forms and governance models support 
these task distribution and collaboration, the first chapter in this study gives 
a brief overview of the several definitions and concepts within the field of 
governance and hospital governance. A framework to identify different forms 
of collaboration is outlined and four possible forms of governance are 
discussed. Thereafter the scope of the study is delineated and the structure 
of the next chapters is outlined.  
1.1 The governance concept 
1.1.1 Definition of governance 
Together with leadership, governance is identified by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as one of the six key building blocks of a well-
functioning national health system. ‘Governance’ is a standard term and is 
frequently used in political science, public administration, social policy, 
human development and administrative research. It essentially refers to the 
complex interplay of rules, values, procedures and structures – generally 
referred to as ‘checks and balances’ – that determine how decisions are 
taken and implemented.4 The Institute on Governance2 defines governance 
as ‘the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is 
exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on 
issues of public concern’. In this study we start from the overall definition 
that governance is:5  
 an interaction between people or a group of people (governance-
actors); 
 wherein the decision-making is not the responsibility of only one of the 
two parties; 
 but where a complex interplay of control and balancing mechanisms 
should enable them to make decisions whereby the interests and goals 
that lie in the foundations of their relationship are realised. 
                                                     
2  http://iog.ca/ 
In the literature, a dominant dichotomy can be found in defining the concept 
‘governance’. While the first approach has a societal point of view, i.e. 
public governance, the second approach originates from the field of 
business administration and organisational management, i.e. corporate 
governance. 
1.1.2 Public governance 
Public governance provides the essential framework that spells out societal 
expectations and norms that, in turn, guide resource allocation, and protects 
the interests and rights of citizens. It also establishes the principles that 
shape legal and other institutions.6 In the public policy and management 
literature, governance has, until recently, been equated with government. 
The basic principle used to be the distribution of power, i.e. the legislative, 
the executive and the judicial power. During the past 25 years, however, one 
has witnessed strong political pressures to reduce government’s scope and 
shift responsibilities for public policy implementation to nongovernmental 
entities.6-8 Due to the growing complexity within our society, governance 
tasks have been outsourced to external private and not-for-profit 
organisations. As a consequence the well-known and clear division between 
three types of governance mechanisms is no longer reality. These 
mechanisms are 1) authority and hierarchy of the state, 2) markets and 3) 
civil society.9  
When the healthcare sector is centrally steered, the governance mechanism 
‘authority’ is most present. If authority is the core concept, central 
administrative regulations and orders, rules and planning are used to govern 
the different actors. In Denmark, for example, the system is to a large extent 
steered by the regional authorities.10, 11 As such, there are no boards on 
hospital level but only one overarching board on a regional level wherein 
regional politicians participate. Also in Belgium, the government intervenes 
through planning, authorisation and financing regulations, but leaving 
substantial freedom to the healthcare sector. 
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‘Markets’ are characterised by competition, negotiations and exchange 
between several actors and their working is based on price mechanisms. 
The logic is that through competition, hospitals will increase quality while 
reducing costs.12 Hence, the market is assumed to balance the healthcare 
sector without the need of the government to intervene a lot. This 
mechanism is present in the United States healthcare system. Intermountain 
Healthcare,13 for example, invests in the best quality of care but also in 
efficiency to attract patients in their region. The competition has increased 
the performance of Intermountain. Because of its success, the organisation 
kept on growing which complicated governance and decision-making. To 
maintain the quality and the task distribution in their services, they became 
an integrated health system.  
‘Civil society’ is comprised of groups or organisations working in the 
interest of the citizens but operating outside the public and for-profit sectors. 
Organisations and institutions that make up civil society include labour 
unions, not-for-profit organisations and other service agencies that provide 
an important service to society.9 As most healthcare organisations are not-
for-profit in Belgium, the healthcare sector is mostly influenced by this 
mechanism.  
Nowadays, societal needs like housing, healthcare and education, are more 
and more fulfilled by a combination of the three mechanisms. These three 
mechanisms affect the way governance in hospitals and collaborations is 
organised and mixed forms, such as regulated competition, occur which 
makes the already complex interplay of control and balancing mechanisms, 
i.e. good leadership14 and good governance structures15 even more 
complex. As a result networks occur to engage public, private and civil 
society actors at transnational, national, regional and local scales in shaping 
the future of our societies.16 
Government decisions are made on international, national, regional and 
local level.5 Hence, ‘government decisions’ have become both vertically and 
horizontally separated.17 The mechanisms and behaviours within public 
governance practices should be adjusted to reflect these new trends.  
1.1.3 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. It involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance provides the structure through which the objectives of a 
company are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance.18 It is the set of rules, systems and regulations intended to 
protect stakeholders’ interests, and especially shareholders’ interests. 
These rules define rights and responsibilities of the firm’s managers and 
board members, define how a company is managed, articulate the 
mechanisms by which board members and stakeholders monitor managers, 
ensure organisational solvency, and protect corporate assets.19, 20 Until 
recently, corporate governance regimes were primarily based on agency 
theory, as expressed in the shareholder model. Agency theory assumes 
there will be a conflict of interest in a relationship of agency where one party 
(the shareholders) delegates work to another (the executives).21 Later, a 
stream of studies on stakeholder theory and corporate governance have 
investigated new ways to integrate more stakeholders into the governance 
of corporations, e.g. through representation in the governing boards. 
Consequently, corporate governance evolved to a broader perspective than 
the set of relationships between a company’s management and its 
shareholders. Within this broader perspective corporate governance has 
also been applied to not-for-profit organisations. It refers to the process of 
providing leadership, direction, and accountability for specific 
nongovernmental, not-for-profit organisations.22 
1.1.4 Public versus corporate governance  
Although there are many differences in both definitions of public governance 
and corporate governance, there are also some similarities. An important 
common theme is the polarisation in the vision on governance. First, 
there was a narrower vision in both concepts, i.e. the distribution of power 
of the government and the shareholder model in enterprises. Thereafter, this 
vision has evolved to a broader scope, public governance has further 
vertically and horizontally developed and the stakeholder model is more 
often applied.5 Corporate governance systems are more and more grounded 
in a society’s legal codes (e.g. regulations).  
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Hence, the relationship between corporate and public governance is 
dynamic. Imperfections in corporate governance may induce changes in 
public governance; the opposite is also true. An important example of this 
congruence is the evolution in the literature on public sector management 
reform. Management concepts applied in the private sector, are now applied 
in a context of civil services. This development has been described in terms 
of New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG).23 
NPM is a shift away from the bureaucratic hierarchical structure of 
governments that are part of the classical or traditional form of administration 
towards the integration of the private sector approach and culture. There is 
a clear emphasis on outputs rather than on input factors and on re-sizing the 
public sector. The goal changes to more cost-effective methods of 
production of goods and services.24 NPG, on the other hand, in contrast with 
the emphasis on competitive markets and outputs as in NPM, places citizens 
rather than government at the centre of its frame of reference. The NPG 
approach emphasises interorganisational relationships and the governance 
of processes, in which trust, relational capital and relational contracts serve 
as the core governance mechanisms, rather than organisational form and 
function.25 
The boundaries between corporate governance in not-for-profit 
organisations and public governance are increasingly fluid and 
overlapping, and the theoretical understanding as well as empirical work on 
governance had to expand to encompass this relationship.26, 27 Drawing on 
one another can strengthen both public and corporate governance research 
literature. Research should expand and go beyond a functional, 
organisational, and board-focused construct that often misses important 
governing behaviour and activities taking place outside the boardroom. 
Because of this fluid and unclear distinction, new concepts in governance 
arise such as network governance. Network governance can be termed as 
a collection of persons or institutions engaged in a policy dialogue that are 
not accountable to the state (although the state may have initiated the 
formation of the network and may be involved in directing the network); that 
interact in an environment that is open and trusting, thus facilitating the free 
flow of views and information within and to other networks; that are 
specifically targeting a policy problem.28 
In this study we do not make the explicit distinction between corporate and 
public governance, since there is an overlap between these two concepts, 
especially when we study hospitals. We will also use a wider search 
including concepts as network governance and not-for-profit governance to 
investigate the governance practices in acute hospitals. This broader 
perspective of governance can be motivated by the goal of this project to 
explore the establishment of governance in acute hospitals with respect to 
governmental and stakeholder’s influence and control.  
1.1.5 Governance in the hospital sector  
Within the world of health, Preker and Harding (2003)29 identified four main 
levels of governance. First, there is the global or international level. An 
example of a specific topic at this level is the decision-making procedures to 
address international pandemics. Second, there is multi-sectoral 
governance. This level addresses policy sets that control the behaviour and 
use of resources in the broader economy of a nation. Third, there is sectoral 
governance, where the government of healthcare seeks to promulgate 
policies and allocate resources among providers, payers, and technology-
pharmacy producers to not just restore health, but to protect and promote 
health. And finally, there is institutional governance, which deals with the 
control of a specific organisation’s (for example a hospital, pharmaceutical 
company or health insurance plan) resources for mission accomplishment.  
Good governance practices 
Former research has investigated ‘good governance practices’ in 
hospitals. First, a clear demarcation of the governance structures has 
shown to contribute to a more transparent decision-making process. 
Evidence shows that operational decisions must be taken by management, 
while the hospital board must be entrusted with all tasks of a supervisory 
nature.30 Secondly, health policy debates recognise the important role of 
hospital boards in overseeing patient quality and safety, and a growing 
body of empirical research has sought to elucidate that role.31 The 
composition and methods applied by the hospital’s board have an influence 
on the quality of care within hospitals.32 The analysis of Verenosi (2013)33 
reveals a significant and positive association between a higher percentage 
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of clinicians participating in the board and the quality ratings of service 
providers.  
These new findings of ‘good hospital governance’ have led to the 
development of new checks and balances. Recently, public indicators, 
accreditation and stakeholder consultations are becoming more important.5 
As a consequence, the concept of ‘clinical governance‘ is gaining 
importance in healthcare literature.34 Clinical governance, however, is not 
focused on the governance of the organisation, it aims to improve the quality 
and safety checks in healthcare. It was initially established as a framework 
through which National Health Services (NHS) organisations are 
accountable for continually improving the quality of their services and 
safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which 
excellence in clinical care will flourish.35  
Current governance guidelines and structures do not suffice in guiding the 
new developments. On organisational level, this will lead to an increased 
necessity of vertical and horizontal integration of healthcare services. The 
collaboration within horizontal networks is between similar organisations, 
which is within the scope of this study. Vertical networks are identified as 
collaboration between organisations with different service offerings (out of 
scope).  
This new demand for streamlining the different configurations of care 
provisions induces equal demands to integrate concepts of hospital 
governance and healthcare governance in general.36 The current 
governance model on meso- and micro level with its roles and 
responsibilities needs to be evaluated. The traditional collaboration forms 
are no longer sufficient and several other forms of collaboration emerge 
bottom-up.37 Hence, there is the need for a new concept of network forms 
and their governance.  
1.2 Collaboration in the healthcare sector 
The term ‘network’ is often used to indicate any form of collaboration in the 
healthcare sector. However, more differentiation is required. To be able to 
clearly define the concept network, we first elaborate on the more general 
concept of collaboration. Collaboration can be defined as ‘the cooperative 
way that two or more entities work together toward a shared goal’.38 
Scholars outline different collaboration models and frameworks. Peterson 
(1991)39, for example, postulates that there is a three point continuum of 
interaction for strategic alliances: 1) cooperation, whereby fully independent 
groups share information that supports each other’s organisational 
outcomes, 2) coordination, whereby independent parties align activities or 
co-sponsor events or services that support mutually beneficial goals and 3) 
collaboration, where individual entities give up some degree of 
independence in an effort to realise a shared goal.  
Hodges et al. (2003)40 suggested five levels of community linkage: 
networking, cooperation or alliance, coordination or partnership, coalition, 
and collaboration. The levels differ by purpose, the structure of decision-
making, and the nature of leadership. Bailey and Koney (2000)41 offered a 
model similar to these, with four steps ending with complete unification: 
cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and coadunation (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 – Forms of strategic alliance 
 
 
Source: Bailey and Koney (2000)41 
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1.2.1 Types of strategic alliance 
1.2.1.1 Cooperation 
The first form of alliance is cooperation. This form of alliance is a very loose 
form of partnership between two or more organisations with the same 
interests. All organisations maintain their own identity; the exchange of 
knowledge is the most important element in this relationship.41 
1.2.1.2 Coordination 
The second form of alliance is coordination. This refers to organisations that 
work together with a complementary organisation to realise their own goals. 
This form of strategic alliance still assumes a low degree of cooperation and 
integration of the organisations and does not imply a collective goal. The 
organisations maintain their own identity while the coordinated alliance, e.g. 
a federation or an association, executes specific tasks. Examples of these 
tasks are funding, training and education, planning, marketing and legal 
assistance.41 
1.2.1.3 Collaboration 
Consortium 
A consortium joins forces and knowledge to obtain a joint goal. A consortium 
is a collaboration of two or more individuals, companies or organisations with 
the objective of participating in a common activity or pooling their resources 
to achieve a common goal. Within the consortium, each participant retains 
separate legal status and the consortium’s control over each participant is 
generally limited to activities involving the joint endeavour. A consortium is 
formed by a contract.42 Examples of a consortium in the healthcare sector 
are hospitals, private organisations and research groups that work together 
to develop a new technology.  
Joint venture 
In a joint venture two or more organisations work together with an economic 
purpose. They want to carry out an economic activity together and profits 
and losses will be shared. This form of collaboration may have a permanent 
character or can be temporary. The main difference with a consortium is that 
the participating parties agree to create a new entity by contributing equity, 
and then share in the revenues, expenses and control of the new enterprise. 
The participating organisations preserve their own identity and participate 
equally in the joint venture. Keuning and Eppink43 articulate that the access 
to information and the shared risks are two big advantages of this 
collaboration form. Also the rather small investments to start with this form 
of collaboration are evaluated as positive. An example of this in a healthcare 
setting are centres of excellence organised as joint ventures. The oncology 
department of the University Hospital Brussels collaborates in a research 
joint venture with the Hercules foundation of the Flemish government and 
Brainlab AG. An international example is the Joint Venture Hospital 
Laboratories Network (JVHL). JVHL was established in 1992 to offer 
hospital and health system outreach laboratory programmes the 
organisational model to attract and administer health plan laboratory service 
agreements. Today, there are more than 120 hospitals across Michigan, 
Ohio, and Indiana participating in the network and providing laboratory 
services to more than 4.5 million members residing in these areas. 
Networks 
Bailey and Koney41 developed a specific definition for networks in healthcare 
organisations. A network is identified as an integrated service system with 
the goal of improving service delivery. The authors differentiate two network 
forms: horizontal and vertical networks. The collaboration within horizontal 
networks is between similar organisations, which offer more or less the 
same services. Vertical networks are identified as collaboration between 
organisations with different service offerings.  
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Following Bailey and Koney (2000)41, a network is the answer to the 
restructuring initiatives within healthcare policies to implement new 
strategies with the goal of reducing expenses. Healthcare policies are 
focused on the responsible use of resources and the elimination of abuse of 
funding in healthcare service delivery. These restructuring initiatives also 
occur in the Belgian healthcare system.  
1.2.1.4 Coadunation  
The term coadunation refers to a more radical form of collaboration. 
Coadunation can be translated as a strategic restructuring.41 Mergers and 
acquisitions are the best-known examples of coadunation. Merger involves 
the coming together of two or more organisations in which one organisation 
survives as a legal entity and the others dissolve to become part of the 
surviving organisation. Acquisition describes mergers between unequal 
organisations; it is the complete integration of one organisation into the other 
in which the integrating agency loses its independent existence and 
becomes part of the acquiring agency.44 
1.2.2 Collaboration and networks 
Bailey and Koney (2000)41 have a very specific definition of a network. We 
see, however, that some authors use a much broader definition. Perri et al. 
(2006)45 define a network as ‘any moderately stable pattern of ties or links 
between organisations or between organisations and individuals, where 
those ties represent some form of recognisable accountability, whether 
formal or informal in character, whether weak, or strong, loosely or tightly 
bounded or unbounded’. In this perspective a network is any form of alliance 
between organisations or between organisations and individuals and 
includes all four categories discussed in the framework of Bailey and Koney 
(2000).41 However, the first two forms of alliance, i.e. coordination and 
cooperation, have a rather low level of integration and formalisation. Since 
these forms are only focused on information exchange and administrative 
tasks and assistance and do not have a collective goal, these are not within 
the scope of this project. In this study we focus on organisational 
collaboration with a collective goal and an integrated strategy to 
achieve this goal. The study focuses on the last two forms within the 
framework of Bailey and Koney (2000)41, i.e. collaboration and 
coadunation.  
Bazzoli et al. (1999)46 outline two large categories of interorganisational 
collaboration: health networks and health systems (Table 1). A health 
network can be positioned as a form of collaboration in the framework of 
Bailey and Koney (2000).41 Health networks are created to function as 
interdependent wholes while maintaining each organisation’s separate legal 
identity. It refers to the relationship formed by a group of hospitals through 
strategic alliance. A health network consists of autonomous units that have 
joined together to achieve a common purpose.  
A health system is a corporate body that owns and/or manages health 
provider facilities as well as non-health-related facilities. The health system 
is an example of coadunation. It is a legally recognised permanent 
arrangement in which common ownership, management, or leasing exists 
for all or most of the components.47 The concept of ‘a health system’ is 
slightly different from the concept ‘merger’ in the Belgian Hospital Act. A 
merger leads in Belgium to the development of a new organisation where 
there is common ownership, while a health system refers to the integration 
of more than one entity wherein all organisations still exist as entities but 
transfer part of their governance to the level of the system.47 Health systems 
are typically governed on principles of hierarchical control and coordination 
by a central administrative or governing authority.48 The central governing 
body is assumed to have ultimate authority over management and 
governance of owned and sponsored affiliate organisations.49 
Consequently, in this study a health system is included as a form of 
coadunation within the framework of Bailey and Koney (2000).41 In the 
following section, the types of collaboration in the Belgian Hospital Act are 
positioned within the adjusted framework of Bailey and Koney (2000).41 
Collaboration in the healthcare sector 
In the remainder of this study the concept ‘collaboration’ is used as an 
overall concept. It encompasses all types of collaboration, including 
mergers, acquisitions and health systems. 
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Table 1 – Health networks and systems 
 Health networks Health systems 
Forms More loosely coupled multihospital arrangement, in which 
hospitals are linked in a number of ways such as informal 
relationships and contract agreements to pursue specific 
objectives 
Formally structured multihospital system, in which hospitals are 
tightly coupled and are linked through formal and structured 
relationships 
Ownerships Multiple ownerships 
Each hospital maintains its separate legal identity 
Single ownership 
Owned and managed by a certain legal entity 
Decision-making Joint planning and decision-making 
Independent implementation 
Planning by a central administrative authority 
Jointly pursue common interests 
Governance structure Intermediate mechanisms Hierarchy mechanisms 
Autonomy Function as interdependent wholes 
Preserve moderate to high independence and autonomy 
Part of an owned system 
Low independence and autonomy 
Source: Yu and Chen (2013)50 
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1.2.3 Collaboration forms in the Belgian Hospital Act 
Three forms of collaboration are defined in the Belgian Hospital Act. They 
can be positioned in the last two forms of alliance: collaboration and 
coadunation.  
The first form of collaboration is a hospital group (‘groepering van 
ziekenhuizen’/‘le groupement d’hôpitaux’). The hospital group can be 
positioned as a network in the framework of Bailey and Koney (2000)41. An 
important condition is the maximum distance of 25 km between the 
collaborating hospitals. This agreement includes specification on task 
distribution and complementarity on the level of services, disciplines and 
equipment. The hospital groups may not result in monodisciplinary hospital 
sites (with the exception of geriatric and Sp-services)3. Hospitals of the 
group should achieve efficient task distribution to obtain complementarity.  
A second form of collaboration is the hospital association 
(‘ziekenhuisassociatie’/‘l’association d’hôpitaux’). The hospital association is 
also an example of a network in the framework of Bailey and Koney 
(2000)41. A hospital association in the Belgian Hospital Act can be defined 
as two or more hospitals with the joint exploitation of one or more care 
programmes/ hospital departments/ hospital functions/ hospital units/ 
(medico-)technical departments. The association agreement contains a 
detailed description of the activities that are run by the association and to 
which catchment area (population) this applies. This form of collaboration is 
of interest when the activity volume determines quality of care and/or 
authorisation. 
The third form of collaboration as defined in the Hospital Act in Belgium is 
the hospital merger (‘fusie van ziekenhuizen’/‘la fusion d’hôpitaux’). This is 
an example of coadunation and includes the integration of two or more 
hospitals (maximum distance of 35 km between hospitals that merge) under 
one single administrator with a single authorisation. The legislation contains 
                                                     
3  Sp-services are specialised services for the treatment and revalidation of 
certain pathologies and disorders, for example neurological problems or 
chronic diseases. 
rules about the distribution of different hospital services and functions on the 
different hospital sites.  
However, looking at the broad framework of Bailey and Koney (2000)41, 
these three forms of collaboration defined in the Belgian legislation are still 
limited. In general, other forms of collaboration such as consortia and joint 
ventures and other examples of coadunation such as mergers, acquisitions 
and health systems exist. 
1.3 Governance of collaboration initiatives 
1.3.1 Governance mechanisms 
In the previous section, there was no discussion on how these forms of 
collaboration should be governed. Since networks and different forms of 
collaboration are a very broad and complex topic, the governance of these 
different forms will be even more complex. Hence, this section describes 
several forms of governance within the healthcare sector. 
Provan and Kenis51 explain that governance of health networks ‘involves the 
use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate 
resources and to coordinate and control joint actions across the network as 
a whole.’ The governance of health networks is about: 1) structures for 
collaboration (governance structure), and 2) collaboration in networks 
(governance mechanisms)52. As the governance of interorganisational 
collaboration can be organised in different ways, several forms of 
governance structures exist. Governance mechanisms refer to the 
mechanisms used in the network to coordinate tasks. Three types of 
governance mechanisms occur:  
 authority and hierarchy of the state; 
 price mechanisms in economic markets;  
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 and the civil society wherein relational governance is an important 
governance mechanism.9 
These are the same mechanisms that have an influence in public 
governance (discussed under section 1.1.2).  
Powell (2003)Powell 53 suggests that it is not the choice of governance 
mechanisms or structures in itself that affects network effectiveness, but the 
fit of governance mechanisms with governance structure. Governance 
structure and governance mechanisms are related and interdependent, and 
can be seen as two dimensions of network governance that can exist in 
several combinations. The structure, for example, influences the possibilities 
for effectively using certain governance mechanisms.51 
1.3.2 Governance structure 
Following Provan and Kenis (2008)51, two distinctions in the structures for 
collaboration are made. First, network governance may or may not be 
brokered. At one extreme, networks may be governed completely by the 
organisations that comprise the network. Every organisation would interact 
with every other organisation to govern the network, resulting in a dense and 
highly decentralised form. This is what is called shared governance, i.e. no 
other parties are involved in the governance of the network. At the other 
extreme, the network may be highly brokered. This implies that an external 
party or a member in the network arranges agreements and governance 
between the several parties involved. Few direct organisation-to-
organisation interactions exist, except regarding operational issues such as 
the transfer of business, clients, and information on services. Instead, 
network governance occurs by and through a single organisation, acting as 
a highly centralised network broker, or lead organisation, regarding issues 
that are critical for overall network maintenance and survival. At the mid-
range, a single organisation might take on some key governance activities 
while leaving others to network members. Alternatively, network members 
may divide governance responsibilities among various subsets, or cliques of 
network members, with no single organisation taking on significant 
governance tasks.  
A second distinction regarding governance can be made in brokered 
networks by focusing on whether the network is participant-governed or 
externally governed. As discussed below, participant-governed networks 
are, at one extreme, governed either collectively by the members 
themselves (i.e. shared), or at the other extreme, by a single network 
participant that takes on the role of a lead organisation. Externally governed 
networks are governed by a unique network administrative organisation 
(NAO), which may be either voluntarily established by network members or 
mandated as part of the network formation process.  
1.3.2.1 Participant-Governed Networks 
The simplest and most common form is participant governance.36 This form 
is governed by the network members themselves with no separate and 
unique governance entity. There is no separate administrative entity set up 
specifically to govern the network. Participant-governed networks can be 
highly decentralised, involving most or all network members interacting on a 
relatively equal basis in the process of governance. Shared participant-
governed networks depend exclusively on the involvement and commitment 
of all, or a significant subset of the organisations that comprise the network. 
Network participants are themselves responsible for managing internal 
network relationships and operations as well as external relations with such 
groups as funders, government, and customers.54 Power in the network, at 
least regarding network-level decisions, is more or less symmetrical, even 
though there may be differences in organisational size, resource 
capabilities, and performance.  
1.3.2.2 Lead Organisation–Governed Networks 
While shared participant-governance involves many or all network 
members, this form of governance is not always appropriate. In particular, 
the inefficiencies of shared governance may mean that a far more 
centralised approach is preferred. At the extreme, network governance can 
occur through what is conceptualised as a ‘lead organisation’.36 There is a 
core provider agency that performs the role of network leader because of its 
central position in the flow of clients and key resources. In lead organisation 
governance, all major network-level activities and key decisions are 
coordinated through and by a single participating member, acting as a lead 
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organisation. Thus, network governance becomes highly centralised and 
brokered, with asymmetrical power. A lead organisation provides 
administration for the network and/or facilitates the activities of member 
organisations in their efforts to achieve network goals, which may be closely 
aligned with the goals of the lead organisation.  
1.3.2.3 Network Administrative Organisation 
A third form of network governance is the NAO model.36 The basic idea is 
that a separate administrative entity is set up specifically to govern the 
network and its activities. Although network members still interact with one 
another, as with the lead organisation model, the NAO model is centralised. 
The network broker (in this case, the NAO) plays a key role in coordinating 
and sustaining the network.55, 56 Unlike the lead organisation model, 
however, the NAO is not another member organisation providing its own 
services. Instead, the network is externally governed, with the NAO 
established, either through mandate or by the members themselves, for the 
exclusive purpose of network governance. The NAO may be a public 
organisation, or a not-for-profit organisation, which is often the case even 
when the network members are for-profit firms.  
1.3.2.4 Health System 
Collaboration structures within the category of coadunation, share common 
ownership and have the joint purpose of pursuing common interests. This 
form of collaboration can have a different governance structure than the 
structures discussed within the framework of Provan and Kenis.51 In a health 
system a hierarchical control method is applied, meaning that a central 
administrative authority is in charge of management and coordination.57 A 
sole party holds this single ownership in the health system.  
1.4 Scope and objectives of this report 
In this report four forms of governance are conceptualised: 
 the participant-governed networks; 
 the lead organisation-governed networks; 
 the network administrative organisation; 
 the health system.  
The first three all refer to networks wherein the organisations still are 
individual operating elements in the network. The fourth form goes a step 
further by developing a health system with a single ownership, which is 
owned and managed by a certain legal entity. This form of governance 
implies a high level of hierarchy. Each of these forms has certain key 
structural characteristics and is utilised in practice for a variety of reasons. 
Each form has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, leading to 
outcomes that are likely to depend on the form chosen. 
This study investigates which forms of governance are applied in the various 
models of collaboration and coadunation. First, to gain a better 
understanding of several combinations of hospital governance and forms of 
alliance, an in-depth literature review is conducted. The review 
investigates which governance models (structures and mechanisms) aim to 
support task distribution and collaboration between hospitals and what 
lessons can be learned. Second, different types of collaborations are 
identified in the current legislation and the barriers and facilitators in the 
current (legal) context are interrogated. Third, a multiple case study is 
performed, exploring the legal Belgian context of current initiatives that aim 
to support the task distribution and collaboration between hospitals. Three 
cases are studied in both French- and Dutch-speaking regions. At least one 
form of collaboration outlined in the framework of Bailey and Koney (2000)41 
is investigated, for example consortium, joint venture, network and 
coadunation in combination with at least one of the four examples of 
governance structure. At the same time international practices are 
investigated building on a literature review (non-systematic) and a multiple 
case study of four countries/regions/best-practice initiatives. Also healthcare 
systems abroad that underwent reforms leading to new governance models 
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are analysed. In a last phase options for best governance practices for 
the Belgian context are identified. The legal possibilities and 
constraints in Belgium and the EU legislation are identified. In addition, 
the different solutions for the Belgian context are checked with important 
stakeholders to explore the possibilities for hospital governance within 
Belgium.  
 
This scientific report includes two legal chapters. The first legal chapter 
(Chapter 2) analyses current legislation on types of collaborations between 
hospitals to identify barriers and facilitators to collaborate. The second one 
(Chapter 4) assesses legal possibilities and constraints to introduce new 
governance models that support task distribution and care coordination. 
Three new models are briefly described in Chapter 3. These models are 
based on a literature review, national and international case studies and 
round-table discussions with Belgian stakeholders. This information is not 
included in the scientific report but is available on request from the authors 
as a working document.  
2 CURRENT BELGIAN LEGAL CONTEXT 
OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN 
HOSPITALS – A DESCRIPTIVE 
ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
The legal context of the current types of collaboration between or with 
hospitals is described in order to be able to identify the legal barriers and 
facilitators (section 2.2). This consists of three parts. The first part involves 
a description of the legally structured types of collaboration among hospitals. 
The second part analyses other types of collaboration between hospitals 
and care providers that are authorised by the competent public authority. 
The third part analyses types of collaboration that are not authorised by the 
competent public authorities.  
In section 2.3 we evaluate more in detail the manner in which the current 
legislation can divide the healthcare landscape in regional and/or supra-
regional collaborations. We evaluate the facilitators and obstacles to 
collaboration between hospitals. We analyse the legislation on the legal 
forms of collaboration of hospitals as well as other legislation (e.g. related to 
competition law, constitutional law, labour law, etc.) that can facilitate or 
hinder collaboration between hospitals. When analysing the facilitators and 
obstacles, we mainly focus on governance and in particular on the direct and 
indirect aspects of governance. With the direct aspects we refer e.g. to the 
way the collaboration is governed by committees, the way hospital 
physicians are involved in decision-making of/for the collaboration, the 
position of the hospital physician working in a collaboration of hospitals, etc. 
The indirect aspects of governance are related to e.g. certain issues of 
external accountability5 like the processing of data, the ombudsfunction, etc. 
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2.2 Different forms of actual collaboration: descriptive 
analysis  
2.2.1 Formalised types of collaboration between hospitals that 
are authorised by the competent minister 
We discuss the legal characteristics of the three legal forms of collaboration 
that currently exist: a hospital association, a hospital group and a merger.   
2.2.1.1 An association of hospitals 
Art. 67 of the coordinated Act of 10 July 2008 on hospitals and other 
healthcare institutions (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Hospital Act’) provides 
that special norms can be enacted for hospital groups, mergers and 
associations of hospitals.4   
By Royal Decree of 25 April 19975, the King has clarified the concept of an 
association of hospitals and has set specific norms to which such an 
association must adhere to. 
Definition and scope 
The association is a sustainable collaboration, legally formalised, between 
two or more hospitals, focused on the joint exploitation of one or more care 
programmes, services, functions, hospital sections, medical services, 
medical-technical services or technical services and authorised by the 
minister empowered to authorise hospitals.6 
                                                     
4  Art. 67, al. 1er, 3° of the Hospital Act 
5  Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 houdende nadere omschrijving van de 
associatie van ziekenhuizen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze 
moet voldoen, B.S. 18 June 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Royal Decree of 
25 April 1997’) 
6  Art. 2, 1° of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997  
Collaboration between acute, categorical or psychiatric hospitals 
The association has the advantage of having a wide scope, allowing acute, 
categorical or psychiatric hospitals to form an association.58 The Royal 
Decree provides that the rules concerning an association apply to all 
hospitals7 and that the association can take place between two or more 
hospitals. 
Collaboration agreements on one or more topics 
The association is a relatively simple and more flexible form of collaboration 
between hospitals than hospital groups. It allows hospitals to collaborate in 
a limited way on a specific topic. The explanatory report to the King of the 
Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 explains the original purpose of an 
association. The report states that a hospital alone is not always able to 
obtain the level of activity required to operate in a profitable way. Therefore, 
it was useful to create the possibility of a functional and specific collaboration 
between hospitals.8 The association consists of a joint exploitation by two or 
more hospitals that are the object of the association in order to ensure an 
optimal use of available resources, avoiding duplication in the provision of 
services and to ensure quality care and to optimise the operation and 
infrastructure of participating hospitals.9 The association enables hospitals 
to organise a tailor-made collaboration in specific fields. The participating 
hospitals stipulate in an agreement the object of the association, in particular 
the type of care programmes, services, functions, hospital sections, medical 
services, medical-technical services or technical services10. There may be 
multiple purposes of an association between two or more hospitals and they 
may involve for example several care programmes or services. The 
association is a tool with a wide scope. According to Vandeurzen and 
Veys58, a tailor-made joint exploitation allows rationalisation which leads to 
7  Art. 1 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
8  Report to the King of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
9  Art. 4 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
10  Art. 2, 2° of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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an increase in the quality of care and the optimisation of the operation or 
infrastructure. 
Legal forms 
The collaborating hospitals can choose the legal form of the association. Art. 
67, paragraph 2, of the Hospital Act provides that the association can result 
in the creation of a legal entity. Such a new entity will have the aim of 
managing the association. In this case, only legal entities operating hospitals 
that are part of the association, and/or natural or legal entities appointed by 
the legal entity that operate the hospital, may be a member or a partner of 
the legal entity that operates this association.11 The agreement of the 
association will regulate the legal form of the association and the 
composition of the management boards.12 It is also possible to organise an 
association without creating a new legal entity. In that case hospitals will 
directly decide as stated in the agreement.  
Conditions of authorisation 
Art. 3 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 provides that in order to be 
authorised as an association, it is necessary to comply with the authorisation 
norms as set by the King.  
 The creation of an association must ensure optimal use of available 
means and quality of care. The objective is to optimise the functioning 
and infrastructure of the participating hospitals.13 
 An association does not itself aim to make it easier to obtain 
authorisation. Participation in an association is not by itself sufficient to 
meet the authorisation norms and to obtain the authorisation of certain 
care programmes, services, etc. Art. 9 of the Royal Decree provides 
that, except for specific situations as set by the King, when it is needed 
                                                     
11  Art. 67, paragraph 3 of the Hospital Act 
12  Art. 16, 6° of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
13  Art. 4, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
14  It is the population to be served by the object of the Association, art. 2, 3°, of 
the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
for an hospital in order to be authorised or to obtain an authorisation for 
certain care programmes, medical services, hospital functions, etc., it is 
not sufficient to participate at an association that operates such 
programmes, services or function. In such cases each hospital will have 
to meet the required authorisation norms as defined by the legislation 
over the specific care programme, medical services, hospital function, 
etc. For example, Art. 17, 1° of the Royal Decree of 15 July 2004 
concerning the authorisation standards for a cardiac pathology care 
programme states that it is necessary in order to be authorised as a 
‘care programme B in cardiac pathology’ that the hospital has a function 
of intensive care. In this case, except if it is otherwise foreseen by the 
King, the hospital has to comply with the authorisation norms 
concerning the function of intensive care stated in the Royal Decree of 
27 April 1998 and cannot only use the fact that the hospital is associated 
with another hospital which has an authorised function of intensive care. 
 The association must be authorised by the competent minister. 
 Participating hospitals must provide evidence concerning the need of 
the activity concerned in an attractive area14 and/or a sufficient level of 
activity of the association. The Royal Decree provides that the King is 
responsible for determining what is meant by ‘a need for association in 
a particular attractive area’ and the ‘activity level’ for each type of activity 
on the basis of national and international standards.15 To date, such 
precision has not been provided. 
 Each hospital that participates in an association must identify in its 
accounts the cost of the object of the association16 and provide related 
statistical data concerning the object of the association that is located 
on its site. 17  
15  Art. 5, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
16  Art. 7, §1er, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
17  Art. 8, §1er, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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If the object or a part of the object of the association lies outside the site 
of the participating hospitals, the association will then need to produce 
its own audit showing the cost of the association18 and communicate 
the above mentioned statistical data.19  
To be authorised as an association, it is furthermore necessary to fulfil a 
number of norms related to the structure of the association. These include 
having an association committee, a common medical committee 
(‘Gemeenschappelijk Medisch Comité’/‘Comité Médical Commun’), a 
general coordinator, a medical coordinator and a nurse coordinator.59  
 The administrators of the participating hospitals have to conclude an 
agreement, named ‘the agreement of the association’, which has to be 
approved by the competent minister.  
The agreement must regulate at least:20 
 the object of the association,  
 the general objectives,  
 the concept and the integration of the activity in the participating 
hospitals,  
 the site where the object of the association is located,  
 the evidence of need of the activity in the attractive area and / or a 
sufficient level of activity,   
 the legal form that is chosen,   
 the composition, tasks and functioning of the decision majorities of the 
association committee,  
 the organisation and coordination of the administrative activities, the 
manner of appointing the general coordinator included,  
                                                     
18  Art. 7, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
19  Art. 8, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
 if applicable, the manner of structuring the medical activity, including 
the manner of appointing the medical coordinator,  
 if applicable the way of structuring the nursing activity, including the way 
of appointing the nurse coordinator,  
 the general organisation and coordination of the medical activities by 
the medical coordinator in consultation with the CMOs of the 
participating hospitals and, if applicable, the medical head of the 
department concerned, 
 the general organisation and coordination of nurse activities by the 
nurse in consultation with the heads of the nursing departments of the 
participating hospitals and, in applicable, the head of nursing 
concerned, 
 the means possessed by the association, in particular the provision of 
equipment and premises, 
 any financial problems related to the association, including cost 
accounting and the proportion in which a potential operating deficit will 
be charged to the participating hospitals or relating to any bonus that 
will be paid,21 
 matters relating to personnel, 
 the rules in case of disputes among the parties, and  
 the duration of the agreement and the terms of its possible termination. 
20  Art. 16 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
21  Art. 16, 12°, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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It should also be noted that such an agreement needs the approval of the 
CEO of each participating hospital. The Hospital Act provides that this 
approval can only be given after obtaining an advice of the medical council.22  
As a result of the Royal Decree of 10 June 2006,23 there is no restriction on 
the possibility of an association across several participating hospitals, and 
therefore at several sites.  
Art. 82 of the Hospital Act provides that it is possible, as part of an 
association of hospitals, to operate a hospital service from multiple sites, a 
hospital function, a hospital section, a care programme, a heavy medical 
device or medical or medico-technical service except if the King has 
otherwise provided. 
If the service, function, section, care programme, heavy medical device or 
medical or medico-technical service is operated on different sites, it is 
required that each site: 
 is authorised,  
 meets all authorisation norms, and 
 is considered as one service, one care programme, etc. as regards the 
implementation of the planning rules. 
                                                     
22  Art. 137, 12° of the Hospital Act 
23  Royal Decree of 10 June 2006 tot wijziging van het koninklijk besluit van 25 
april 1997 houdende nadere omschrijving van de associatie van ziekenhuizen 
en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moet voldoen, B.S. 22 June 2006 
24  Art. 5 of the Royal Decree of 5 April 1991 houdende vaststelling van de 
normen waaraan een dienst radiotherapie moet voldoen om te worden erkend 
als [...] medisch-technische dienst zoals bedoeld in artikel 44 van de wet op 
de ziekenhuizen, gecoördineerd op 7 augustus 1987, B.S. 17 April 
1991modified by the Royal Decree of 1 August 2006 houdende vaststelling 
van de afwijkingen op de toepassing van artikel 76secties van de wet op de 
ziekenhuizen, gecoördineerd op 7 augustus 1987 
25  Art. 3 of the Royal Decree of 2 April 2014 houdende vaststelling van de 
normen waaraan het zorgprogramma voor kinderen moet voldoen om erkend 
Nevertheless, art. 82, § 3 of the Hospital Act provides that the King may 
make exceptions, what has been done in some matters. This is for example 
the case with the radiotherapy service: not every hospital has to have 
authorisation from the government to be part of an association. It is therefore 
an exemption to art. 82, § 2, 3 ° of the Hospital Act, provided that other 
conditions are met.24  
The King has also made an exception for the paediatric care programme25 
and the cardiac programme,26 which by exemption to art. 82, §1, of the 
Hospital Act, can only be operated on one site. When a region 
(‘gewest’/’région’) has no tertiary paediatric care programme which meets 
on one site all authorisation requirements, two tertiary care programmes 
could be created in the region by means of an association of hospitals on 
several sites that jointly meet all the authorisation standards, by exemption 
to art. 82 §2 of the Hospital Act.27  
Other exceptions can be found in regulations such as for Reproductive 
Medicine28 or the Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan.29 
te worden, B.S. 18 April 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Royal Decree of 2 
April 2014’) 
26  Art. 11, paragraph 1, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
27  Art. 54, § 5, of the Royal Decree of 2 April 2014 
28  Art. 28 of the Royal Decree of 15 February 1999 houdende vaststelling van 
de normen waaraan de zorgprogramma's ‘reproductieve geneeskunde’ 
moeten voldoen om erkend te worden, B.S. 25 March 1999 
29  Art. 2 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 houdende vaststelling van het 
maximum aantal PET-scanners en diensten nucleaire geneeskunde waarin 
een PET-scanner wordt opgesteld, dat uitgebaat mag worden, B.S. 8 
Augustus 2014 
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Governance structures 
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE  
Regarding the structure of the association, the Royal Decree of 25 April 
1997 provides that each association must have an association committee.30 
This committee is composed of the administrators appointed by each 
participating hospital. The exact composition of the committee has to be 
described in the association agreement.31 According to Vansweevelt and 
Dewallens, the fact that only administrators can be a member of the 
association committee does not allow stricto sensu CEOs to participate in 
the association committee.60 However, CEOs can to our opinion always be 
invited by the committee as an expert even if they are not allowed to vote.  
The association agreement must describe the tasks and functioning of the 
committee. The agreement must also mention the required majorities in 
order to take decisions. 
COMMON MEDICAL COMMITTEE 
The association must have a common medical committee composed of 
physicians appointed by the different medical councils of each participating 
hospital. Unlike the association committee, the composition and functioning 
of the common medical committee does not have to be mentioned in the 
association agreement, but in another written agreement concluded 
between the medical councils of the participating hospitals.32 This 
agreement should be attached to the agreement of the association. 
The objective of creating such a common medical committee is to reach a 
consensus on matters concerning the association, particularly in areas 
where an advice or an agreement of one or more medical councils is 
required. 
                                                     
30  Art. 10 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
31  Art. 16, 7° of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
32  Art. 11, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
33  Art. 11, §4, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
It must be noted that the common medical committee is not competent to 
make a final decision. Ultimately, it is the medical council of the participating 
hospitals that must express their opinion. If a consensus is reached in the 
common medical committee, the mandated members will only have to 
defend this position in their own medical council.33 According to the National 
Council for hospital facilities, members of the common medical committee 
have no autonomy from the medical committee of the participating 
hospitals.34 
PERMANENT CONSULTATION COMMITTEE 
The Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 also provides the possibility to create a 
permanent consultation committee (PCC) (‘Permanent Overleg Comité’/ 
‘Comité Permanent de Consultation’).35 This decision is made upon a joint 
proposal of the participating hospitals’ boards of administrators. This 
committee is composed of the members of the association committee and 
the members of the common medical committee.36 This PCC decides on 
matters related to the association for which the advice or the agreement of 
one or more medical councils is required under the Hospital Act.  
The purpose of the PCC is to facilitate the decision by attempting to find a 
consensus. If such a consensus is reached, the members mandated by the 
administrators and medical councils of the participating hospitals will be 
required to defend the consensus. 
  
34  Nationale Raad voor ZIekenhuisvoorzieningen, Maatregelen om 
samenwerking tussen ziekenhuizen te bevorderen, 14 June 2012, Brussels, 
7 
35  Art. 12 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
36  Art. 12, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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GENERAL COORDINATOR 
Each association must appoint a general coordinator who is responsible for 
organising and coordinating the administrative activities in collaboration with 
the participating hospitals’ CEOs.37 The method of appointment of the 
coordinator and the collaboration arrangements with the CEOs must be 
included in the association agreement. 
The association agreement will also cover the organisation and coordination 
of the administrative activity of the association.  
MEDICAL COORDINATOR AND NURSE COORDINATOR  
In each association, the medical and nursing activities should be structured 
and organised in order to become an integral part of the activity of the 
participating hospitals. The modality of appointing the medical coordinator38 
and the nurse coordinator39 must be included in the association agreement. 
Each coordinator is responsible for organising and coordinating its activities. 
The objective is to organise a co-operation with medical and nursing 
managers of each participating hospital. The medical coordinator will thus 
cooperate with the CMO of the participating hospitals and, if applicable, with 
the medical head of the department concerned. The association agreement 
must outline such possibilities for collaboration. 
                                                     
37  Art. 13 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
38  Art. 14 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
39  Art. 15 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
40  Art. 16bis of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
Association of catchment area 
Specialise or concentrate care a minimum number of hospital sites in the 
concerned catchment area 
The concept of ‘association of catchment area’ was introduced by the Royal 
Decree of 10 June 2006 to adjust the hospital supply to the actual needs of 
the target population within a particular catchment area. The objective is to 
specialise or focus hospital functions, medical services, medico-technical 
services or care programmes operated by the association of catchment area 
at a minimal number of sites within a maximum period of ten years from the 
approval of the convention of the association.40 
Such an arrangement represents an association as mentioned in art. 2, 1° 
of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 between hospitals located within a 
certain territory, described as a ‘catchment area’. The joint exploitation of 
the object of the association aims therefore to adjust the supply of hospital 
care to the actual need of the target population within the concerned 
catchment area, through specialisation or concentration of care on a 
minimum number of sites.60  
A catchment area has at least 150 000 inhabitants 
To be authorised as an association of a catchment area, the association 
must fulfil the authorisation norms for associations as well as additional 
norms. This includes in particular the territorial criterion which must be the 
object of the association. Indeed, a territory is determined as an 
administrative district or jointly adjacent administrative districts having at 
least41 150 000 inhabitants.42 Due to this geographical criterion, the rules 
require that if a hospital has multiple sites, only the activities organised on 
sites that are located in the territory of the catchment area will be integrated 
in the association of the catchment area.43 In this regard, it should be noted 
41  Only contiguous districts from a geographic perspective can join in a single 
catchment area (art. 16ter, §1, paragraph 2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 
1997) 
42  Art. 16ter, §1, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
43  Art. 16ter, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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that the agreement of the association of the catchment area must specify 
the territory of the association and the measures taken to ensure that the 
population of the region of care concerned have access to specialised 
healthcare according to their needs.44 
Not compulsory for all hospitals of a territory to participate 
It is not necessary that all hospitals in the specified territory participate in the 
association of a catchment area. However, if it is the case, it will be 
necessary to indicate, when submitting the agreement for authorisation, the 
reasons why the association does not include all the hospitals in the 
territory.45 
If the association is operated by a legal entity, the association will then need 
to have its own accounts and will have to communicate the statistical data 
related to the association.46  
Following a parliamentary question on 13 February 200947, the Minister of 
Health answered that, concerning financial mechanisms for associations of 
a catchment area, the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 on the fixing and 
liquidation of the Budget of Financial Means (BFM) contains specific 
measures for hospitals, particularly in the context of association of a 
catchment area, which would see its budget decrease as a result of an 
internal restructuring or a collaboration agreement with one or more 
hospitals. So there are financial incentives to participate in such 
associations. However, this form of collaboration has not had much success. 
According to Vansweevelt and Dewallens (2014) this form of collaboration 
                                                     
44  Art. 16sexies of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997  
45  Art. 16septies, a), of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
46  Art. 16quater and 16quinquies of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
47  Question n° 4-3006 from Anne-Marie Lizin of 13 February 2009 (F), Q.R., 
Senate, 2008-2009, 13 February 2009 
48  F. Dewallens, ‘De gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen’ in T. Vansweevelt en F. 
Dewallens (eds.), Handboek Gezondheidsrecht Volume I: Zorgverleners: 
statuut en aansprakelijkheid, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2014, 206. 
was used to offer a solution for specific problems in Walloon hospitals and 
was not used in Flanders.48 
2.2.1.2 A group of hospitals 
Definition and scope 
A hospital group is a legally structured and authorised sustainable 
partnership among hospitals whereby appointments are made regarding the 
allocation of tasks and the complementarity for the provision of services, 
disciplines or equipment, in order to meet the needs of the population and 
to improve the quality of healthcare. Art. 8, second paragraph of the Royal 
Decree of 30 January 1989 explains that the group may not lead to mono-
specialist hospital sites, with the exception of sub-acute geriatric- and Sp-
services.49 
The concept of the hospital group allows hospitals to enter into forms of 
collaboration that are focused on allocation of tasks. The goal of a ‘group’ is 
to support complementarity of hospitals.50 In a group agreements are made 
regarding the allocation of tasks and adjustments to healthcare provision 
that do not imply a common exploitation.61  
  
49  Art. 8 Royal Decree  30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
50  Report to the King of the Royal Decree 25 April1997 houdende nadere 
omschrijving van de associatie van ziekenhuizen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moet voldoen, BS 18 June 1997. 
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Collaboration between acute, categorical or psychiatric hospitals 
Psychiatric hospitals and isolated Sp-services (specialised services for 
treatment and revalidation), alone or together with H-services (services for 
ordinary hospitalisation) or T-services (neuropsychiatry services for 
treatment of adult patients) do not fall under the scope of the royal decree.51 
Before 1997 the concept of ‘a group’ was often used as an opportunity for 
hospitals that did not comply with the minimum requirements of being a 
hospital (i.e. a minimum of 150 beds, having a C/D-service, another basic 
service, six basic functions and 24/7 medical on duty). This is no longer 
possible52 since each member of the group must comply with the norms 
regarding the minimum concept of a hospital (see below). 
Legal forms 
It is possible to create a new legal entity for a group. However, a group can 
also be based on a contract between hospitals. In such cases it is not 
necessary to create a different legal entity. 
Conditions of authorisation  
A group must comply with several conditions in order to be authorised:53 
 The hospitals in a group cannot be located more than 25 km away from 
each other. 
                                                     
51  Art. 2 Royal Decree 30 January1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
52  According to the amendment decree  6 May 1997 (BS 18 June 1997), 
annulled  by the Council of state (Judgement nr. 70502 of 23 December 1997, 
BS 26 February1998) and confirmed by the Decree of 21 January 1998 (BS 
7 March 1998); W. Vercruyssen, Basisbeginselen inzake 
ziekenhuiswetgeving, 2015-16, 205. 
53  Art. 9 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
 The hospitals in a group have to comply separately with certain norms 
regarding structure. The basic services must comply with the minimal 
bed capacity for each site. With the exception of isolated geriatric 
services (character G), each hospital must have: 
a. A minimum of 150 beds, not taking into account the beds in 
specialised services for treatment and revalidation (character Sp), 
intended for patients with psychogeriatric and chronic diseases and 
those intended for patients with an incurable disease in a terminal 
phase and in need of palliative care, whereby each theoretical 
place is considered as one bed. In case of a group or merger with 
an isolated G-service, the beds of this isolated service are not taken 
into account for determining the minimum number of beds.54 
 However, it is possible for a hospital to have a minimum of only 
120 beds not taking into account the beds of specialised 
services for treatment and revalidation (character Sp), 
intended for patients with psychogeriatric and chronic 
diseases and those intended for patients with an incurable 
disease in a terminal phase and in need of palliative care if the 
hospital is located in a town of 25 000 inhabitants or less and 
the nearest hospital (with the exception of psychiatric hospitals 
and isolated Sp services, alone or together with H-services or 
T-services  is located at least 15 km away).55 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
54  Art. 2, §1, 1° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
55  Art. 3, §1 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
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 Contrary to the previous rule, a hospital may have less than 
120 beds, if the nearest hospital of the same community is 
located at a distance of at least 50 km away (e.g. Sint 
Augustinus hospital at Veurne and Centre de Santé des 
Fagnes at Chimay).56 
b. The following types of hospital services: 
 a service where surgical activity as well as activity in the field 
of internal medical science is carried out (C/D service); 
 a geriatric service (character G) or a service for 
neuropsychiatric observation and treatment (character A) or a 
maternity department (character M) or a service for paediatrics 
(character E).57  
c. The following functions:  
 anaesthesiology; 
 radiology; 
o basic activities of clinical biology. Regarding the activities 
that go beyond the basic activity, it is sufficient that the 
                                                     
56  Art. 3, §2 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
57  Art. 2, §1, 2° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
58  Art. 2, §1, 3° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
hospital can invoke an entire extended function through a 
collaboration agreement; 
o revalidation; 
o basic activities of the hospital pharmacy. Regarding the 
activities that go beyond the basic activity, it is sufficient 
that the hospital can invoke an entire extended function 
through a collaboration agreement; 
o palliative care.58 
d. The following care programmes:  
 A care programme for basic oncology care if the hospital does 
not have an authorised care programme for oncology.59 
e. The permanent presence of a physician: 
 Each hospital with a maternity department (character M) must 
have a function for neonatal care (N*-function).60 
 Exceptions to points 2.a., 2.b. and 2.c. are allowed by the 
competent minister only for hospitals that have both surgical 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
59  Art. 2, §1, 4° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
60  Art. 2, §1, 5° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
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and medical activities solely for children or for the treatment of 
tumours.61   
 Homogeneity of group services must be guaranteed within two years 
after signing the group contract. If a hospital of the group has one or 
more types of services that have a bed capacity lower than 2/3 of the 
minimum required bed capacity, the beds of that type of service must 
be grouped at the same site. Moreover, the above mentioned basic 
services62 on each site must always comply with the minimal bed 
capacity for each service.63 
 In order to ensure good collaboration the hospitals must create a 
common medical committee and a coordination committee. The 
common medical committee is composed of the representatives of the 
different medical councils. A CMO-coordinator, a coordinator of the 
nursing department and a general coordinator are to be appointed. 
 The hospitals of the group must realise an efficient allocation of tasks 
to ultimately ensure that they are complementary. To achieve this aim 
a plan is needed. The plan must be sent to the competent minister. 
 Each decision for investment, creation of a new service or a new 
medical technical service by the hospitals of the group must be 
approved by the coordination committee. Without such approval no 
authorisation will be given. 
                                                     
61  Art. 2, §1bis Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
62  i.e. a service where surgical activity as activity in the field of internal medical 
science is carried out (C/D service) and a geriatric service (character G) or a 
service for neuropsychiatric observation and treatment (character A) or a 
maternity department (character M) or a service for pediatrics (character E).  
The administrators of the hospitals of the group should enter into a group 
agreement.64 This agreement must be approved by the competent minister.  
The group contract must deal at least with the following items: 
 The aim sought; 
 The legal form of the collaboration agreement; 
 The allocation of tasks concerning the provision of services and 
specialisms including the equipment; 
 The rationalisation that may follow from the allocation of tasks; 
 The creation, composition, the tasks and the functioning of the 
coordination committee; 
 The decisions of the board that may require the approval of the 
coordination committee; 
 The admissions and dismissal policy, the coordination of medical policy, 
the functioning of the medical staff and the organisation of the on duty 
medical personnel; 
 The organisation of common activities, if applicable; 
 The means that will be used for common activities as well as their 
administration and use; 
63  Art. 14 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
64  Art. 12, §1 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
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 Problems in terms of staffing linked to common activities as well as the 
transfer of the staff from one entity to another if applicable; 
 The rates and the modalities of the institutions in the group; 
 Financial agreements; 
 Insurance; 
 The regulation of disputes among parties; 
 The duration of the agreement and the means of termination, including 
the trial period, if applicable; 
 The nomination of the CMO-coordinator, the coordinator of the nursing 
department, the general coordinator and the composition of the 
common medical committee; 
 The way to achieve efficient allocation of tasks and complementarity. 
This is written in a plan.65 
Parties do enter into an agreement for at least ten years, unless the group 
leads to a merger before the end of that period.66 The trial period must be at 
least one year. The conditions for terminating the agreement must be at 
least two years before the end of the agreement. 
In conformity with art. 137, 12° of the Hospital Act of 10 July 2008, the board 
must ask the medical council to give its advice on the group agreement.67 
                                                     
65  Art. 12, §2 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
66  Art. 12, §3 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
The group agreement can be considered as an agreement with a third party 
that may have an effect on the medical activity in the hospital. 
Governance structures 
Medical council 
The common medical committee of the hospital group is composed of 
representatives of different medical councils. 
A CMO-coordinator, a coordinator for the nursing department and a general 
coordinator are appointed. These coordinators should attend the meetings 
of the coordination committee.  
Each hospital group has a coordination committee.68 The coordination 
committee is composed of representatives of the administrators of different 
hospitals of the group. The coordination committee complies with the 
requirements described in the group agreement. 
Coordination committee 
The coordination committee has at least the following tasks: 
 It supervises the execution of the group contract; 
 It should aim, through an allocation of tasks, to achieve the highest 
possible level of complementarity and to ameliorate the quality of 
healthcare; 
67  Art. 137, 12° Hospital Act 10 July 2008 states: ‘In the context of the purpose 
formulated in art. 136, the medical council provides advice to the 
administrator about the following matters: agreements with third parties that 
have an impact on the medical activity in the hospital.’ art. 138, §1 Hospital 
Act 10 July 2008 states: ‘In all the matters enumerated in art. 137, the 
administrator is obliged to obtain the advice of the medical council. […]’.    
68  Art. 13, §1 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
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 It should be consulted on all decisions regarding new buildings, 
extensions, rebuilding of hospitals, changes relating to the type of beds 
or of the services, taking into account the complementarity and the 
quality of healthcare, and;  
 It should meet several times a year and draft a yearly report. This report 
must be communicated to the minister having competence for the 
authorisation of hospitals.69 
Each decision regarding investment, the creation of new services or of new 
medico-technical services by the hospitals of the group, must be approved 
by the coordination committee. Without this decision no authorisation can 
be given. 
2.2.1.3 Merger of hospitals 
Definition and scope 
A merger of hospitals is the bringing together of two or more separate 
authorised hospitals (that may or may not be controlled by different boards 
of administrators) that are located at different sites, under one administrator 
with one single authorisation.70 A merger is the most far-reaching form of 
collaboration.62  
                                                     
69  Art. 13, §2 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
70  Art. 2 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de fusie 
van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, 
BS 5 July 1989. 
Collaboration between acute, categorical or psychiatric hospitals 
Psychiatric hospitals and isolated Sp-services (specialised services for 
treatment and revalidation), alone or together with H-services (services for 
ordinary hospitalisation) or T-services (services for neuropsychiatry for 
treatment of adult patients) do not fall under the scope of the royal decree 
of 31 May 1989 concerning mergers and the specific standards to which 
they must comply.71 They may merge but not on the basis of the articles of 
the royal decree of 31 May 1989. 
Given that binding guidance concerning the conditions of such a merger 
does not exist, mergers with psychiatric and specialist hospitals may lead to 
problems, for example concerning the authorisation.63 
Legal forms 
From a legal viewpoint several ways to merge hospitals exist. A legal entity 
may disappear, create another legal entity or absorb an existing legal 
entity.59 
Conditions of authorisation:  
Concerning the homogeneity of services art. 82 of the Hospital Act prevails 
that a hospital merger must always comply with several conditions in order 
to be authorised.72 
 The hospitals may not be located more than 35 km away from each 
other. This rule is however not absolute. Two exceptions are possible. 
Hospitals can be located more than 35 km from each other if there are 
no two acute care hospitals within 35 km. Moreover, hospitals can be 
more than 35 km from each other, if they belong to one group (since 
71  Art. 1 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de fusie 
van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, 
BS 5 July 1989. 
72  Art. 3 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de fusie 
van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, 
BS 5 July 1989. 
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1 December 1996). However, to be authorised as a group, the hospitals 
may not be located more than 25 km away from each other.73 From the 
reading of the abovementioned exception concerning the distance of 
mergers and the abovementioned rule concerning the distance of 
groups, it can be concluded that this second exception lacks any logical 
basis. 
 Homogeneity of the services must be realised within the merger. If a 
merged hospital has a hospital service dispersed over several sites, the 
beds of the service must be grouped on the same site if the bed capacity 
on one of the sites is lower than 2/3 of the required minimum capacity. 
However, the minimum capacity of 30 beds on each site suffices for a 
C/D service. The hospitals possess a transit period of two years after 
the signing of the merger agreement to comply with this requirement. 
 If the merged hospital has several similar hospital services spread over 
different sites, each service must separately comply with the existing 
authorisation norms. This applies notwithstanding the rules regarding 
homogeneity of services and minimum bed capacity. Hospitals involved 
in the merger must at least comply with the minimum concept.64 
There is at present no maximum limit of authorised beds of merged 
hospitals.74 The National Council for Hospitals Facilities was of the opinion 
that the maximum limit of beds was no longer required.75 The required 
                                                     
73  Art. 9, 1° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
74  This maximum limit was removed by the Royal Decree 17 September 2005 
to amendment of the Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere 
omschrijving van de fusie van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen 
waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 18 October 2005. 
75  Nationale Raad voor Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen, Eerste advies met betrekking 
tot de fusies 2005, Brussels 10 March 2005, 
http://www.health.belgium.be/eportal/Healthcare 
/Consultativebodies/Nationalcouncilforhospitalfaci/714739#.VsRQL7c5A_w.   
reduction of the amount of beds in the past in case of a merger has been 
abolished since it was an obstacle for collaboration.76,77 
The hospitals involved in the merger must jointly comply with the norms 
provided in the royal decree of 30 January 1989.78  
With the exception of the isolated geriatric services (character G) each 
(merged) hospital must have:    
 150 beds, not taking into account the beds in specialised services for 
treatment and revalidation (character Sp) intended for patients with 
psychogeriatric and chronic diseases and for patients with an incurable 
disease in a terminal phase and in need of palliative care whereby a 
theoretical place is considered as one bed. In case of a group of merger 
within an isolated G- service, the beds of this isolated service are not 
taken into account for determining the minimum amount of beds. 
 The following types of hospitals services: 
o a service where surgical activity as well as activity in the field of 
internal medical science is carried out (C/D service); 
o a geriatric service (character G) or a service for neuropsychiatric 
observation and treatment (character A) or a maternity department 
(character M) or a service for paediatrics (character E); 
76  Royal Decree 17 September 2005, BS 18 October 2005; Nationale Raad voor 
Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen, Eerste advies met betrekking tot de fusies 2005, 
Brussels 10 March 2005, http://www.health.belgium.be/eportal/Healthcare 
/Consultativebodies/Nationalcouncilforhospitalfaci/714739#.VsRQL7c5A_w.; 
S. Callens, M. Leire, L. Boddez, L. Van Leuven and J. Peers, ‘Het aanbod in 
de gezondheidszorg’, in S. Callens and J. Peers (eds.), Organisatie van de 
gezondheidszorg, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2015, 164.  
77  For the financial aspect regarding this reduction, see Durant, G, Le 
financement des hôpitaux en Belgique, Waterloo, Kluwer, 2010, 75 
78  Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
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 The following functions: 
o anaesthesiology; 
o radiology; 
o basic activities of clinical biology. Regarding the activities that go 
beyond the basic activity, it is sufficient that the hospital can invoke 
an entire extended function through a collaboration agreement;    
o revalidation;  
o basic activities of the hospital pharmacy. Regarding the activities 
that go beyond the basic activity, it is sufficient that the hospital can 
invoke an entire extended function through a collaboration 
agreement; 
o palliative care;79 
 The following care programmes: 
A care programme for basic oncology care if the hospital does not 
have an authorised care programme for oncology;80 
 The permanent presence of a physician. 
Each hospital with a maternity department (character M) must have a 
neonatal care capability (N*-function). 
                                                     
79  Art. 2, §1, 3° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
80  Art. 2, §1, 4° Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
A merger plan must be drafted by the administrators of the hospitals 
involved in the merger.81 The drafting of such a plan is obligatory. The 
merger plan must at least regulate the following items: 
o General aims of the merger, including:  
 The improvement of quality of care; 
 The rationalisation of the functioning and of the infrastructure 
of the hospital; The unity of the concept, the management and 
the organisation of the hospital. 
o The legal form of the merger; 
o The financial problems related to the merger; 
o A plan of realisation regarding: 
 The rationalisation associated with the merger; 
 The intermediate phases to achieve the aims of the merger, 
including the division of tasks between the different hospitals 
involved in the merger, concerning the offer of services and the 
specialisms, including the equipment; 
o The staffing problems associated with the merger; 
o The way in which the conditions concerning the homogeneity of the 
services within the merger will be complied with and the principle 
that (if the merged hospital has several similar hospital services 
spread over different sites) each service must separately comply 
with the existing authorisation norms. 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
81  Art. 6 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de fusie 
van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, 
BS 5 July1989. 
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The merger plan must contain a minimum content which is determined by 
the Hospital Act. This content is clearly related to the medical activity in the 
hospitals. Strictly speaking, the hospitals of a merger are still third parties in 
relation to each other, when they are drafting the merger plan.65 At that 
moment, the merger has not been authorised. 
The board of the hospitals must also ask their medical council to give an 
advice concerning the merger plan, since it concerns an agreement with a 
third party which has an impact on the medical activities at the hospital.82 It 
concerns an advice of the medical council as referred to in art. 137, 12° of 
the Hospital Act of 10 July 2008. This advice does not bind the 
administrators of the hospitals, unless otherwise provided in the general 
regulation document of the hospital containing the rights and obligations of 
the administrators and the hospital physicians. 
Governance structures 
The merger plan must be drawn up in such a way that there is one 
administrator, one CEO, one CMO, one head of the nursing department and 
one medical council for all the hospitals involved in the merger.83 The merger 
plan must be submitted to the minister responsible for the authorisation of 
hospitals. A copy of the plan must also be submitted to the Federal Minister 
of Health.84 
                                                     
82  Art. 137, 12° Hospital Act 10 July 2008 states: ‘In the context of the purpose 
formulated in art. 136, the medical council provides advice to the 
administrator about the following matters: agreements with third parties that 
have an impact on the medical activity in the hospital.’; art. 138, §1 Hospital 
Act 10 July 2008 states: ‘In all the matters enumerated in Art. 137, the 
administrator is obliged to obtain the advice of the medical council. […]’. 
2.2.2 Types of collaboration between hospitals and other care 
providers that are authorised by the competent minister 
2.2.2.1 Collaboration on the basis of Art. 11 of the Hospital Act 
Increasingly, collaboration between different institutions has become 
necessary to make healthcare safer, more efficient and more affordable. 
Hospitals create a chain with other healthcare providers. In this way 
healthcare professionals that are few in number can be used in a broader 
collaboration.59 Various healthcare stakeholders think that hospitals should 
better position themselves in collaboration initiatives.66 
The collaboration between institutions and the development of 
collaborations was emphasised in the Flemish and in the federal 
Government Declaration of 2014. The objective of the politicians was to start 
from the existing structures.59 KCE emphasizes in its report of 201437 the 
importance of collaborations, which do not have to be limited to hospitals 
only. According to the KCE strategic care programmes by geographical 
area, based on the needs of the population and the financial resources 
allocated by public authorities, should be important factors in the scope in 
which healthcare providers can deploy their offer. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve a reduction of the number of acute beds, the centralisation of highly 
specialised, complex or expensive care, and care organised in 
collaborations per care zone, over all hospitals and other care providers.59  
  
83  Art. 6, §3 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de 
fusie van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 5 July1989. 
84  Art. 6, §4 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de 
fusie van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 5 July 1989. 
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Definition and scope 
The collaboration aims to provide for patients care circuits associated with 
the main focus of the collaboration in the context of a legally formalised 
collaboration agreement. Care circuits are generally offered in a specific 
geographic zone. 
Collaboration between acute, categorical or psychiatric hospitals 
Clinical collaborations emphasise the curative aspect of care and 
acknowledge the need to evolve towards a reallocation of tasks and a 
differentiated practice between hospitals. Task agreements are made 
between general hospitals providing basic care and/or specialised care, 
revalidation centres and psychiatric hospitals, in order to provide a 
complementary care offer in a collaboration. Within the clinical collaboration 
hospitals can offer a broad range of acute hospital services (C, D, E, M etc.), 
or (partially) opt for the expansion of niche services. It is possible that a 
hospital, for certain complex, expensive or rare pathologies may participate 
in multiple collaborations. The ultimate goal is to have a good spread of 
hospitals, hospital services and medical-technical equipment. This requires 
not only regional hospitals to cooperate with other hospitals in the same 
region, but also supra-regional collaboration for rare and/or complex 
treatments.59, 67 
LEGAL FORMS 
These are healthcare professionals, institutions and services, 1) which do 
not fall under the competence of the authorities referred to in articles 128, 
130 or 135 of the Constitution and 2) which jointly offer one or more care 
circuits as part of an agreement of legal collaboration within and outside 
institutions for a target group of patients in a geographic area to be defined 
and chosen by them.  
                                                     
85  Royal Decree of 15 February 1999 tot vaststelling van de lijst van 
zorgprogramma's zoals bedoeld in artikel 12 van de gecoördineerde wet van 
10 juli 2008 op de ziekenhuizen en andere verzorgingsinrichtingen en tot 
aanduiding van de artikelen van de gecoördineerde wet van 10 juli 2008 op 
de ziekenhuizen en andere verzorgingsinrichtingen die op hen van 
The care circuit is defined as all care programmes and other healthcare 
facilities, which do not fall under the competence of the authorities referred 
in articles 128, 130 or 135 of the Constitution and are organised through a 
collaboration of healthcare facilities and that can be followed by the target 
group or target subgroup.  
To understand the concept of circuits of care, it is necessary to refer to the 
concept of care programmes. Art. 12 of the Hospital Act defines the concept 
of care programme. This is actually a Royal Decree of 15 February 199985 
which sets the list of care programmes referred to in art. 12 of the Hospital 
Act. The Royal Decree of 15 February 1999 issued under art. 12 of the 
Hospital Act considers the following care programmes: reproductive 
medicine, cardiac pathology, oncology, paediatric care programme, geriatric 
care programmes and care for stroke patients. 86 The King stipulates for 
each care programme the target group, the type and content of care, the 
minimum level of activity, the infrastructure needed, the expertise and 
medical and non-medical staff required, the quality standards and standards 
relating to the quality monitoring, the micro-economic criteria and the criteria 
for geographic accessibility.87 
In Belgium, the concept of collaborations is built around these care 
programmes. However the collaboration is not necessarily built around a 
care programme as for example is the case for the collaborations for rare 
diseases which are built around a specific disease (function or reference 
centre). There are already clinical collaborations that are regulated by 
different Royal Decrees on the basis of art. 11 of the Hospital Act. This is 
toepassing zijn, B.S. 25 March 1999 ( hereinafter referred to as « Royal 
Decree of 15 February 1999 ») 
86  Art. 1er of the Royal Decree of 15 February 1999 
87  Art. 12, §2, of the Hospital Act  
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the case for collaborations for cardiac pathology88, paediatric care89, care for 
stroke patients 90 and rare diseases.91 There are therefore currently four 
types of collaborations in Belgium. 
Conditions of authorisation 
The conditions of authorisation for the care covered by the collaboration are 
specific for each collaboration. It is therefore important to refer to the specific 
rules of each to know the conditions of authorisation. 
With the exception of the 'rare diseases' collaboration, it must be noted that 
the conditions of authorisation require the inclusion of hospitals in the 
collaboration that have the care programme related to the activity concerned 
by the collaboration. Therefore, in addition to the authorisation requirements 
mentioned in the regulation of collaborations, it is also important to refer to 
the regulation of each healthcare programme.  
A care provider can also participate in multiple collaborations within the area 
covered by the collaboration. In any case, the care provider must have the 
opportunity to participate in the collaboration that exists within its area if the 
care provider meets the conditions.  
                                                     
88  Royal Decree of 12 June 2012 tot vaststelling van de erkenningsnormen voor 
het netwerk 'cardiale pathologie', BS 15 June 2012 (hereinafter referred as 
‘Royal Decree of 12 June 2012’) 
89  Royal Decree of 2 April 2014 houdende vaststelling van de 
erkenningsnormen voor het netwerk ‘pediatrie’, BS 18 April 2014 (hereinafter 
referred as ‘Royal Decree of 2 April 2014’) 
90  Royal Decree of 19 April 2014 tot vaststelling van de erkenningsnormen voor 
het netwerk `beroertezorg', BS 8 Augustus 2014 (hereinafter referred as 
‘Royal Decree of 19 April 2014’) 
Conditions of authorisation for the ‘cardiac pathology’ collaboration 
The cardiac pathology collaboration aims to provide care circuits, in a 
specific area, for patients with heart disease, as part of an agreement of 
intra- and extramural legal collaboration.  
The cardiac pathology collaboration can offer different care circuits, but must 
in any case offer at least a circuit of care for patients with acute myocardial 
infarction with ST-elevation (STEMI heart attack). This care circuit must 
meet the norms laid down by the Royal Decree to ensure that in case of an 
emergency or if a patient is in a hospital only with limited care programme 
cardiac pathology, the patient can be quickly referred to a hospital with a 
more completed care programme cardiac pathology and accompanied to 
the cardiac catheterization laboratory.92 
The collaboration must include hospitals with care programmes cardiac 
pathology A, B ,P, E, T and C or partial programmes B1 and B2.93 The 
collaboration must furthermore also include hospitals with a function medical 
emergency care unit (‘MUG’/’SMUR’) and circles of general practitioners 
(GPs).94 The care providers must be located in the area covered by the 
collaboration. If the area covered by the collaboration does not provide the 
services mentioned above, the collaboration will have to conclude a 
collaboration agreement with one or more of these care providers.  
Each care provider located in the area covered by the collaboration should 
have the opportunity to participate in the collaboration. A care provider can 
also be part of multiple collaborations.  
91  Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 tot vaststelling van de erkenningsnormen voor 
het netwerk `zeldzame ziekten' BS 8 Augustus 2014 (hereinafter referred as 
‘Royal Decree of 25 April 2014’) 
92  Art. 2, of the Royal Decree of 12 June 2012  
93  Royal Decree of 15 July 2004 houdende vaststelling van de normen waaraan 
de zorgprogramma's ‘cardiale pathologie’ moeten voldoen om erkend te 
worden, B.S. 13 September 2004 
94  Art. 3 of the Royal Decree of 12 June 2012 
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Conditions of authorisation for the ‘paediatric’ collaboration 
The ‘paediatric’ collaboration aims to provide, in a specific area, care 
circuits, as defined in articles 11, §1, 2°, of the Hospital Act, to children under 
15 years old, as part of a legal collaboration agreement.   
The ‘paediatric’ collaboration must at least offer a severe trauma care circuit, 
an acute renal failure care circuit, an acute liver failure care circuit, a cardio- 
respiratory failure and an intracranial hypertension care circuit.95  
The collaboration is composed of hospitals that have as a minimum a basic 
healthcare programme for children, a specialised care programme for 
children and a tertiary referral programme for children. For each hospital with 
a basic care programme or a specialised care programme in the 
collaboration, the nearest tertiary care programme is also part of the same 
collaboration to ensure a quick and effective transport of critically ill children. 
The collaboration must also contain hospitals with a local (N*- function), an 
intensive neonatal unit46 and hospitals which do not have a paediatric care 
programme. Paediatricians that are not linked to a hospital and circles of 
GPs may also join the collaboration. 
If the area covered by the collaboration does not have any of the above care 
providers, the collaboration must conclude a collaboration agreement with 
one or more of these care providers.  
Conditions of authorisation of the ‘stroke care’ collaboration 
The ‘stroke care’ collaboration aims to provide care circuits in a specific 
area, to patients suffering from an acute stroke, as part of a collaboration 
agreement legally formalised between different institutions. 
The collaboration must at least offer a care circuit designed for patients 
suffering from an acute ischemic stroke and an acute haemorrhagic stroke. 
                                                     
95  Art. 2 of the Royal Decree of 2 April 2014  
96  Art. 2 of the Royal Decree of 19 April 2014  
97  Art. 3 of the Royal Decree of 19 April 2014 
The conditions are set by the Royal Decree and are mainly concerned with 
the organisation of transfer of patients.96 
The collaboration must include hospitals with an authorisation for a basic 
‘stroke care’ programme and hospitals with an authorisation for a specialised 
care programme ‘stroke care relating to acute brain involving invasive 
procedures’ and a hospital with an authorised mobile emergency unit.97 The 
collaboration may also include hospitals without specific authorisation in this 
regard and circles of GPs.  
Conditions of authorisation for a ‘rare diseases’ collaboration 
The ‘rare diseases’ collaboration aims to provide care circuits to patients 
with rare diseases as part of a legally formalised collaboration agreement. 
A rare disease is a disease that involves life-threatening and/or which 
causes chronic disability, and whose prevalence is less than 5/10 000 
inhabitants.98 
The collaboration includes a care circuit which at a minimum ensures that 
patients with a rare disease are treated and followed by the most appropriate 
‘rare disease’ function or, provided that these centres have been designated, 
by the most appropriate expertise centre of 'rare diseases'. 
The collaboration must include general hospitals that are not authorised to 
provide a function ‘rare disease’ or a 'rare diseases' centre of expertise and 
hospitals with these functions and / or centre of expertise. The collaboration 
must also include human genetic centres. Circles of GPs can also be part of 
these collaborations.  
A ‘rare disease’ function needs to participate to the appropriate collaboration 
in order to be authorised.99 
 
98  Art. 1 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2014  
99  Art. 18 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 
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Governance structures 
The clinical collaborations have a similar management structure. There is 
always a coordinator, the creation of a consultative committee, the redaction 
of a quality manual, an agreement on the (re)referral of patients, and finally, 
the awareness of healthcare providers.59  
Role of the coordinator 
A coordinator should be appointed according to the conditions provided in 
the legal collaboration agreement formulated by the different care providers 
in the collaboration. He is responsible for organising and coordinating the 
activities of the collaboration in agreement with the participating care 
providers. For the collaboration ‘care of the acute stroke’, it is a medical 
coordinator and specialist in neurology designated according to the 
conditions established in the collaboration agreement.100 
Consultation committee 
The collaboration must also have a consultation committee composed of 
representatives of each of the participating care providers and designated 
according to the terms of the collaboration agreement. Depending on the 
activity concerned by the collaboration, this consultation committee will have 
different tasks:  
 It must always ensure the enforcement of the collaboration agreement 
and take the necessary initiatives to improve the quality of care. In 
particular, agreements should be concluded regarding transfers and re-
transfers of patients and to develop methods to jointly monitor the 
processes and the quality of such transfers. It must conduct regular 
consultations with care providers involved in this activity. The 
consultation committee also aims to support healthcare providers in 
creating a multidisciplinary quality manual. Basic structures for 
multidisciplinary quality manuals were defined for oncology68 and 
cardiac care.69 
                                                     
100  Art. 4 of the Royal Decree of 19 April 2014  
 The consultation committee is expected to meet at least once a year in 
order to fulfil its duties.  
2.2.2.2 Collaboration on the basis of article 10 of the Hospital Act 
Definition and Scope 
On the basis of article 10 of the Hospital Act, collaboration between hospitals 
and other care services can be authorised. Certain articles of the Hospital 
Act are relevant to these collaborations. The special thing of this 
collaboration is that collaboration is possible in fields other than typical care 
domains. Such collaboration already exists in the domain of psychiatric care, 
palliative care and the removal and transplantation of organs. The Royal 
Decree of 10 July 1990 provides the norms for the authorisation of 
collaboration of psychiatric institutions and services.101 A particular 
collaboration must aim either for the creation and the management of 
sheltered accommodation or a so called ‘consultation platform’. 
Collaboration between acute, categorical or psychiatric hospitals 
The collaboration must include at least a general hospital that has a neuro-
psychiatry service for observation and treatment (character A) or a 
psychiatric hospital and a service or centre for psychiatric care. The 
collaboration includes a written agreement that has to be approved by the 
competent authority. Moreover, the collaboration must be created through a 
not-for-profit association or an association as provided in article 118 of the 
Act of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare (‘OCMW’/’CPAS’). Art. 
1 §2 of the Royal Decree on the Conditions to be fulfilled by an 
‘ombudsfunction’ in Hospitals provides that such collaboration can take 
place through the conclusion of a written collaboration agreement between 
the hospitals. Moreover, it is provided in article 1, § 3 of the Royal Decree of 
8 July 2003 that psychiatric hospitals can comply with article 11 of the Act 
on patient rights (i.e. the right for a patient to file a complaint related to his 
rights before a competent ombudsman) through the ombudsman of a 
101  Royal Decree of 10 July 1990 houdende vaststelling van de normen voor de 
erkenning van samenwerkingsverbanden van psychiatrische instellingen en 
diensten, BS, 26 July 1990 
 KCE Report 277 Governance models for hospital collaborations 37 
 
collaboration of psychiatric institutions and services as consultation platform 
as mentioned in the Royal Decree of 10 July 1990.  
Legal Forms 
The Royal Decree of 19 June 1997 lays down the norms to which 
collaboration for palliative care must comply with in order to be authorised.102 
The collaboration must cover a geographic zone (territorially separated) 
consisting of between 200 000 and 1 000 000 inhabitants and each 
Community must have at least one collaboration. One of the aims of the 
collaboration is to provide information and boost awareness amongst the 
population. Others include updating knowledge on palliative care for 
physicians, nurses and paramedics etc. Organisations tasked with helping 
families and patients with palliative care, organisations of home care, local 
or regional organisations of GPs and other care providers, elderly homes 
and hospitals can be part of a collaboration. The written agreement of the 
collaboration must be approved by the competent public authority. The 
collaboration must have a coordinator and a committee with members 
representing the parties to the collaboration. 
Collaboration concerning the removal and transplantation of organs is 
regulated by the Royal Decree of 10 November 2012.103 To be authorised, 
such collaboration must include at least the categories ‘local donor 
coordination’, transplantations centres, care programmes ‘heart and heart 
lung transplantation’ T-services, functions specialised in emergency care, 
functions for intensive care, clinical laboratories where Human Leukocyte 
Antigen (HLA) -tests are performed and centres for the treatment of chronic 
renal failure. Such collaboration requires a written agreement, a coordinator 
and a committee with the members representing the parties to the 
collaboration. 
                                                     
102  Royal Decree of 19 June 1997 houdende vaststelling van de normen waaraan 
een samenwerkingsverband inzake palliatieve zorg moet voldoen om te 
worden erkend, BS 28 June 1997 
2.2.2.3 Collaboration on the basis of Art. 107 of the Hospital Act 
Definition and scope 
Art. 107 of the Hospital Act provides that the King may make specific 
financing arrangements to allow, on an experimental basis and for a limited 
time, a prospective financing of care circuits and collaborations, focusing on 
care programmes. This possibility allows a reallocation of existing financial 
resources to develop care circuits and collaborations. It is a financial 
technique that allows the reallocation of part of the BFM so that resources 
and manpower can be devoted to a specific area of work in order to adapt 
the current supply of care.70 
Based on this article, many projects have been established in psychiatric 
care. Art. 63 §2 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 on the fixing and the 
liquidation of the BFM allows the conclusion of agreements within the 
framework of pilot projects with psychiatric hospitals in particular to allow the 
implementation of article 107 of the Hospital Act. 
Regarding the projects in the context of mental healthcare, we see in 
practice that this allows part of the healthcare staff of hospital psychiatric 
services to create a mobile team that can operate to provide home care to 
patients rather than in a hospital. Such a situation risks challenging 
compliance with authorisation standards in hospitals, especially in terms of 
personnel. It is therefore necessary to adapt the Royal Decree of 23 October 
1964 with a provision allowing for hospitals that have been selected to 
participate in a project under article 107 so that the staffing standards for A- 
and T-services apply at the level of the institution and not at the hospital 
service level.71 
103  Royal Decree of 10 November 2012 tot vaststelling van de erkenningsnormen 
voor het samenwerkingsverband ‘wegneming en transplantatie van organen’, 
BS 23 November 2012 
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2.2.3 Types of collaboration between or with hospitals that are 
not legally authorised by the competent minister   
Many hospitals have so-called informal agreements with other hospitals that 
have not been authorised by the competent minister. These collaborations 
have different functions including the referral of patients, supporting 
specialists from other hospitals, the purchase of medical products through 
public procurement, the exchange of information, the support of information 
and communication technology (ICT), the sharing of trainees, etc.   
The type of collaboration may differ in description and may range from two 
hospitals to a collaboration of many hospitals. The collaboration may be 
based upon a contract or may be conducted through a legal entity, such as 
a not-for-profit association.  
2.2.3.1 Holdings: including extra-muros surgery centres 
Some hospitals may form a hospital holding. The holding is not regulated by 
the Hospital Act. It refers to the situation whereby independent units are 
governed by a common board.72 The authorisation numbers of the 
independent units are maintained. Specialised medical care, including 
surgery is not only practiced in hospitals. More and more surgery is 
performed by external surgery centres, for instance external eye surgery 
centres.104 These centres do not fall within the definition of a ‘hospital’ in the 
sense of the Hospital Act and do not have the legal obligation to comply with 
the authorisation and norms applicable to authorise hospitals.73 Certain 
external centres, such as external eye surgery centres are able to obtain 
surgery room authorisation certificates. The certificate guarantees 
compliance with the norms predefined by the Belgian working group for 
extramural eye surgery.73 This working group was set up by the Belgian 
Society for Cataract and Refractive Surgeons, the Belgian Professional 
                                                     
104  Extramural centres are private for-profit clinics. 
105  Id. 21.  
106  Art. 20, eerste lid Wet 10 May 2015 betreffende de uitoefening van de 
gezondheidszorgberoepen, BS 18 June 2015. 
Association for Ophthalmologists and the Ophthalmologic Trade Union. The 
conformity assessment is carried out by an independent institution (National 
Institute of Health (ISS), accredited by the Belgian Accreditation 
Organisation) specialised in hygiene and expertise.105  
In order to take into account the situation of these external centres or private 
clinics, the physician or dentist may be authorised to keep a deposit of 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices and so to purchase pharmaceuticals 
and implants, in either a pharmacy open to the public or a hospital 
pharmacy.106 Nevertheless, this physician or dentist can only deliver the 
pharmaceuticals or implants in the context of a medical act. The physician 
must also sign an agreement with the holder of an authorisation for a 
pharmacy open to the public or a hospital pharmacy.107 
2.3 Facilitators and obstacles to collaborate  
In this section we will analyse varying viewpoints on whether the common 
legal forms of collaboration are able to create regional and/or supra-regional 
collaboration initiatives based on law expert viewpoints. Legally speaking, 
the word ‘regional’ refers to one of the three national regions. Belgium has 
three regions, i.e. the Flemish Region, the Brussels Capital Region and the 
Walloon Region. The Regions normally refer to economic topics. 
Competence for healthcare is however vested with the Federal State and 
the Communities (and not the Regions). In terms of Communities there 
exists the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-
speaking Community. The concept of ‘Community’ refers to persons that 
make up a community and the bond that unifies them, namely their language 
and culture. In some reports on regional hospital collaborations, reference 
is made to a care area and within this care area a certain type of 
(specialised) services must be available within a certain response time (e.g. 
30 minutes).  References in this section to ‘regions’ and ‘regional’ are used 
107  Art. 20, eerste lid Wet 10 May 2015 betreffende de uitoefening van de 
gezondheidszorgberoepen, BS 18 June 2015; art. 8 Act 10 May 2015 
betreffende de uitoefening van de gezondheidszorgberoepen, BS 18 June 
2015. 
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to refer to these care areas but also to larger areas, such as ‘communities’. 
The word supra-regional will be used in the context of collaborations with 
hospitals located in different care areas, not excluding hospitals located in 
different Communities or different Member States of the European Union 
(EU). 
It is necessary to evaluate the facilitators and obstacles of current legislation 
in order to divide the care landscape into collaborations. The analysis below 
looks at the legislation on the legal forms of collaboration of hospitals but 
also at other legislation that can facilitate or hinder collaboration between 
hospitals. When analysing the facilitators and obstacles, we mainly focus on 
governance and in particular on the direct and indirect aspects of 
governance. With the direct aspects we refer to the way the collaboration is 
governed by committees, the way hospital physicians are involved in 
decision making of/for the collaboration, the position of the hospital 
physician working in a collaboration of hospitals etc. With indirect aspects of 
governance we refer e.g. to certain issues of external accountability5 like the 
processing of data, the ombudsfunction, etc.  
2.3.1 Facilitators to collaborate within the current legal framework 
2.3.1.1 Facilitators created by the current legal forms of 
collaboration strictly related to governance  
Coordinator and coordinating committees 
The current legislation provides the obligation to organise the collaboration 
between hospitals by the creation of coordinating committees and 
coordinators. These committees and coordinators can make a collaboration 
between hospitals much easier.  
In the case of an association of hospitals or a group of hospitals, the 
participating hospitals must create a coordinating committee (article 10 
Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 for the association and article 13, §1, of the 
Royal Decree of 30 January 1989 for the group of hospitals). This committee 
is composed of the administrators appointed by each participating hospital. 
The agreement concluded between the participating hospitals must describe 
the exact composition, the tasks and functioning of the committee. Each 
association or group of hospitals must also appoint a general coordinator 
who is responsible for organising and coordinating the administrative 
activities in collaboration with the participating hospitals CEOs. When 
hospitals decide to merge, there must be one board and one CEO (Art. 6, 
§3 of the Royal Decree of 31 May 1989). 
Involvement of physicians via medical councils 
Common medical committee for different hospitals 
After a hospital merger, a medical council must be established on the basis 
of elections. The creation of the medical council in the context of a merger 
must guarantee that the different disciplines and sites are represented in the 
new medical council in a proportionate way.  
It is possible however under the existing act, to create a common medical 
committee of two hospitals that are not yet merged. If hospitals work closely 
together, e.g. in a ‘group’, there is the possibility to create one medical 
council for the two hospitals. Art. 5, § 6 of the Royal Decree of 10 August 
1987 provides that in case of different collaborating hospitals, the board and 
the medical staff may send a common and concurrent request at the Joint 
Committee Hospital Administrators and Hospital Physicians at the Federal 
Health Department to organise elections for one single medical council. In 
deciding whether to consent to this request the Commission will look at the 
integration of governance structures and of the medical activities in the 
hospitals.  
Involvement of a medical council before signing a collaboration 
agreement 
The different classic types of collaboration, such as the ‘group’ and the 
‘association’ foresee the creation of a medical council. 
It follows from article 137, 12° of the Hospital Act that medical councils give 
an opinion where its hospital enters into agreement with another party that 
may have an impact on the medical activities. Unless otherwise provided in 
the General Rules of Rights and Obligations of Hospital Administrators and 
Hospital Physicians, the opinion is non-reinforced for the hospital 
administrator. This is why this topic can also be considered an obstacle. The 
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advice of the medical council is indeed for the administrator not a reinforced 
opinion. 
Votes and activities in different hospitals 
For the first elections in the merger of hospitals, a physician gets a number 
of votes in relation to his activities in the hospital. If he does not work fulltime 
or exclusively in the hospital, the physician will have less votes (see further). 
However, in case of activities in hospitals which were regrouped in a hospital 
merger, the activities are counted together in order to determine the total 
activity (and the total number of votes).108  
CMOs and heads of medical services can work in different hospitals of 
the collaboration 
The CMO and the head of a medical department have to work exclusively in 
the hospital. However, this rule does not apply if they work in several 
hospitals in a group of hospitals.109  Within a ‘group’, the CMO can practice 
his function as a fulltime job or with a part-time job together with other 
functions in the hospitals of the group.110 
Freedom of care providers to participate in collaborations 
In the current regulation of collaborations, each care provider (specifically 
defined by the relevant Royal Decrees) is free to participate in collaborations 
created within its area of practice. Care providers are also in principle free 
to join multiple collaborations. 
                                                     
108  Art. 2, §4 Royal Decree 10 August 1987 tot vaststelling van de regels met 
betrekking tot de samenstelling en de werking van de medische raad in 
uitvoering van de artikelen 24, 25 en 26 van de wet van 23 december 1963 
op de ziekenhuizen, BS 18 August 1987.  
Flexibility of legal form 
The legislator does not provide for a specific structure of a ‘group’, ‘merger’ 
or ‘association’. The form in each case is created by the drafting of an 
agreement59 or by the creation of a legal entity, accompanying the drafting 
of an agreement. The type of legal entity is not specified, although the most 
common legal form is a not-for-profit association. 
No exclusivity 
One of the advantages of an association is the fact that exclusivity is not 
required. A hospital may participate in several associations.58 In case of a 
merger or a group of hospitals, the participating hospitals have to restrain of 
collaboration with hospitals or hospital services being a third party according 
to the collaboration.  
Different parties to the collaboration 
Certain legal forms provide a broad scope of participation to the 
collaboration. An ‘association’ has the advantage of having a wide scope, 
so it is possible that acute, specialist or psychiatric hospitals are able to form 
an association.58 
With regard to collaborations, article 11 of the Hospital Act defines the 
‘collaboration of care providers’ as a set of care providers, healthcare 
professionals, institutions and services (which do not fall under the 
competence of the authorities referred to in articles 128, 130 or 135 of 
the Constitution) and which jointly offer one or more care circuits as part of 
an agreement of legal collaboration within and outside institutions for a 
109   Art. 7 en 17 Royal Decree of 15 December 1987 houdende uitvoering van de 
artikels 13 tot en met 17 van de wet op de ziekenhuizen, as coordinated by 
the Royal Decree 7 August 1987. 
110  Art. 8 Royal Decree of 15 December 1987 houdende uitvoering van de 
artikels 13 tot en met 17 van de wet op de ziekenhuizen, as coordinated bythe 
Royal Decree 7 August 1987, BS 25 December 1987. 
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target group of patients in a geographic area defined by the institutions 
concerned. 
2.3.1.2 Other facilitators created by law 
Hospital pharmacy 
To be recognised as a hospital there must be a basic activity of the hospital 
pharmacy.111 A hospital pharmacy must meet some architectonical 
standards.112 The hospital should form a functional unit which must be so 
located that it is easily accessible and that the distribution and supply of 
medicines can run smoothly and the hospital pharmacy must have a certain 
surface.74 
In a ‘group’ it is possible to organise a collaboration amongst the hospitals 
to have a more efficient function of the hospital pharmacy for the following 
topics: 
 the compounding of medicinal products, the packaging of medicinal 
products and the sterilization of medical products; 
 the analysis and control of the quality of substances and medicinal 
products; 
 the buying of medicinal products, and; 
 the medico-pharmaceutical information.113 
                                                     
111  Royal Decree of 4 March 1991 houdende vaststelling van de normen 
waaraan een ziekenhuisapotheek moet voldoen om te worden erkend, BS 
23 March 1991, err., BS 30 April 1991. 
112  Royal Decree of 4 March 1991 houdende vaststelling van de normen 
waaraan een ziekenhuisapotheek moet voldoen om te worden erkend, BS 
23 March 1991, err., BS 30 April 1991. 
Moreover, it is possible, within a group of hospitals, to create an ‘on-duty’ 
system to guarantee the continuity of care.114 
An association of hospitals can also organise an association of the hospital 
pharmacy.115  
Art. 107 of the Hospital Act – agreements 
Art. 107 of the Hospital Act provides that the King may make specific 
financing arrangements to allow, on an experimental basis and for a limited 
time, a prospective financing of care circuits and collaborations, focusing on 
care programmes. This possibility allows a reallocation of existing financial 
resources to develop care circuits and collaborations. It is a financial 
mechanism that allows the reallocation of part of the BFM so that resources 
and manpower can be devoted to a specific area of work in order to adapt 
the current supply of care.70 
Many projects have taken place in psychiatric care based on this article. Art. 
63 §2 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 on the Fixing and the Liquidation 
of the BFM permits the conclusion of agreements within the framework of 
pilot projects with psychiatric hospitals, in particular to allow the 
implementation of article 107 of the Hospital Act. 
  
113  Art. 23, §1 Royal Decree 4 March 1991 houdende vaststelling van de normen 
waaraan een ziekenhuisapotheek moet voldoen om te worden erkend, BS 
23 March 1991, err., BS 30 April 1991. 
114  Art. 13, §1 en §2 Royal Decree 4 March 1991 houdende vaststelling van de 
normen waaraan een ziekenhuisapotheek moet voldoen om te worden 
erkend, BS 23 March 1991, err., BS 30 April 1991. 
115  National Council of the hospitals, Tweede advies inzake 
‘ziekenhuisassociaties’, 9 January 1997 
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Common ethics committee in a group 
Each hospital must have a local ethics committee.116 In the case of an 
authorised hospital group, a common ethics committee can be created for 
all the hospitals of the group, or separate ethics committees can be created 
for each hospital. All hospitals in a group may therefore have an ethics 
committee. This is provided in the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964. This is 
notable when viewed from the context of Regulation n° 536/2014 on clinical 
trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directive 
2001/20/EC. This is because article 9.1 of the Regulation provides that 
Member States shall ensure that the persons validating and assessing the 
application do not have conflicts of interest, are independent of the sponsor, 
of the clinical trial site, the investigators involved and of persons financing 
the clinical trial, as well as free of any other undue influence. In order to 
guarantee independence and transparency, Member States must ensure 
that persons assessing the application falling under Parts I and II of the 
assessment report have no financial or personal interests which could affect 
their impartiality. These persons must make an annual declaration of their 
financial interests. In the case of a committee working for a group, it is easier 
to comply with article 9 of the Regulation n° 536/2014. 
A common ombudsfunction for collaborating hospitals 
Art. 71 of the Hospital Act provides that to be authorised, every hospital must 
have a mediation function. Such a function can be shared between hospitals 
under the conditions described by the King.   
Art. 1 §2 of the Royal Decree on the conditions to be fulfilled by an 
‘ombudsfunction’ in hospitals provides that such collaboration can take place 
through the conclusion of a written collaboration agreement between the 
hospitals. Moreover, it is provided in article 1, § 3 of the Royal Decree of 8 
July 2003 that psychiatric hospitals can comply with article 11 of the Act on 
                                                     
116  Annex A.III., 9°ter Royal Decree 23 October 1964 tot bepaling van de normen 
die door de ziekenhuizen en hun diensten moeten worden nageleefd, BS 7 
November 1964. 
patient rights (i.e. the right for a patient to file a complaint related to his rights 
before a competent ombudsman) through the ombudsfunction of a 
collaboration of psychiatric institutions and services as consultation platform 
as mentioned in the Royal Decree of 10 July 1990.  
The purchasing of medicines via a central purchasing body centre or 
framework agreements 
There exist in the current legislation on public procurement opportunities to 
facilitate the purchase of pharmaceuticals by several hospitals. This may be 
the case via a central purchasing or via the use of a framework agreement. 
A framework agreement is an agreement between one or more contracting 
authorities and one or more economic operators, the purpose of which is to 
establish the terms governing contracts to be awarded during a given period, 
in particular with regard to price and, where appropriate, the quantity 
envisaged.117 To conclude a framework agreement, the contracting 
authorities use the normal procedures and consequently the normal rules 
apply– with modifications depending on the procedure chosen-, in particular 
concerning publicity, time limits, criteria for exclusion, selection and 
award.118 The duration of framework agreements is in principle limited to four 
years. According to Casteleyn75 the framework agreement is particularly 
useful to conclude a procurement in a short term and at the most 
advantageous conditions of the time assignments. Indeed, once the 
framework agreement is concluded, the conclusion of a part-procurement 
can take place very quickly because it is no more necessary to follow an 
entirely new procurement procedure. In addition, the part-procurement will 
be awarded to the best conditions of the moment, since it is possible for the 
economic operators who were admitted to the framework agreement still to 
question. 
117  Art. 3, 15° of the Act of 15 June 2006 on public procurements, B.S.  15 
February 2007 
118  European Commission, Explanatory Note – Framework agreements – classic 
directive, Brussels, 14.7.2005, CC/2005/03_rev 1 
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Another possibility to make the purchasing between hospitals easier is the 
central purchasing body. This is a contracting authority which acquires 
supplies and/or services intended for contracting authorities, or awards 
public contracts or concludes framework agreements for works, supplies or 
services intended for contracting authorities.119 The central purchasing body 
is a contracting authority in its own120 which must respect the procurement 
procedures in order to conclude a procurement.121 
eHealth makes information collaborations easier 
The current eHealth platform Act of 2008122 does not oppose the creation of 
information collaborations, which are at present progressively structured into 
five major collaborations in Belgium, each with a server or ‘hub’ for data 
exchange:123 
 The Collaboratief Zorgplatform (CoZo) 
 The Antwerpse Regionale Hub (ARH) 
 The Vlaams Ziekenhuisnetwerk KU Leuven 
 The Abrumet 
 The Réseau Santé Wallon 
                                                     
119  Art. 3, 10, of the Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts 
120  Art. 2, 1°, e), of the Act of 15 June 2006 on public procurements 
121  There is also in Belgium, beside the central purchasing body a central market 
(art. 2, 4° of the Act of 15 June 2006 on public procurements) 
122  Act of 21 Augustus 2008 houdende oprichting en organisatie van het eHealth-
platform en diverse bepalingen, B.S. 13 Oktober 2008 
123  Annexe - Fiche info financement des hôpitaux, MC-Informations, September 
2013, n° 253, 11 
Patient data exchange raises many questions pertaining to the legality of 
these exchanges. The federal government supports the electronic exchange 
of health information and in 2008 created the eHealth platform for such 
purposes. This platform allows inter alia the linkage of data from between 
these five hubs through a ‘metahub’124 
The European Commission and Member States put a lot of efforts in 
eHealth. The eHealth Action Plan 2012-2020 e.g. aims to create a fully 
mature and interoperable eHealth system.125 eHealth can deliver more 
citizen-centric healthcare and reduce the length of hospitalisation. However, 
the lack of health data exchange can contribute to one market failure, but 
can be tackled by addressing in a coordinated way fragmented legal 
frameworks, lack of legal clarity and lack of interoperability.126 The eHealth 
Collaboration set up by Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare is the main strategic 
and governance body at EU level to work towards interoperability of cross-
border eHealth services. One of the aspects of interoperability, 
organisational interoperability, implies integrating business processes and 
related data exchange and finding instruments to formalise mutual 
assistance, joint action and interconnected business processes in 
connection with cross-border service provision.127  
 
124  Annexe - Fiche info financement des hôpitaux, MC-Informations, September 
2013, n° 253, 11 
125  European Commission, eHealth Action Plan 2012-2020: Innovative 
healthcare for the 21st century, COM (2012) 736 final, 6 December 2012, 3. 
126  European Commission, eHealth Action Plan 2012-2020: Innovative 
healthcare for the 21st century, COM (2012) 736 final, 6 December 2012, 5. 
127  European Commission, eHealth Action Plan 2012-2020: Innovative 
healthcare for the 21st century, COM (2012) 736 final, 6 December 2012, 8. 
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Towards European reference collaborations 
Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights 
in cross-border healthcare promotes the use of European reference 
collaborations. The Commission supports the continued development of 
European reference collaborations between healthcare providers and 
centres of expertise in the Member States. A European reference 
collaboration can improve access to diagnosis and the provision of high-
quality healthcare to all patients who have conditions requiring a particular 
concentration of resources or expertise, and could also be focal points for 
medical training and research, information dissemination and evaluation, 
especially for rare diseases.128 Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, in particular article 
12, accordingly provides incentives to Member States to reinforce the 
continued development of European reference collaborations. European 
reference collaborations are based on the voluntary participation of their 
members, but the Commission has developed criteria and conditions that 
the collaborations are required to fulfil in order to receive support from the 
Commission. The criteria and conditions that European reference 
collaborations and healthcare providers wishing to join a European 
reference collaboration must fulfil were set out in a delegated decision of the 
European Commission.129 Another decision of the European Commission 
sets out the criteria for establishing and evaluating European reference 
collaborations and their Members and for facilitating the exchange of 
information and expertise on establishing and evaluating such 
collaborations.130  
Art. 12, 3, of Directive 2011/24/EU provides that Member States are 
encouraged to facilitate the development of the European reference 
collaborations:  
                                                     
128  Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare promotes the use of European reference networks, 
point 54 
(a) by connecting appropriate healthcare  providers and centres of expertise 
throughout their national territory and ensuring the dissemination of 
information towards appropriate healthcare  providers and centres of 
expertise throughout their national territory;  
(b) by fostering the participation of healthcare  providers and centres of 
expertise in the European reference collaborations. 
European reference collaborations should have at least three of the 
following objectives:  
 to help realise the potential of European collaboration regarding highly 
specialised healthcare for patients and for healthcare systems by 
exploiting innovations in medical science and health technologies; 
 to contribute to the pooling of knowledge regarding sickness prevention;  
 to facilitate improvements in diagnosis and the delivery of high-quality, 
accessible and cost-effective healthcare for all patients with a medical 
condition requiring a particular concentration of expertise in medical 
domains where expertise is rare;  
 to maximise the cost-effective use of resources by concentrating them 
where appropriate; 
 to reinforce research, epidemiological surveillance like registries and 
provide training for health professionals;  
 to facilitate mobility of expertise, virtually or physically, and to develop, 
share and spread information, knowledge and best practice and to 
foster developments of the diagnosis and treatment of rare diseases, 
within and outside the collaborations;  
129  Delegated decision of the European Commission of 10 March 2014 
(2014/286/EU) 
130  Implementing the decision of the European Commission of 10 March 2014 
(2014/287/EU) 
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 to encourage the development of quality and safety benchmarks and to 
help develop and spread best practice within and outside the 
collaboration;  
 to help Member States with an insufficient number of patients with a 
particular medical condition or lacking technology or expertise to 
provide highly specialised services of high quality. 
2.3.2 Obstacles to collaborate in the current legal framework 
2.3.2.1 The relationship between committees of the collaboration 
and the board and/or medical councils of the hospitals 
participating at the collaboration 
It must be noted that the common medical committee of an association is 
not competent to make a final decision. It will ultimately be the medical 
councils of the participating hospitals concerned that will have to express 
their opinion. If a consensus is reached in the common medical committee, 
the mandated members will only have to defend this position in their own 
medical council.131 According to the National Council of the Hospitals, 
members of the common medical committee are not independent of the 
medical council of the participating hospitals. 132 
The Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 regarding the association of hospitals 
also provides the possibility to create a PCC.133 The decision to create a 
PCC is made on a joint proposal by the boards of administrators of the 
participating hospitals. This committee is composed of the members of the 
association committee and the members of the common medical 
committee,134 This PCC will decide on topics related to ‘associations’ for 
which the advice or the agreement of one or more medical councils is 
                                                     
131  Art. 11, §4, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
132  National Council of the Hospitals, Advies inzake maatregelen om 
samenwerking tussen ziekenhuizen te bevorderen, 14 June 2012, Brussels, 
7 
133  Art. 12 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
required under the Hospital Act. The purpose of the PCC is to facilitate a 
decision by attempting to find a consensus. If such a consensus is reached, 
the members mandated by the administrators and medical councils of the 
participating hospitals will be required to defend the consensus. 
Unless otherwise provided in the agreement between the collaborating 
parties, it is not always obvious what the legal value is of a decision of a 
coordination committee for the council of administrators of the individual 
hospital that is a member of the collaboration.  
2.3.2.2 The composition of association committees in case of an 
association 
Regarding the structure of the association, the Royal Decree of 25 April 
1997 provides that each association must have an association committee.135 
This committee is composed of the administrators mandated by each 
participating hospital. The exact composition of the committee shall be 
described in the association agreement. 136 According to Vansweevelt and 
Dewallens (2014),60  this limited list does not allow stricto sensu CEOs to 
participate in the association committee. 
The association agreement must describe the tasks and functioning of the 
committee. The agreement must also mention the required majorities in 
order to take decisions. 
2.3.2.3 Collaboration and conflicts of interest 
CEOs of hospitals may be appointed as an administrator in another hospital 
that is member of a collaboration or they may be appointed as the 
administrator of the legal entity that is created to facilitate collaboration 
among hospitals. This CEO may even become an administrator in another 
134  Art. 12, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
135  Art. 10 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
136  Art. 16, 7° of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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hospital. There are no specific legal rules to make this decision transparent 
for the medical staff. This may lead to conflict of interests for administrators. 
A specific decision of a hospital X or collaboration Y may be bad for a 
specific hospital Z in which the administrator is also a CEO. It may not 
always be obvious to the medical staff of the hospital that their CEO is 
serving the interests of another hospital or a collaboration, rather than the 
interests of the hospital where he is a CEO. Moreover, the fact that Belgium 
is a relatively small country makes it difficult to nominate expert-
administrators e.g. for regional collaborations that do have a good 
knowledge of the hospital sector but have no links with individual hospitals 
that are members of the collaboration.   
2.3.2.4 Organisation of polyclinics 
The current legislation does not provide specific rules for the organisation of 
polyclinics. One may therefore ask whether the hospital legislation, including 
the Hospital Act, is applicable to polyclinics that may be ‘run’ by a 
‘collaboration’. Further questions are raised concerning the storage of 
medical files in the clinic. What are the conditions to be met in case of 
problems with a particular collaboration? Should the activity practiced in the 
polyclinic of the hospital be seen as part of the activity considered for the 
medical council elections? These are questions that currently do not have 
explicit answers but that should be taken into account in the context of 
collaborating, and namely concerning activities performed outside the 
hospital. The more the sphere of activity of healthcare professionals 
increases, the more the scope of the Hospital Act will be incompatible with 
the activity carried out by hospital physicians. 
2.3.2.5 Statutory purpose of the legal entity  
Art. 15 §2 of the Hospital Act specifies that hospitals are operated by a legal 
entity whose sole statutory purpose is the operation of one or more 
hospitals, healthcare institutions or medical-social institutions.  
The operation of a hospital is therefore limited. This may pose difficulties for 
the development of large collaborations with other care providers than 
hospitals.  
2.3.2.6 Status of the hospital physician  
Most physicians are self-employed. They often form an association with 
other self-employed physicians of a similar discipline at the hospital where 
they are working. They are, however, mostly not a party to the agreement of 
collaboration between hospitals. The current rules on collaboration of 
hospitals include rules to involve the medical council but do not provide 
specific rules regarding self-employed physicians as parties to the 
collaboration. Decisions regarding referrals taken at the level of the 
collaboration have to take into account that hospital physicians have the 
right of professional autonomy (see article 144, § 1 of the Hospital Act).  
The hospital legislation provides in article 145 Hospital Act the need to 
conclude a written agreement between the hospital and the physician in 
order to be authorised as a hospital physician. The rights and obligations of 
both parties must be specified in that written agreement. However, no rules 
are provided with regard to the relation between a collaboration, group or 
association of hospitals and physicians given that the rules relating to the 
status of the physician are only provided for the relation hospital-based 
physician. Therefore, a physician who has a contract with a hospital A and 
who works on the site of a hospital B following a hospital group or an 
association of hospitals for example, will in principle always be considered 
as a hospital physician of the hospital A. As long as the collaboration is not 
running a hospital, the rights of physicians as laid down in the Hospital Act 
results from the relationship between the hospital and physician and not 
from the relationship between collaboration and physician.  
If on the basis of a collaboration, hospital A of the collaboration enters into 
agreement with hospital B to allow physicians of hospital A to work in 
hospital B, these physicians are not considered as hospital physicians of 
hospital B. As a consequence, the medical council of hospital B does not 
have to give its opinion on an appointment of this physician given that this 
physician is not a ‘hospital-based physician’ of hospital B. A hospital-based 
physician is a physician who enters into an agreement with the hospital. If 
there is no contract between the physician of hospital A and hospital B, the 
physician will be not be considered a hospital-based physician of hospital B.  
A collaboration may lead to the situation whereby (many) physicians 
therefore start working in different hospitals without the prior opinion of the 
medical council of that hospital.  Nevertheless, the medical council of 
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hospital B will have to give its opinion before signing a collaboration 
agreement.  This follows from art. 137, 12° of the Hospital Act. According to 
this article, agreements with third parties that have an impact on the medical 
activity in a hospital require the prior opinion of the medical council. This 
opinion is not a reinforced opinion, unless otherwise provided in the working 
rules relating to the rights and obligations of the hospital administrators and 
the physicians. 
2.3.2.7 Exclusiveness of the physician in the hospital 
A CMO of a hospital or the chief of the medical services must in principle 
work exclusively at one hospital.137  This does not allow the creation of large 
regional collaborations with one CMO or one medical head of service. 
However, it is only provided in the rules regarding ‘hospital groups’ that the 
CMO and the head of medical services can be working in one or more 
hospitals within a group.  
2.3.2.8 The advice of medical council 
Art. 137, 12 of the Hospital Act provides that the board of the hospital must 
request an advice from the medical council before concluding an agreement 
with a third party concerning matters that can have repercussion on the 
medical activity. This consultation is required for all agreements that are 
signed within the framework of a particular collaboration with other hospitals 
or care providers.  
It seems that the power of the medical council is not strong enough in case 
of collaboration between hospitals because the hospital manager can decide 
not to take into account the advice of the medical council unless it is 
otherwise foreseen in the general regulation. A general regulation may 
provide more protection for hospital physicians. It can be provided that the 
hospital can only start a collaboration with a collaboration or another hospital 
if there is e.g. an approval by the medical council. What is written above has 
                                                     
137  Art. 7 and art. 17 of the Royal Decree of 15 December 1987 enforcing art. 13 
until 17 of the Hospital Act 
138  Art. 11, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
to be nuanced with regard to the association of hospitals. It is indeed 
provided that the medical councils of the participating hospitals must 
conclude a written agreement which will be annexed to the association 
agreement.138 According to Vansweevelt and Dewallens (2014),60  the 
requirement to conclude an agreement between the medical councils of 
participating hospitals implies that all medical councils have a decisive voice 
in the establishment of an ‘association’. If one of the medical councils does 
not sign the agreement for the establishment of a common medical 
committee, the association cannot be authorised by the competent minister. 
Election of medical council  
The difficulty of the medical council elections perfectly reflects the 
inadequacy of the current hospital legislation vis-à-vis the collaboration of 
hospitals at present. If two hospitals A and B decide to cooperate and, as 
part of this collaboration, organise services on different hospital sites so that 
physicians of hospital A will also work in hospital B, it will be no longer 
possible for this physician – if he works fulltime – to have the maximum of 4 
votes. Instead, he will have only maximum 3 votes. Moreover, if he works at 
least two half days in the other hospital, he will have to decide where he will 
vote for the elections of the medical council and if he wants to vote in both 
hospitals, he will have only 2 votes divided over the two hospitals.139  
The election of a medical council - or the organisation of a general assembly 
of the physicians (the medical staff) - is a complex issue within the 
framework of collaboration between hospitals. Current legislation does not 
promote working in different hospitals. It weakens the number of votes a 
physician has for the elections of a medical council. 
  
139  Royal Decree of 10 Augustus 1987 tot vaststelling van de regels met 
betrekking tot de samenstelling en de werking van de medische raad in 
uitvoering van de artikelen 24, 25 en 26 van de wet van 23 december 1963 
op de ziekenhuizen, B.S. 18 Augustus 1987 
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Other legal relationships 
Besides the individual agreement between the hospital and the physician, 
the Hospital Act provides the need to have in writing a general regulation 
related to the legal relationship between the hospital administrator and the 
physicians working in the hospital.140 There is no legal obligation to have a 
regulation related to the rights and duties of the collaboration administrator 
and the physicians working in the collaboration. Moreover, if each hospital 
of a collaboration has its own general regulation and if some physicians of a 
collaboration hospital start working in another hospital of the collaboration, 
having different general regulations regarding the rights and obligations may 
hinder the quality of care and the good collaboration among hospital 
physicians. In order to have a physician of hospital A working also in hospital 
B of the collaboration being bound by the general regulation of hospital B 
the physician must agree to be bound by the general regulation of hospital 
B. The Court of Cassation is of the opinion that a general regulation is only 
binding for a physician after he has given his individual consent.141 
2.3.2.9 The retrocession system 
The Hospital Act provides in article 155 a system of retrocessions or 
deductions. This system offers the possibility to retain a certain percentage 
of a physician’s fees to cover matters such as the (administrative) costs of 
the central collection of fees and costs related to the medical activities, etc.76 
The Hospital Act provides inter alia that the physician fees related to 
hospitalised patients (art. 147 of the Hospital Act) or related to services 
accomplished in medical-technical services for patients who are examined 
or treated in hospital but are not hospitalised (art. 148 of Hospital Act) have 
to be centralised. 
The hospital manager may also deduct a certain percentage of physician 
fees to allow the implementation of measures to maintain and promote 
                                                     
140  Art. 144 of the Hospital Act 
141  Cass., 8 April 2002, C000118N, www.cass.be 
142  The existing hospital legislation does provide certain rules related to 
supervision in the field of e.g. nephrology. A main centre will have to 
medical activities at the hospital. In this case, the hospital manager and the 
medical council will fix the percentage by mutual agreement. This agreement 
is binding on hospital physicians. The situation is not always clear in 
hospitals and this leads often to disputes between physicians and hospitals.    
This retrocession system which is one of the hospital's financial sources of 
income is regulated by the Hospital Act. It is unclear as to whether such a 
system can be used by a collaboration (instead of a single hospital), whether 
it can be used to cover the costs from other hospitals, whether it can be 
applied to cover costs for care delivered at home etc.  
2.3.2.10 Data and privacy 
Art. 20, §1, of the Hospital Act states that medical file must be kept by the 
hospital and that the CMO supervises the patient file. It is not regulated 
whether a collaboration (or network) can keep the patient files and if so, 
which CMO will supervise the patient file.  
Liability of the hospital collaboration 
If medical staff is working on behalf of a collaboration, one may wonder 
whether the collaboration is responsible to make sure that the patient rights 
are complied with. The current article 30 of the Hospital Act provides that 
the hospital complies with the Act on patient rights. It is the hospital that must 
be sure that the healthcare professions do comply with these rights. 
Moreover, the hospital will be liable for non-compliance of the Act on patient 
rights by the healthcare professionals working in the hospital, unless 
otherwise communicated to the patient. There are no rules regarding the 
responsibility and liability of a collaboration of hospitals, especially if this 
collaboration will receive authorisation for certain services, care 
programmes, or if this collaboration will hire medical staff.142  
supervise the low-care activities carried out in another hospital (see art. II, B, 
c and art. II, B, e of  Annex of the Royal Decree of  27 November 1996 
houdende vaststelling van de normen waaraan de centra voor de 
behandeling van chronische nierinsufficiëntie). 
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2.3.2.11 Collaboration and human resource management 
Larger collaborations often require staff to work in different hospitals. The 
existing legal forms of collaboration between hospitals do not take into 
account of the provision of staff for another employer. Art. 31 of the Act of 
24 July 1987143 prohibits the provision of staff from one employer to another. 
Areas of precarious and temporary employment form exceptions to this rule.  
However, art. 186 of the Act of 12 August 2000 on social, budgetary and 
other regulations provides that despite art.31 of the Act of 24 July 1987 it is 
possible to give employers within groups the possibility to provide staff for 
its users. Since the Act of 25 April 2014 regarding various provisions on 
social security, modifying the Act of 12 August 2000 the employer’s group 
must have the form of an economic collaboration (as mentioned in book XIV 
of the Corporate Act) or of a not-for-profit organisation and the provision of 
staff must be the only statutory purpose of the group.  
In principle, a hospital or a collaboration cannot allow its own personnel to 
work as employees for other hospitals of the collaboration. Nevertheless, 
the system of the so-called employers groups, that is modified by the Act of 
25 April 2014 regarding several regulations on social security, provides a 
procedure to be followed to allow the use of employees of an employer’s 
group for different users. This type of employer’s group permits, under 
certain conditions, the creation of a pool of employees or co-sourcing.  
This represents an opportunity to have employees working at several sites 
of a collaboration and on several days of the week.144  
It is not easy to give a general account of a common policy of employees 
in view of fiscal rules and rules related to employees and social security.145  
With regard to the agreements based on article 107 of the Hospital Act, part 
of the health staff of hospital psychiatric services are used in a mobile team 
that can operate to provide home care to patients rather than care in the 
                                                     
143  Act of 24 July 1987 betreffende de tijdelijke arbeid, de uitzendarbeid en het 
ter beschikking stellen van werknemers ten behoeve van gebruikers, B.S. 20 
Augustus 1987 
hospital. Such a situation could, however raise compliance issues with 
authorisation norms in hospitals, especially in terms of personnel. As a result 
it is arguably necessary to adapt the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 with 
a provision allowing, for hospitals that have been selected to participate in a 
project under article 107, to use staffing standards for A and T services at 
the level of the institution and not at the hospital service level.71  
2.3.2.12 Incompatibility of the legislation concerning the hospital 
pharmacy 
The regulations applicable to the hospital pharmacy are provided in 
particular by the Royal Decree of 4 March 1991 laying down the standards 
to which a hospital pharmacy must meet to be authorised and the Royal 
Decree of 19 October 1978 regulating the dispensaries and drug deposits in 
care institutions. It must also take into account an old Royal Decree of 31 
May 1885. According to this regulation, and in particular article 4, paragraph 
2, of the Royal Decree of 19 October 1978, the hospital pharmacist is not 
able to deliver medicines to non-hospitalised patients, except in certain 
situations explicitly specified by the King. It is also provided that the use of 
medicines and medical devices delivered by the hospital pharmacist should 
only be used within the hospital. The regulations on hospital pharmacies can 
therefore constitute an obstacle to the formation of large collaborations 
whereby pharmaceuticals will have to be delivered to patients not staying in 
the hospital. Pharmaceutical delivery should optimally be part of the services 
offered to patients through a collaboration, meaning it should be necessary 
to be able to deliver a medicine to a patient who is not hospitalised at a 
particular location. The question is whether this should be done by a hospital 
pharmacy or a pharmacy open to the public. 
144  See in detail Hendrickx, F. and Vanderpoorten, A., ‘Poolen van personeel, 
co-sourcing en de werkgeversgroepering in het arbeidsrecht’, in Recht in 
beweging, 2016. 
145  National Council of Hospitals, Advies inzake maatregelen om samenwerking 
tussen ziekenhuizen te bevorderen, 14 June 2012, Brussels, 7 
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2.3.2.13 Conditions related to the area  
The three classic formalised forms of collaboration, i.e. the ‘group’, the 
‘merger’ and the ‘association’ may hinder the division of the care landscape 
in larger collaborations as long as they continue to refer to a specific area. 
With regards to ‘groups’ the hospitals cannot be located more than 25 km 
from each other.  
In a ‘merger’ the hospitals concerned can in principle not be located more 
than 35 km from each other. In the Royal Decree on ‘associations’ there is 
no reference to a distance but the hospitals forming the association must 
provide the evidence of the need of the concerned activity in an attractive 
area 146 and/or a sufficient level of activity. The Royal Decree provides that 
the King is responsible for determining what is meant by ‘the need for 
association in a particular attractive area’ and the ‘activity level’ for each type 
of activity on the basis of scientific national and international standards.147  
With regard to ‘association of catchment area’, there are no specific 
references made to distance. However, it is specified that the territory of the 
‘association of catchment area’ is determined by an administrative district or 
by joint adjacent districts148 covering a minimum population of 150 000 
inhabitants.149 Due to these criteria, the regulations require that if a hospital 
has multiple sites, only the activities organised on sites that are located in 
the territory of the catchment area, will be integrated in the ‘association of a 
catchment area’.150 
The existing rules on collaborations are mainly inspired by larger 
collaborations, although it is still unclear whether they will lead to the 
creation of regional collaborations as described above. Art. 11 of the 
Hospital Act defines a ‘collaboration of care providers’ as a set of care 
providers, healthcare professionals, institutions and services, (which not fall 
                                                     
146  It is the population to be served by the object of the Association, art. 2, 3°, of 
the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
147  Art. 5, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
148  Only contiguous districts on a geographic perspective can join in a single 
catchment area (art. 16ter, §1, paragraph 2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 
1997) 
under the competence of the authorities referred to in art. 128, 130 or 135 
of the Constitution) and which jointly offer one or more care circuits as part 
of an agreement of legal collaboration within and outside institutions for a 
target group of patients in a geographic area to be defined by the institutions 
concerned.  
The typical forms of collaboration are still based upon physical infrastructure 
such a buildings that are located close to each other. They do not take into 
account collaboration between hospitals at a distance using ICT, cloud 
platforms, apps (‘clicks’ i.e. instead of bricks).77 At the same time European 
healthcare systems are converging and cross-border care is becoming more 
common. The eHealth and mHealth market are transforming the way health 
services are managed. Integration of care should improve through 
eHealth151 and mHealth resulting not only in an improvement of the 
integration of care, but also having an impact on the movement of healthcare 
providers and patients. In general, a shift from inpatient to outpatient 
treatment is expected. Patients will not always be physically present in 
hospitals when they are monitored. They will often be monitored at a 
distance. Developments such as these entail transformation of health 
services and of the type of collaboration from that which exists at present. 
The current legal forms of collaboration do focus too much on buildings and 
physical distance instead of focusing also on mHealth.  
149  Art. 16ter, §1, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
150  Art. 16ter, §2, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
151  European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2016, 26 November 2015, p. 
15. 
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2.3.2.14 Who is the competent legislator?  
The Special Act of 8 August 1980 on institutional reform is important with 
regard to care policy both inside and outside the hospital context, in 
particular with the competence of the Communities vis-à-vis the Federal 
State.78 According to art. 5 of the Special Act, the Federal State possesses 
competence for the ‘organic (‘organiek’/’organique’) legislation’ concerning 
health policy. 
The question is what is meant by this concept of organic legislation. The 
legislator does not define the concept in the legal text itself. According to the 
case law of the Constitutional Court, ‘organic legislation’ refers to the basic 
rules and guidelines of a hospital as enshrined in the Hospital Act.152 This 
does not mean that topics regulated by the Hospital Act will be considered 
as ‘organic legislation’. It is therefore not sufficient to include a provision in 
the Hospital Act to ensure that the provision falls under the federal 
competence. If the Communities are competent to authorise collaboration 
between hospitals, the question then is as to whether enacting norms for 
collaboration belongs to the competence of the Federal Sate. According to 
the explanation of the proposal of the Act related to the (6th) constitutional 
reforms, ‘organic legislation’ includes the basic characteristics of 
collaboration between hospitals.153 It is therefore only possible for one 
legislator, i.e. the Federal State, to enact requirements pertaining to the 
basic characteristics with regard to the forms of collaboration between 
hospitals such as the associations of hospitals, the hospital groups and the 
mergers. With regard to collaborations of hospitals and care providers, the 
competence of the Federal State may be not extensive. The Constitutional 
Court held in its decision n° 108/2000 that the Federal State does not have 
                                                     
152  GwH 14 February 2008, nr 15/2008; GwH 31 October 2000, nr 108/2000 
153  Explanatory Statement of the proposal of bijzondere wet met betrekking tot 
de Zesde Staatshervorming, Parl. St. Senate 2012-2013, nr 5-2232/1, 36 
154   B.3.3. Het komt derhalve de federale overheid niet toe unilateraal een 
regeling te treffen die  betrekking heeft op de totaliteit van de zorgverstrekking 
buiten de ziekenhuizen. Nu de aangevochten bepaling de verplichting inhoudt 
om aan zorgverstrekking te doen « via een netwerk van zorgvoorzieningen » 
competence to unilaterally enact regulations in this regard.154 A consensus 
between the federal and the community authorities should therefore be 
encouraged, especially if the collaborations imply hospitals and homes for 
the elderly. 
This is incidentally the approach that has been chosen within the framework 
of the Joint Declaration of 29 June 2015 on the new role of the hospital in 
the landscape of healthcare signed by all competent ministers of the various 
levels of authority. One of the principal goals of this declaration (although it 
is not legally binding), is to organise a systematic joint consultation between 
the various competent authorities and all the concerned parties so that 
agreements can be made. These different levels of authorities can realise 
their strategic visions in a context of optimisation, better collaboration and, 
if possible, by collaboration and concentration agreements. 
The specification of the conditions that must be met, including rules with 
respect to the quality of services, institutions and hospital organisation is not 
‘organic’ and therefore falls within the competence of the Communities.155 
It will have to be seen for which type of collaboration the Federal State is 
competent. Finally, the Federal State can regulate the basic characteristics 
of the types of collaborations but the question will be what is meant by basic 
characteristics. 
dat bestaat uit «een geheel van zorgaanbieders, zorgverstrekkers, 
instellingen en diensten […] in het kader van een instellingoverstijgende 
juridisch geformaliseerde samenwerkingsovereenkomst », maakt de federale 
wetgever inbreuk op de bevoegdheid van de gemeenschappen inzake de 
zorgverstrekking buiten de ziekenhuizen. 
155  Explanatory Statement of the proposal of the bijzondere wet met betrekking 
tot de Zesde Staatshervorming, Parl. St. Senate 2012-2013, nr 5-2232/1, 36 
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2.3.2.15 Collaboration and competition law 
Agreements of undertakings, like hospitals and decisions of associations, 
collaborations or groups of hospitals must not hinder competition in the 
healthcare market.156 An entity that practices an economic activity, whatever 
the legal form it has and the way it is financed, can be considered as an 
undertaking.157 In terms of ‘economic activity’, it is required that the entity 
independently produces products for and/or provides services to the 
market.79 Although hospitals operate on a not-for-profit basis and although 
they serve the general interest according to art. 2 of the Hospital Act, their 
activities are classified as economic activities.80 
Large regional collaborations will only by possible if they comply with 
competition rules. This means that the collaboration cannot be used to 
discuss confidential information regarding hospitals. A risk for compliance 
with competition rules may occur where such information is communicated 
(e.g. concerning future collaboration of a hospital with other hospitals) and 
if the communication of the information is not mainly intended to improve the 
quality of care. 
It is important that collaboration agreements place quality of care as a main 
objective. Moreover, in case of a merger, notification of the competition 
authorities may be needed. The same can be the case if a collaboration can 
be considered as a concentration. There is a concentration in the sense of 
the competition rules if there is a sustainable change of control following 
either a merger or if one or more persons who had the control over at least 
one undertaking get the control over another undertaking (or parts of it).158 
The creation of a common undertaking which fulfils all functions of an 
                                                     
156  Stipulated in art. IV.1, §1 Wetboek van economisch recht van 28 February 
2013 and in art. 101 VWEU. 
157  Court of Justice of the EU, C-41/90, Höfner, Jur. 1991, I, 01979, point 21.  
158  Art. IV.6, § 1 Wetboek van economisch recht van 28 February 2013, BS 29 
March 2013 
159  Art. IV.6, § 2 Wetboek van economisch recht van 28 February 2013, BS 29 
March 2013 
independent economic unity is a concentration.159  Concentrations with a 
change of control on a lasting basis which consist of a merger of two or more 
previously independent undertakings or parts of such undertakings have to 
be notified jointly by the parties to the merger to the Competition Prosecutor 
general before their implementation and after the conclusion of the 
agreement, publication of the take-over bid or public offer of exchange, or of 
the acquisition of a controlling interest.160 The parties may however notify a 
proposed agreement provided that they declare explicitly that they intend to 
conclude an agreement which does not differ significantly from the notified 
proposal as regards all the relevant points of the competition act. The 
notification can be done in Dutch or French. As long as the Competition 
College does not pronounce its decision on the permissibility of the 
concentration, the undertakings concerned may not implement the 
concentration.161 
2.3.2.16 Open or closed forms of collaboration – Parties to the 
collaboration 
There is no obligation under the rules for mergers, groups or associations to 
include all hospitals within a specific area, or even the care providers of that 
area.  
With regard to ‘association of catchment area’ it is not necessary for all the 
hospitals in the specified territory to participate in the ‘association of 
catchment area’. It is however necessary to indicate in such cases (when 
requesting authorisation), the reasons why the association does not include 
all the hospitals of the territory.162 
160  Art. IV.10, §1 Wetboek van economisch recht van 28 February 2013, BS 29 
March 2013. 
161  Art. IV.10, §5 Wetboek van economisch recht van 28 February 2013, BS 29 
March 2013. 
162  Art. 16septies, a), of the Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 
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With regard to the collaborations of art. 11 of the Hospital Act it is clearly 
stated in the different Royal Decrees that care providers must have the 
opportunity to participate in the collaboration that exists within its area if the 
care provider meets the conditions.  
Certain legal forms of collaboration do exclude certain hospitals. The 
concept of the ‘hospital group’ allows hospitals to enter into forms of 
collaboration that are focused on the allocation of tasks. A ‘group’ aims at 
the total complementary of hospitals.163 In a ‘group’ agreements are made 
regarding allocation of tasks and adjustment of the offer of care that do not 
imply a common exploitation.61 However, psychiatric hospitals and isolated 
Sp-services (specialised services for treatment and revalidation), alone or 
together with H-services (services for ordinary hospitalisation) or T-services 
(services neuropsychiatry for treatment of adult patients) do not fall under 
the scope of the royal decree.164  
A ‘merger’ of hospitals represents the fusion of two or more separate 
authorised hospitals that may or may not have different boards that are 
located at different physical sites, under one administrator with one single 
authorisation.165 However, psychiatric hospitals and isolated Sp-services 
(specialised services for treatment and revalidation), alone or together with 
H-services (services for ordinary hospitalisation) or T-services (services for 
neuropsychiatry for treatment of adult patients) do not fall under the scope 
of the royal decree of 31 May 1989. They may merge but not on the basis 
of the art. of the royal decree of 31 May 1989. 
Since binding guidance concerning the conditions of such a merger are 
missing, mergers with psychiatric and specialist hospitals may lead to 
problems.63 
                                                     
163  Report to the King of the Royal Decree 25 April 1997 houdende nadere 
omschrijving van de associatie van ziekenhuizen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moet voldoen, BS 18 June 1997. 
164  Art. 2 Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
2.3.2.17 Collaboration between hospitals from other regions 
and/or other Member States 
The competence of the Communities with regard to care provided outside 
hospitals, with regard to norms of hospital services, functions etc., with 
regard to additional norms regarding the planning requirements and the 
authorisation of forms of collaboration, may hinder the creation of (supra) 
regional collaborations, i.e. collaborations with hospitals from other regions 
and/or with hospitals from other Member States. If a Community will be able 
to authorise a new structure in the framework of collaborations (specialised 
clinic for example), one may wonder whether the other Community will be 
willing to authorise certain types of collaboration with this new structure. 
As a consequence of constitutional reform within Belgium and the existing 
specific rules for the forms of collaboration, clear rules related to the creation 
of collaborations between all types of hospitals or between totally different 
healthcare providers, including private hospitals and institutions for the 
elderly etc. do not exist. 
2.3.2.18  Collaboration and physicians - Order of Physicians 
The current legislation provides that the physician must be registered at the 
Provincial Council of the Order of physicians of the province in which he 
performs his main activity. Art. 21 of the Royal Decree of 6 February 1970 
regulating the organisation and functioning of the councils of the Order of 
Physicians states that physicians must be registered on the list of the Order 
of the Provincial Council of the physician’s site of ‘residence’. This is the 
physician's site of residence determined by the location where the physician 
mainly practices.  
 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989. 
165  Art. 2 Royal Decree 31 May 1989 houdende nadere omschrijving van de fusie 
van ziekenhuizen en de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, 
BS 5 July 1989. 
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Art. 22 of the Deontology Code, the Code of Conduct of the Council of 
Physicians, states that the physician practices his practice preferably in one 
place. However, if he wants to disperse his activities in more than one place, 
he must inform the provincial council, explain the need for the dispersion of 
his activities and indicate the location of his main activity. The decision to 
allow the physician to work elsewhere than at the location of his main activity 
is the competence of the Provincial Council. The highest Court (’Hof van 
Cassatie’/’Cour de Cassation’)) considers that when the provincial councils 
refuse to grant a physician permission to disperse his medical activities, they 
draw their competence in art. 6, 2 ° of the Royal Decree n° 79 which provides 
that it is the provincial councils’ task to ‘ensure compliance with the rules of 
medical ethics and maintain the honour, discretion, probity and dignity of 
physicians referred to in art. 5, paragraph 1’.166 
The rules related to registration at the competent provincial council as well 
as those related to evaluation of requests to work at differing hospitals may 
represent an obstacle to physicians in the context of large collaborations, 
where physicians may wish to work in different hospitals or even in different 
provinces. 
2.3.2.19 Procurement and the concept of contracting authority 
The concept of contracting authority, which partly defines the scope of the 
legislation on public procurement, is exhaustively defined by the European 
directives167 and by the Act of 15 June 2006.168 A ‘Contracting Authority’ 
means the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public 
law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities or one or 
several of such bodies governed by public law. A ‘body governed by public 
law’ means anybody:169 
                                                     
166  Cass., 25 May 2001, D.00.0021.N 
167  Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts which remains in force until 18.4.2016 and Directive 
2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing 
Directive 2004/18/EC 
 established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general 
interest, not having an industrial or commercial character; 
 having legal personality; and 
 financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or 
other bodies governed by public law; or subject to management 
supervision by those bodies; or having an administrative, managerial or 
supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by 
the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by 
public law. 
Therefore, if the legislation on public procurement is applicable in the context 
of collaboration between hospitals one might also ask (given that it is a 
collaboration between two contracting authorities) what the legal situation is 
concerning collaborations such as collaborations, organised between 
hospitals and other healthcare providers. In such a case, will the legislation 
on public procurement be applicable to a collaboration if this collaboration 
does not get public finance (but only the parties to the collaboration)? 
2.3.2.20 Collaboration and finance 
It is difficult to create regional or supra-regional collaborations if the financing 
of the BFM or the financing of infrastructure is related to the legal entity 
running a hospital. As long as a collaboration is not operating a hospital, it 
will be difficult to obtain financial support of public authorities. The National 
Hospitals Council was of the opinion in 2012 that the aim of the legislation 
was to link financial incentives to the creation of associations. The Council 
deplores that fact that this has not occurred either by the nomenclature or 
by the BFM.170  
168  A reform is currently underway and aims to replace the current Act of 15 June 
2006 
169  Art. 1,9, of the Directive 2004/18/EC 
170  National Council of the Hospitals, Advies inzake maatregelen om 
samenwerking tussen ziekenhuizen te bevorderen, 14 June 2012, Brussels, 
6 
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It is also important to ponder the effect of European State aid rules where 
collaborations receive public finance and where they carry out other tasks 
than public service obligations. What for instance is the legal situation with 
regards to the use of hospital personnel financed by public means for 
ambulatory care? Similar questions exist with regards to the selling of 
medicinal products by hospital pharmacists to patients at home. 
2.3.2.21 VAT and collaboration between hospitals  
In a circular of 27 November 2012, n° 36/2012, the Belgian fiscal service 
recognised that collaboration between healthcare institutions in the 
healthcare field continues to increase. This is mainly an evolution driven by 
the competent authorities which are involved in the maintenance and 
improvement of healthcare delivery and the management of the costs 
relating thereto.171 However, such collaboration can also arise 
spontaneously through initiatives of the care providers themselves. 
The fiscal authority is of the opinion that, within the framework of 
collaboration agreements that aim to provide a complete level of care to 
those needing it, the care institutions themselves provide each other 
services and supply of goods at cost price. Questions therefore arise 
concerning the VAT of operations carried out under such contracts of 
collaboration between care institutions.  
The fiscal authority distinguishes five types of collaboration contracts in the 
care sector: 
 The ‘type 1’ collaboration arises through part of a sustainable 
collaboration agreement, legally formalised and approved by the 
competent authority. This includes hospital associations, hospital 
groups and hospital mergers. 
                                                     
171  Mennig, F., ‘Actualités 2012 en matière de TVA’, in Le droit fiscal en Belgique, 
Limal, Anthemis, 2013, 283 
 The ‘type 2’ collaboration relates to collaboration for the implementation 
of a care programme or a care project well defined and which is 
authorised or funded by the federal competent authority. There may be 
temporary collaboration. 
 The ‘type 3’ collaboration regards the implementation of a care project 
that is regulated by the Authority without being subjected to a formal 
authorisation. 
 The ‘type 4’ collaboration intervenes spontaneously between 
institutions without any intervention or assistance from the authority. It 
must concern the provision of care. 
 The ‘type 5’ collaboration concerns agreements that are not linked to 
care (cleaning, food, etc.). 
Art. 44 of the Code of Value Added Tax (VAT) provides an exemption regime 
for certain VAT payers as the healthcare providers. Therefore the tax 
administration has analysed whether all the services exchanged between 
healthcare institutions in a collaborative framework could fall under the 
exemption in art. 44.  
In its circular, the fiscal authority has indicated that according the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the EU, the notion of ‘medical care’ in art. 132, 
paragraph 1 (b) of Directive 2006/112/EC, does not call for an especially 
narrow interpretation. The services covered by that term, like those covered 
by 'provision of medical care' in letter (c) of the same provision, must have 
as their purpose the diagnosis, treatment and, in so far as possible, cure of 
diseases or health disorders. Medical services carried out for a purpose of 
protecting, including maintaining or restoring, human health may benefit 
from the exemption under art. 132, paragraph 1, b and c, of the Directive - 
2006/112/EC.172  
 
172  Circular 36/2012 (E.T.123.129) of 27 November 2012 
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Based on the transposition of the European case law concerning the 
exemption of services performed between healthcare institutions, the 
administration considers that the exemption applies to services rendered 
when three conditions are met.173 
 The service must be provided by a care provider (as mentioned in art. 
44 of the Code of VAT) to another care provider mentioned in this art.. 
 The service must be directly related to diagnosis, treatment, 
convalescence, a host, the provision of assistance or a care for a person 
in need. The service must be required to achieve the above purpose. It 
will therefore primarily concern services requiring the intervention of 
care professionals or the provision of infrastructure or specialised 
medical equipment. Services that do not concern the provision of care 
may, however, be exempted if they are part of a complex operation that 
involves diagnosis, treatment, convalescence, a host or the provision of 
assistance or care to a person in need of care. 
 The exemption of the service may not lead to a distortion of competition 
towards a non-exempted payer. This third condition is based on art. 134 
of Directive 2006/112/EC. It is a question of fact. The fiscal authority 
stipulates that when a non-exempted economic operator provides the 
same operation, there is in principle a distortion of competition and the 
service cannot be exempted. 
The collaborations of the type I, II and III are primarily intended to improve 
the quality of care. It is recognised for these collaborations that the non-
application of VAT does not lead to a distortion of competition against other 
market players. However, should this be the case, the third condition for 
exemption will not be complied with and the status of collaboration in 
question would be re-examined by the fiscal authority. 
                                                     
173  Mennig, F., o.c., 283 
174  For the viewpoint of Zorgnet-Icuro, see Zorgnet-Icuro, Regionale 
ziekenhuisnetwerken, Brussel, 2015, 12 
175  It is provided in of the Royal Decree n°. 78 of 11 November 1967 regarding 
the practice of health professions, art. 4, § 4 that physicians who are allowed 
Regarding the type IV collaboration, all transactions between the hospitals 
must individually comply with the three conditions. 
It is important to identify the characteristic features of the transaction in 
question to determine whether the taxable person delivers to the consumer, 
several distinct principal services or a single service. A service will be 
regarded as ancillary to a principal service if it does not constitute for 
customers an aim in itself, but a means of better enjoying the principal 
service supplied. The ancillary service will have the tax treatment of the 
principal service.174 
The ‘type 5’ collaboration does not have care as a purpose and therefore 
does not satisfy to the conditions set to benefit from the exemptions to VAT. 
2.3.2.22 Collaboration between hospitals and private clinics 
There is no specific binding legislation concerning collaboration between 
hospitals and private clinics.175 Evermore surgery is being performed by 
external surgery centres, for instance external eye surgery centres.176  Such 
centres do not fall within the definition of a ‘hospital’ in the sense of the 
Hospital Act and do not have a legal obligation to comply with the 
authorisation and norms applicable to authorised hospitals.73 A legal 
definition of external centres does not exist. According to the Belgian Health 
Care Knowledge Centre37 Report 225. D/2014/10.273/49, external centres 
are ‘healthcare centres, other than hospitals as defined in the Belgian 
Hospital Act or a healthcare setting linked to a hospital, where any eye 
surgical or other invasive procedure requiring general or locoregional 
anaesthesia, or sedation, including cryosurgery and laser surgery, but 
without the patients staying overnight, is performed by a physician. This 
definition excludes ambulatory practices, where only minor interventions are 
to hold a storage of medicinal products and implants if they have an 
agreement with a hospital pharmacy or a pharmacy open to the public. 
176  Extramural centres are often private for-profit clinics. 
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performed belonging to the nomenclature for GPs, dermatologists and 
dentists.73 ‘ 
For certain risky medical interventions outside a hospital, a notification 
obligation was provided in a Flemish decree of 22 June 2012 regarding the 
obligatory notification of risky medical practices.177 This Decree has been 
annulled by the Constitutional Court.178 External centres do not have to 
comply with the authorisation norms and the quality norms embedded in the 
Hospital Act and many other rules and initiatives.81 
In Table 2, the facilitators and barriers are listed. 
Table 2 – Synthesis of the facilitators and obstacles 
 Facilitators Obstacles 
Coordination of the collaboration  General coordinator 
 Coordinating committee 
 CMOs and head of medical services 
 Decision power of the coordinating committee 
 Composition of the association committee 
 Conflicts of interest are possible 
Representation of the medical staff  Common medical committee  Impact of the medical council of the collaboration 
 Power of the medical council of the participating hospital 
Legal form of the collaboration  Flexibility of the legal form  Limited statutory purpose of the legal entity that operates a 
hospital 
Hospital pharmacy  Existence of form of collaboration   Incompatibility of the legislation concerning hospital pharmacy  
Status of the hospital physicians   Individual contract with a collaboration 
 Different general regulations 
 Less votes for medical councils election 
 Exclusiveness  
Provision of staff   Incompatibility of labour legislation 
 Non common policy for employees 
Purchasing of pharmaceuticals  Central purchasing body 
 Framework agreement 
 Concept of contracting authority 
                                                     
177  Decree of 22 June 2012 regarding the obligatory notification of risky medical 
practices of 22 June 2012, BS 20 July 2012. 
178  Constitutional Court 19 December 2013, nr. 170/2013. 
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3 THREE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR 
HOSPITAL COLLABORATIONS  
Based on the input from a review of the literature, national and international 
case studies and an analysis of current legislation, a number of different 
solutions for governing hospital collaborations in Belgium were drafted. 
Three governance models that support task distribution and collaboration 
between hospitals were identified. In this chapter, the final drafts of these 
potential solutions are presented. 
3.1 Model 1: The health system  
As identified in the literature and the international cases, integrated 
governance forms, such as health systems, can enhance task distribution 
and collaboration. Participants in the national cases also acknowledge that, 
when the goal of the hospitals is to collaborate on a large number of 
services, an integrated structure like a health system is appropriate. In a 
health system, organisations agree to collaborate in some kind of closed 
system where an overarching board is in charge of the collaboration (Figure 
2). The institutions that are part of the health system remain independent 
entities in the sense that they can be located in separate locations; however, 
the central board directs all hospitals on the overarching level (Table 3). As 
such, the main difference between a health system and a merger lies in the 
fact that all authorisations are maintained. However, it is the health system 
instead of the single hospital that receives the authorisation. In addition, 
different types of governance structures are possible and in a health system 
other organisations besides hospitals can collaborate. 
This model answers some challenges identified in the current legislation and 
Belgian situation. As a health system is a single organisation, authorisation 
is possible on a higher level, and it is not necessary to provide each service 
at each location. The budget is allocated to the organisation as a whole, 
which makes it less important where a patient is treated for the organisation. 
The exchange of physicians is easier because they all work in the same 
organisation and follow the same regulations and conditions. The 
governance structure also enables more integrated care forms of 
healthcare, since other types of organisations may also be part of the health 
system. The latter, however, is not a prerequisite: a health system can be 
focused on hospital collaborations only, certainly in the beginning of this 
collaboration type. Although this governance structure provides an answer 
to many currently identified problems, such a high level of integration still 
represents an enormous step for some of the collaborations. 
Figure 2 – Model 1: Health system 
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3.2 Model 2: Network  
In the Belgian cases, the interviewees indicated that decision making in a 
network type of collaboration can be too time consuming. Before making a 
decision on the network level, each medical council (and board) at the 
hospital level needs to discuss these decisions. An integrated governance 
form like a health system provides a solution for this problem. However, as 
an intermediate step between the current situation and the more integrated 
models, interviewees in the Belgian case studies indicated that it is 
preferable to have a governance model where delegates in a network 
configuration have some level of decision-making rights in the overarching 
governing bodies. Hence, in Model 2, an overarching committee should be 
able to make certain network-related decisions without having to consult the 
councils and boards of the hospitals each time (Table 3). 
The Model 2 cooperation involves the formation of a participant-governed 
network. Equal decision-making rights in participant-governed networks 
were considered a strength, and in lead organisations the decision-making 
structure evolves (or might evolve) to a participant-governed network. We 
prefer to select a participant-governed network, although other governance 
structures (such as lead organisations or NAOs) might be selected and 
described in the collaboration rules. The characteristic of this type of 
collaboration is that the decision-making and authorisation remain on the 
level of the participating hospitals and are not transferred to the overarching 
collaboration. The collaboration in Model 2 leaves decision making on the 
hospital level. However, there is a network committee with members 
representing different actors, such as the hospital physicians and the 
administrators that are mandated to make decisions. An explicit list of 
mandated topics should be established. If one hospital does not agree with 
a decision, they can recall the decision.  
The collaboration may serve different purposes and can include not only 
hospitals, but also homes for the elderly, GPs, and so on. It is not the 
collaboration that runs the hospital services: the collaboration is not 
authorised for either services or hospitals. All authorisations stay on the 
hospital level. The cooperation between hospitals and other health actors of 
the network may be based solely on a contract without a need for the 
collaboration to be a separate legal entity, though this is also possible.  
Figure 3 – Model 2: Network 
 
Although in the national cases, the importance of authorisation at the 
collaboration level was often mentioned, Model 2 does not support this. If a 
collaboration were indeed authorised on the collaboration level, many 
problems of a legal, financial, and organisational nature can occur when a 
hospital leaves. A loosely coupled structure complicates this. If 
organisations aim for authorisation at the overarching level, they will need to 
form a more integrated structure (as in Model 1); another possibility for more 
specialised service lines, is described by Model 3.  
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3.3 Model 3: The new organisation  
The interviewees of the different Belgian case studies indicated that there is 
a need for care programmes, such as diabetic and cardiology programmes, 
to be authorised on the collaboration level and to be able to receive a BFM. 
However, the hospitals do not want to integrate all their services with the 
same partners (as would occur in a health system). Some of the 
collaborations aimed to collaborate for only one or a limited amount of 
services. A new organisation should be developed with a limited scope 
(Figure 4). 
Model 3 involves the establishment of a new organisation with its own board 
and medical council. This organisation should be able to receive a budget 
from the BFM. Model 3 can be used for supporting medical services – e.g. 
laboratories, pharmacies, and medical equipment collaborations, as in the 
case of radiotherapy. The model can also be applied for high-expertise care, 
for innovative high technology care, and for care programmes, such as 
diabetic or cardiology programmes, but also for specific service lines 
(examples exist abroad, such as elective orthopaedic surgery and eye 
surgery). This model will enhance collaboration for more horizontal networks 
that aim to provide care for a specific pathology of service with high 
expertise. At the moment, this final goal may still be difficult to achieve, as 
hospital activities are paid from a closed-end budget in the BFM, which can 
hinder pathology-based allocation to the organisation. However, since this 
new organisation can receive the budget, this model can create 
opportunities for new legislation to enhance pathology-based allocation of 
financial means for collaborations. 
Model 3 enables collaboration for specific service lines and supporting 
services. When hospitals do not want to integrate all their services, but 
instead desire to collaborate intensely on a few services, a new organisation 
can provide an answer. This model can enhance collaboration for care 
programmes, although the study also identified that the regulations for care 
programmes should change. More and adjusted care programmes (e.g. 
oncology, paediatrics), should also be available. 
Figure 4 – Model 3: New organisation 
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Table 3 – Proposed collaboration models 
Model  Description 
Health system Used inter alia by institutions that want an integrated system  
High level of integration, partners that strive for the same goals  
One board at the health-system level 
The health system holds authorisations 
Non-hospitals may also be part of the health system, although this is not a prerequisite 
Network Decision making and authorisation remain within the hospitals 
On the network level: network committee 
The network committee consists of mandated physicians and CEOs/members of the board 
The topics that are mandated and the level of decision-making rights should be described in the regulations of the organisation 
A participant-governed network is assumed (equal partners), but this can also be adjusted through the regulations of the 
collaboration in other governance forms such as lead organisation or a NAO 
Depending on the goals of a collaboration, the network can encompass all services or a selected group of hospital services 
(interhospital) 
New organisation Collaboration in terms of one or a limited number of patient groups, pathologies, services, or supporting services 
Authorisation on the level of the new organisation 
Provides medical services at the level of a new institution (in accordance with current hospital legislation) 
Concerns collaboration between several hospital services (interhospital) 
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4 FACILITATORS AND BARRIERS IN 
CURRENT LEGISLATION TO 
ESTABLISH NEW GOVERNANCE 
MODELS OF HOSPITAL 
COLLABORATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The legally structured types of collaboration among hospitals, as well as 
other types of collaboration between hospitals and care providers, whether 
they are authorised by the competent public authority or not, have been 
examined in Chapter 2. We evaluated more in detail in which way the current 
legislation can divide the care landscape in regional and/or supra-regional 
networks. We evaluated the facilitators and obstacles to collaboration 
between hospitals from a legal perspective. 
Different forms of collaboration were examined. New models have been 
created on the basis of, inter alia, case studies and literature reviews (see 
Chapter 3).  
In this chapter, facilitators and barriers in current legislation, both hospital-
specific and non-hospital-specific, to establish the three governance models 
are examined. It will focus on important points for each of the legal texts that 
might apply if the models were to be put into practice. In addition to hospital 
legislation, attention is paid to aspects such as competition rules, public 
procurement law, labour law, VAT-law, the legislation on not-for-profit 
association, company law, European law and administrative law. 
We first provide a brief description of each model. Next, we analyse the 
impact of legal rules on each model separately. In a final section, we 
formulate a legal answer to the following questions: is it necessary for the 
legislator to make legal rules for different governance models? How can 
collaboration with other hospitals be achieved? Should the legislator 
intervene in the decision process? What is the impact of the model on the 
quality of care and on the payment system? 
4.2 Legal feasibility of a health system 
4.2.1 The launch of a health system 
In a health system, institutions enter into a collaboration in which they work 
together in a closed system with an overall administrator. Although the 
institutions that are part of the health system remain independent entities in 
the sense that they can be located at a separate site, on an overall level, a 
central administrator is charged with controlling them. 
Legally speaking, the entities that enter into the health system will be in most 
cases dissolved over time. Depending on the complexity of the integration, 
this may or may not take a long period of time. In extremis, a transitional 
period of 10 years is not inconceivable. The individual entities will thus 
continue to exist for a transitional period. This implies that an arrangement 
should be made, not only for the situation after the integration, but also at 
the start, a situation where there e.g. still exist a few ‘not-for-profit 
associations’ that were involved before the launch of the health system with 
running a hospital. With regard to the transition period, arrangements will 
have to be made concerning, but not limited to, the transfer and employment 
of staff and physicians, the transfer of materials, etc. 
This model allows the creation of a collaboration between numerous 
facilities originating from different sectors located in the health and welfare 
sector, including general hospitals, mental health facilities, nursing homes, 
institutions supporting disabled people and child, youth and family 
institutions. The focus is however, mainly on hospitals. 
Please note that the term ‘health system’ as used in this chapter does not 
necessarily totally comply with the term ‘group’ as mentioned in the Royal 
Decree of 30 January 1989 where a group implies agreements regarding 
the allocation of tasks and the complementarity for the provision of services, 
disciplines or equipment used in hospitals, in order to meet the needs of the 
population and to improve the quality of healthcare. Art. 8, second paragraph 
of this Royal Decree explains that the group may not lead to mono-specialist 
hospital sites, with the exception of sub-acute geriatric- and specialised (Sp-
services. So, under the Royal Decree the term ‘group’ does not necessarily 
refer to an organisation that also runs institutions for the elderly, for children 
etc.  Moreover, the creation of a health system as described in this section 
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does not necessarily imply a group as in the meaning of the Royal Decree 
where for example there is no collaboration among the institutions. So the 
term health system in this section refers more (as was described in part I) to 
situations such as a hospital holdings, although in reality a health system 
differs from hospital holdings since non-hospitals may also be part of the 
health system. As we stated earlier, a holding is not regulated by the Hospital 
Act. It refers to the situation whereby independent units are governed by a 
common board.72The authorisation numbers of the independent units are 
maintained. 
4.2.2 Legal form for operation 
It is important for a health system that chooses a certain legal form to verify 
whether the current legislation poses requirements in terms of the type of 
legal form required in order to operate a healthcare organisation or to get 
funding for the healthcare organisation in question. This section refers to the 
importance of the legal form needed to operate an institution. In section 4.2.6 
we discuss whether a Member State can limit the granting of subsidies to 
specific types of organisations. 
4.2.2.1 Not-for-profit association 
The Hospital Act does not require that the hospital is run by a not-for-profit 
association. The legislator did not choose for a specific legal form for running 
a hospital, with the exception of the rules related to subsidies for 
infrastructure. The hospital legislation does not even prohibit a commercial 
organisation, like a for-profit organisation, to operate a hospital and to 
receive funding doing so. The hospital legislation only requires that the 
hospital has the mandatory authorisations. So if a commercial organisation 
obtains authorisations, that commercial organisation is allowed to constitute 
                                                     
179  Art. 3, § 1, first paragraph Act 27 June 1921 betreffende de verenigingen 
zonder winstoogmerk, de internationale verenigingen zonder winstoogmerk 
en de stichtingen, BS 1 July 1921. 
180  M. Denef et al, De VZW, Bruges, die Keure, 2015, 71 en 72. 
a hospital under hospital legislation and it can claim the BFM as it has beds 
for which it has obtained authorisations. 
As will be shown below in the section on financial legislation (4.2.6), the 
legislation concerning the possibility to receive subsidies for infrastructure, 
is much more rigid. A commercial organisation will not be able to receive 
subsidies for infrastructure since it should be a not-for-profit association (or 
a local government, a public utility or a university (see art. 63 of the Hospital 
Act).  
A possible legal form for a health system is that of a not-for-profit 
association. Opting for this form brings with it some important legal effects. 
First of all, the provisions of the not-for-profit association will apply. A not-
for-profit association is an independent entity that can possess rights and 
duties. Such an organisation has legal personality from the day on which its 
statutes, the documents concerning the appointment of the first 
administrators and, if applicable, the persons authorised to represent the 
organisation in and out of court are deposited at the registry of the 
commercial court.179 Given that a not-for-profit association has complete 
legal personality, the members shall not be personally liable for the debts of 
the organisation. 
Both natural persons and legal persons (such as not-for-profit association or 
commercial companies) can act as the founder of a not-for-profit 
association.180 Likewise, an organisation without legal personality as well as 
an organisation authorised in public law can act as a founding member of a 
not-for-profit association. When creating a not-for-profit association, at least 
three founders are required.181 The founding statutes list the conditions and 
procedures for admission and resignation of members.182 Moreover, the 
article of an association can provide additional special conditions of 
181  Art. 2, 3° Act 27 June 1921 betreffende de verenigingen zonder 
winstoogmerk, de internationale verenigingen zonder winstoogmerk en de 
stichtingen, BS 1 July 1921. 
182  Art.. 2, first paragraph, 5° Act 27 June 1921 betreffende de verenigingen 
zonder winstoogmerk, de internationale verenigingen zonder winstoogmerk 
en de stichtingen, BS 1July 1921. 
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accession and formalities for which a prospective member must comply if 
they wish to join a specific not-for-profit association.183 
4.2.2.2 Company with social aim 
Since the purpose of the statutes limits the legal capacity of the individual 
legal entity concerned, the creation of the entity must fit within the statutory 
objects of the participating entities.184 This means that an entity cannot 
acquire rights or make commitments outside of its object, as defined in the 
article, in addition, legal restrictions can be imposed on the object or subject 
field pursued by the legal entity.185 An example of this is the main specific 
feature of a not-for-profit association, namely the absence of a profit motive. 
This report is not focused on the public hospitals since many of these 
hospitals disappeared or the legislation related to public centres of social 
welfare is mainly written now at the level of the regions and the subject of 
recent/planned modifications. However, the so called company with social 
aim might be an option next to the not-for-profit association as well 
(‘vennootschap met sociaal oogmerk’/ ‘une société à finalité sociale’). This 
is a company which is not aimed at the enrichment of partners. The statutes 
stipulate among other things: 
 that the partners pursue no or limited power advantage; 
 the social purpose of the activities they carry out in accordance with the 
purpose of the company in which the main objective should not be the 
granting of an indirect financial benefit to the partners; 
 how the profits are spent in accordance with the internal and external 
objective of the company. 
There are many differences between a not-for-profit association and a 
company with a social aim.  Below we describe some of these differences. 
Where one becomes a member of a not-for-profit association by being 
accepted, one becomes a partner of the company with a social aim through 
                                                     
183  M. Denef et al, De VZW, Bruges, die Keure, 2015, 131. 
184  M. Denef et al, De VZW, Bruges, die Keure, 2015, 73. 
a contribution.82 Where there is normally no liability for the members of a 
not-for-profit association, there is founders’ liability for the partners and 
possible unlimited liability depending on the type of company.82 Where 
sharing of profits is prohibited in a not-for-profit association, the distribution 
of profits in a company with a social aim is either impossible or possible to a 
certain extent, depending on the choices in the statutes. 
A not-for-profit association can organise civil activities and commercial 
activities to the extent that a commercial activity is not the main activity and 
is a function of the civil activity. In a company with a social aim one can 
organize civil activities and commercial activities as main activities.82 It is 
obvious that the field of activities of a company with a social aim is even 
broader than that of not-for-profit association and that the company it may 
also have commercial activities as their main activity. But this is exactly why 
under the current legislation it will be difficult to run a hospital with a company 
with a social aim. Art. 63 of the Hospital Act and art. 4 of the Decree of the 
Flemish government on 8 June 1999 provide that infrastructure grants are 
only possible to a local government, a not-for-profit association, an institute 
of public utility or a university. The company with a social aim is not listed 
and is therefore under the current legislation not eligible for infrastructure 
funding. 
4.2.2.3 The operation of other organisations  
Please note that legislation applicable to organisations that deliver care at 
home is only applicable if they are e.g. not-for-profit associations.  
In the Woonzorgdecreet of 13 March 2009 it is provided that home care 
organisations can only be authorised if they are created by one of the 
following organisations: 
 a private incorporated society for which it is prohibited by law to provide 
her members a financial benefit 
185  J. Ronse, Algemeen deel van het vennootschapsrecht, Leuven, Acco, s.d., 
292-293; V. Simonart, La personnalité morale en droit privé comparé, 
Brussel, Bruylant, 1995, 179, nr. 215. 
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 a provincial administration 
 a municipal administration  
 a public welfare centre  
 the Flemish community commission 
 a public organisation 
 an organisation founded in conformity with title VIII of the Decree of 
19 December 2008 regarding the organisation of public welfare centres  
 a sickness fund  
 a public institution of category B as mentioned in the Act of 16 
March 1954 on the control of certain institutions having public utility 
 another legal person that does not seek profit and which is appointed 
by the Flemish government. 
4.2.2.4 Impact of State aid rules and public procurement 
legislation on the type of organisation 
Healthcare organisations often receive payments from public authorities to 
operate a hospital or other facilities such as homes for the elderly. If running 
a (private) hospitals can be considered as a service of general economic 
interest (SGEIs), then the question is whether a health system can be a profit 
or a not-for-profit organisation. The Court of Justice has held that, according 
to the scale of values held by each of the Member States and, having regard 
to the discretion available to them, a Member State may restrict the 
operation of certain activities by entrusting them to public or charitable 
                                                     
186  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 105. For case 
law, see e.g. CJ, C-447/08 en C-448/08, 8 July 2010. 
187  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled « Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
bodies.186 Any measure of this kind must, however, be suitable for 
guaranteeing the achievement of one or more legitimate objectives invoked 
by that Member State and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
those objectives. National legislation is appropriate for ensuring attainment 
of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a 
consistent and systematic manner. In any event, such restrictions must be 
applied without discrimination.187 Moreover, European State aid rules do not 
provide for specific criteria on the legal form of the health system.  
If public procurement legislation does apply, an individual contracting 
authority could not, until recently, decide to limit a tender procedure to not-
for-profit service providers.188   
The new public procurement Directive of 2014 (Directive 2014/24) explicitly 
provides that if a Member State applies the procurement procedures for 
certain services in the fields of health, social and cultural services these 
services could be reserved for organisations which are based on employee 
ownership or active employee participation in their governance, and for 
existing organisations such as cooperatives to participate in delivering these 
services to end users. This provision is limited in scope exclusively to certain 
health, social and related services. Art. 77 of Directive 2014/24 provides 
indeed that Member States may provide that contracting authorities may 
reserve the right for organisations to participate in procedures for the award 
of e.g. public contracts exclusively for those health, social and cultural 
services which are covered by CPV (Common Procurement Vocabulary) 
codes 75121000-0 (SC: Supply services of nursing personnel), 75123000-4 
(SC: Supply services of medical personnel). 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 105. 
188  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 95. 
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Such an organisation shall fulfil all of the following conditions: 
 its objective is the pursuit of a public service mission linked to the 
delivery of the above mentioned services;  
 profits are reinvested with a view to achieving the organisation’s 
objective. Where profits are distributed or redistributed, this should be 
based on participatory considerations; 
 the structures of management or ownership of the organisation 
performing the contract are based on employee ownership or 
participatory principles, or require the active participation of employees, 
users or stakeholders; and the organisation has not been awarded a 
contract for the services concerned by the contracting authority 
concerned pursuant to this art. within the past three years. 
Moreover, the maximum duration of the contract shall not be longer than 
three years. 
Even before this new Directive of 2014 on public procurement, the 
Commission was, in 2013, already of the opinion,189 that national law 
regulating a particular activity might, in exceptional cases, provide for 
restricted access to certain services for the benefit of not-for-profit 
organisations. In this case public authorities would be authorised to limit 
participation in a tender procedure to such not-for-profit organisations, if the 
national law is compatible with European law. Nevertheless, such a national 
law would restrict the working of art. 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), on the freedom of establishment 
and the free movement of services, and would have to be justified on a case-
by-case basis. On the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice, such a 
restriction could be justified, in particular, if it is necessary and proportionate 
in view of the attainment of certain social objectives pursued by the national 
social welfare system.190 
                                                     
189  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled « Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 95 
In conclusion, if it is necessary and proportionate in view of the attainment 
of certain societal objectives pursued by the national social welfare system 
it is allowed, under the EU legislation, to restrict Health system services 
(subsidies and procurement) to not-for-profit organisations. Yet, this should 
be motivated on a case-by-case basis and may not be in conflict with other 
national laws. 
4.2.3 Delegation of daily management within the health system 
If the health system is composed of various institutions, it may opt for 
installing a managing CEO in the executive committee for the different types 
of institutions. By special mandate, the board can delegate functions by 
sector or facility, to board committees. In addition, a kind of coordination 
service can be added to the board. To ensure internal collaboration and 
consultation between the various institutions, it is advisable to work with 
coordinating committees and working groups (as in that case of coordinators 
of financial-economic projects or coordinators of common purchase 
agreements and procurement activities) that advise the board and the 
management of facilities. 
4.2.3.1 Not-for-profit association 
If a health system works through a not-for-profit association the general 
assembly decides on the issues mentioned in the Act of 21 June 1921 on 
not-for-profit associations and in the statutes of the organisation. The board 
manages and represents the not-for-profit association. All powers that are 
not expressly conferred by the Act to the general assembly belongs to the 
board.191 The power to represent the collaboration can according to the 
statutes be given to one or more persons. The executive management of 
the collaboration can also be given according to the art. of the association 
to one or more persons. 
190  See Judgment  17 June 1997, zaak C-70/95, Sodemare SA, Anni Azzurri 
Holding SpA en Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl/ Regione Lombardia, Jurispr. 1997, 
pag. I-3395.)  
191  Art. 13 of the Act of 27 June 1921 
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4.2.3.2 For-profit structure 
If a health system opted for working in a for-profit structure (a public limited 
company (PLC); ‘Naamloze Vennootschap’/’Société Anonyme’), then the 
board also plays an important role, as is the case in a not-for-profit 
association. That board cannot simply delegate its powers in general 
terms.192 The daily management may however still be delegated to, for 
example, a CEO. The Highest Court stated in its 2009 judgment193 that a 
member of the executive committee is authorised to make transactions that 
meet the daily needs of the company (and needs that are less important), 
where an urgent settlement is required that does not allow the intervention 
of the board.194 To address the need for more efficient decision-making and 
the legal uncertainty, the Act on Corporate Governance195 provided in the 
ability of a for-profit company (PLC) to create a new provisional institution: 
the legal executive committee. 
The board may be authorised by the statutes to transfer its management 
powers to this executive committee.196 The ability to set up such a 
committee, depends therefore on the existence of a statutory provision.197 
The Act stipulates explicitly that the transfer can never concern the general 
policy or acts which are reserved by Act for the board. In practice it is often 
the executive committee that in reality takes the important decisions, which 
are then subject to ratification by the board.198  
                                                     
192  S. De Geyter, I. De Poorter en E. Leroux, Delegatie en taakverdeling in de 
NV, Gent, Larcier, 2015, 61. 
193  Cass. 26February 2009, R.W. 2009-10, afl. 27, 1129, noot W. GOOSSENS 
and B. CAFMEYER. 
194  B. Beele ‘Dagelijks bestuur’ in B.Beele, J. Huysentruyt en G. Verhaeghe e.d., 
Het bestuur van een NV: vennootschapsrechtelijke, sociale en fiscale 
aspecten, Heule, UGA, 2005, 347. 
195  Act 2 August 2002 houdende wijziging van het Wetboek van 
Vennootschappen alsook van de wet van 2 maart 1989 op de 
openbaarmaking van belangrijke deelnemingen in ter beurze genoteerde 
vennootschappen en tot reglementering van de openbare 
overnameaanbiedingen, BS 22 August 2002. 
Art. 522, § 1, third paragraph of the Company Code allows the board to set 
up in its midst and under its responsibility one or more advisory committees. 
Upon establishment, their composition and their tasks must be defined. The 
board has full freedom in the composition of an advisory committee. Both 
members and non-members, CEOs, employees and external consultants 
can be appointed to a seat in the committee. It is important to note that such 
committees only have advisory roles. The creation of such a committee 
therefore does not imply a delegation of powers by the board.199 The 
purpose of an advisory committee is to inform the board on specific matters. 
The chairman of the committee is expected to write a report after each 
meeting for the board. Examples of such committees include but are not 
limited to: audit committees, remuneration committees (both modelled on 
the obligation for listed public limited companies) and scientific committees. 
The Act contains no provision that the establishment, composition, 
functioning and powers of an advisory committee should be regulated by 
statutes or must be approved of by the general assembly. The board is 
however required to establish the internal rules for each committee and 
include it in the corporate governance-charter. This should also include the 
196  See art. 524bis W. Venn. 
197  S. De Geyter, I. De Poorter en E. Leroux, Delegatie en taakverdeling in de 
NV, Gent, Larcier, 2015, 63. 
198  S. De Geyter, I. De Poorter en E. Leroux, Delegatie en taakverdeling in de 
NV, Gent, Larcier, 2015, 78, nr. 178. The acts of the executive committee and 
its existence can only be invoked against third parties after publication in 
accordance with the art. 76 and 524 bis of the Company Code. If an executive 
committee is established, the board will take on a supervisory role. 
199  S. De Geyter, I. De Poorter en E. Leroux, Delegatie en taakverdeling in de 
NV, Gent, Larcier, 2015, 116, nr. 260; J. De Wolf, ‘Niet-uitvoerende 
bestuurders in een one-tier board system. Begrip en wettelijke toepassing’, 
RPS 2011, afl. 2, nr. 7050, 161. 
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clarification of the composition and functioning of the committee 
concerned.200 
4.2.4 Statutory purpose of the legal entity in charge of the health 
system and participation of other organisations   
As written above, the Hospital Act has made no specific choice of the type 
of legal entity that may operate hospitals. However, in art. 15 of the Hospital 
Act it is defined what kind of institutions can be governed by the not-for-profit 
association operating a hospital. Art. 15 §2 of the Hospital Act specifies that 
hospitals are operated by a legal entity whose sole statutory purpose is the 
operation of one or more hospitals, healthcare institutions or medical-social 
institutions.  
Originally, numerous not-for-profit organisations were, in the broadest sense 
of the term, ‘responsible’ for the operation of nursing homes, meaning that 
they could run for example both nursing homes and hospitals and often also 
carry out related activities in the context of healthcare and welfare, or 
education.201  
Art. 57 of the Act of 14 January 2002 on healthcare measures radically 
altered the then applicable art. 10 (now art. 15 of the Hospital Act). This 
article states: 
 § 1. Every hospital has its own management. 
 § 2. Hospitals are, in accordance with the conditions established by the 
King, by decree adopted after deliberating with the Council of Ministers, 
run by a legal person which has, as its sole statutory purpose, the 
operation of one or more hospitals or health or medical-social 
establishments. 
The King may specify the healthcare establishments, referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs, by decree adopted after deliberating with the 
Council of Ministers. 
                                                     
200   S. De Geyter, I. De Poorter en E. Leroux, Delegatie en taakverdeling in de 
NV, Gent, Larcier, 2015, 174. 
The King may, by decree adopted after deliberating with the Council of 
Ministers, provide exemptions in respect of the provision referred to in 
the first paragraph. 
 § 3. The King may, by decree adopted after deliberating with the Council 
of Ministers, determine the categories of legal persons that may operate 
a hospital. 
4.2.5 Authorisation of the health system or institutions of the 
health system 
4.2.5.1 Authorisation belongs to the administrator, not to a 
building 
As was described above, different types of legal persons can run a health 
system and it remains possible for a Member State to provide in very 
specific, justified and non-discriminatory situations to limit the operation of a 
health system to a very specific type of legal person. The question then is to 
whom belongs the authorisation that was given in the past and was related 
to an institution that is now operated by the health system. 
The legal entity responsible for the exploitation receives authorisation, and 
not the physical institution itself.  
Art. 69 § 1 of the Hospital Act stipulates that every hospital should be 
authorised by the authorities responsible for health policy on the basis of the 
art. 128, 130 or 135 of the Constitution. According to art. 72 each service 
established within a hospital must be authorised by the authorities referred 
to in the art. 128, 130 or 135 of the Constitution. However, the application 
for authorisation as a hospital or hospital service is carried out by the 
‘administration’. For example, art. 1 of the Decree of 25 April 2014 of the 
Flemish Government concerning the procedures for healthcare facilities 
defines the ‘administration’ as one or more persons representing an 
institution who has legal control of the institution. Strictly speaking, it is not 
the hospital as a building or as a service that applies for authorisation. It is 
201  W. Vercruyssen, Basisbeginselen inzake ziekenhuiswetgeving, Caritas 
Verbond der Zorginstellingen vzw, Brussel, 2002, 35 
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the person representing a hospital or service and authorised to legally bind 
it, who applies for the authorisation (see e.g. art. 4 of the Decree of 25 April 
2014) and who will in principle receive it. It is logical that a reference is made 
in the authorisation to the location to which the authorisation relates, but 
strictly speaking is it not the building to whom the authorisation relates, but 
to the person who represents the hospital or service and has legal control of 
it. So, in other words, if a hospital or a service is operated by a not-for-profit 
organisation, it will be that not-for-profit organisation to whom authorisation 
is given. If the not-for-profit association operates various facilities, it will 
always be that same not-for-profit association that will receive authorisation 
but such authorisation can in reality then relate to completely different 
buildings, sites and services. 
4.2.5.2 Is a collaboration or a health system contract between 
hospitals possible if the same legal person operates the 
institutions within the health system? 
Art. 67 of the Hospital Act provides that specific standards can be 
established for groups, mergers and associations of hospitals, such as those 
specified by the King and for the specific locations of the hospitals, such as 
those specified by the King. 
Art. 67 is not concerned with issues concerning a group of hospitals as 
described above. The extent to which institutions within a group as 
described above may proceed to form an association or a group in the 
meaning of the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989, even though there is only 
one legal entity operating the institutions is, however, not clear. In the past, 
the (Flemish) administration did not contest initiatives in which an institution, 
being the authorised operator of hospital A, engages in an association or a 
group according to the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989 with an institution 
which is the authorised operator of hospital B, even if hospital A and hospital 
B were operated by the same legal person. The Royal Decree of the 
30 January 1989 refers mainly to a group of hospitals (rather than the 
different legal entities operating hospitals). 
                                                     
202  Art. 30 of the Decree of 25 April 2014. 
As for the hospital association, it should be pointed out that if a health system 
would like to engage in an association, art. 67 of the Hospital Act states that 
only the legal persons who operate the hospitals that are part of the 
association as well as physical or legal persons who are proposed by the 
concerned entity, may be a member or partner of the legal person that 
exploits this association. If other legal entities are also represented in the 
health system, other than legal persons who are involved in the operating of 
hospitals, it will not be possible to conclude an association. 
Transfer of authorisation and modification of authorisation 
If a hospital is transferred to another organisation, the resulting overarching 
organisation must also secure authorisation relating to the transferred 
hospital. 
In the Decree of 25 April 2014 of the Flemish Government concerning the 
procedures for healthcare facilities, it is stated that any change occurring in 
the course of the authorisation term, in the data contained in the documents 
transmitted, is immediately communicated to the Care and Health Agency. 
If the administration of a hospital, a hospital service, a hospital unit or a form 
of collaboration decides upon the voluntary cessation of the operation of the 
hospital, the hospital service, the hospital unit or a form of collaboration, the 
administrator-general of the Agency must be notified three months in 
advance, specifying the date on which the decision takes its effect. The 
voluntary cessation of the operation, will result in the closure of the hospital, 
the hospital service, the hospital unit or form of collaboration in question.202 
In this case, the planning permission and operating license on which 
authorisation was based, shall expire six months after the date of 
conclusion. 
According to art. 13 of the Decree of 25 April 2014 the request (with 
accompanying explanation as to motivation) for authorisation of a hospital 
unit or a form of collaboration has to be submitted to the agency by the 
administration through means of a registered letter. That application shall 
contain the information and documents supporting the aforementioned 
 70  Governance models for hospital collaborations KCE Report 277 
 
reasons and provide evidence of compliance with all the conditions for 
authorisation. In case of an authorisation for a form of collaboration, art. 1, 
12° of the Decree refers to the forms of collaboration regulated on the basis 
of the Hospital Act, i.e. the merger, association or group. The above 
mentioned Decree of 25 April 2014 does not provide for specific rules for the 
method of collaboration in the context of a health system.  
4.2.6 Financing of the health system 
4.2.6.1 Subsidies for infrastructure 
Above we have described which type of legal person can operate a hospital. 
In this section we analyse which type of legal person may receive subsidies 
for infrastructure.  
Art. 63 of the Hospital Act states that ‘to the extent that the requesting party 
is the executive management in the organisation, a not-for-profit 
organisation, a public utility or a university referred to in art. 10 of the Decree 
of the French Community of 31 March 2004 defining Higher education, 
Favouring its Integration into the European Higher Education Space and the 
Refinancing of Universities’ on the one hand and art. 3 of the Decree of the 
Flemish Community of 12 June 1991 ‘concerning universities in the Flemish 
Community’ on the other hand, the government, as meant in art. 128, 130 
or 135 of the Constitution, can, through grants, intervene in the costs that 
occur. This includes costs pertaining to construction and reorientation of a 
hospital or of a service as well as the first costs of equipping the hospital 
(including the purchase of appliances), provided that the establishment, 
maintenance or conversion of the hospital or of the service fits within the 
framework of the programme mentioned in art. 36. 
This art. 63 of the Hospital Act makes obvious that the legal form is important 
when considering the potential award of infrastructure subsidies. This 
federal rule has been taken over by the legislator of the Community.  
For example, art. 2 of the Decree of 23 February 1994 concerning the 
infrastructure related to individual requirements (‘persoonsgebonden 
materies’/’matières personnalisables’) describes the applicant as the legal 
entity which is approved or meets the legal requirements to organise care 
and services in the framework of individual requirements, and which submits 
an application to obtain an investment subsidy or investment security. The 
decision of 8 June 1999 of the Flemish Government concerning the 
procedure governing the infrastructure for individual requirements states in 
art. 4 the following: 
 The request for subsidies must contain: 
 For the general hospital: 
a. the signed minutes of the meeting of the competent organs of the 
applicant with the decision to apply for an investment and possibly 
an investment guarantee; 
b. the mentioning of the company number or the documents or 
articles which show that the requesting party is either a local or 
provincial administrator, or a not-for-profit organisation. 
From what precedes it appears that applications for investments can only 
be requested by the person who operates the hospital and that if the 
applicant is a commercial organisation, it will not be granted subsidies or 
investment guarantees for a hospital.  
If an organisation modifies its purpose of service or institution without 
previous authorisation it must reimburse the received amounts. 
The Decree on care and housing (‘Woonzorgdecreet’/ ‘Décret sur les soins 
et le lodgement’) of 13 March 2009 provides in art. 63 that subsidies for the 
building or the modification of homes for the elderly, daily care centres or 
centres for short stay can only be given to organisations described by art. 
50. Art. 50 does, however, not mention commercial organisations and refers 
only to:  
 a private incorporated society for which it is prohibited by law to provide 
her members a financial benefit 
 a provincial administration 
 a municipal administration 
 a public welfare centre  
 the Flemish community commission 
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 an organisation authorised in public (administrative law) 
 an organisation founded in conformity with title VIII of the Decree of 19 
December 2008 regarding the organisation of public centres for societal 
wellbeing 
 a sickness fund (a mutuality) 
 a public institution of category B as mentioned in the Act of 16 March 
1954 on the control of certain institution of public utility  
 another legal entity that is not-for-profit and which is appointed by the 
Flemish government. 
Similar rules are applicable for the Walloon region.203 
Such services must be provided by not-for-profit organisations, provinces, 
cities, intermunicipal companies or associations of chapter XII of the Act of 
8 July 1976 regarding public centres of societal wellbeing (art. 226). For the 
homes of the elderly, it follows that the organisation asking for investment 
grants cannot be a commercial organisation (see art. 1473).  
4.2.6.2 Financing for the operation of hospitals 
Each organisation operating a hospital receives a specific budget. A draft 
decision regarding the budget for operating the hospital is sent to the 
administrator, i.e. the legal body that according to the legal status of the 
hospital takes care of operating the hospital. When the administrator 
receives the final budget it will be mentioned (according to art. 106, 2 of the 
TFEU), that the decision is based on the decision of the Commission of 20 
December 2011 regarding the application of art. 10637 TFEU to State aid in 
the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of SGEIs.  
                                                     
203  See Code wallon du 29 septembre 2011 de l’action sociale et de la santé 
(M.B., 21 décembre 2011 (deuxième éd.)) en de Code réglementaire wallon 
du 30 juillet 2013 de l'Action sociale et de la Santé (M.B., 30 août 2013, Errat., 
4.2.6.3 Subsidies for collaboration 
In conformity with art. 105 of the Hospital Act the King, after taking advice 
from the section ‘financing’ National Council for Hospital Facilities 
(‘Nationale Raad voor Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen’/’Conseil National des 
Etablissements Hospitaliers’), determines the conditions and the rules for 
fixing the financial means of the different elements. On the basis of art. 105 
of the Hospital Act, the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 on the fixing and the 
liquidation of the BFM has been taken (MB 30 May 2002 (ed. 3), err. BS 3 
October 2002 (ed.2)). 
A merger of hospitals will of course have an impact on the calculation of the 
BFM. A merger occurs when two or more separate authorised hospitals, that 
may or may not have different boards of administrators, and that are located 
at different physical sites, are brought under one administrator with one 
single authorisation (art. 2 of the Royal Decree 31 May 1989). 
The BFM of the new entity will be fixed according to the rules of the Royal 
Decree of 25 April 2002 on the basis of joint parameters and criteria for each 
of the parts of the budget.204 Art. 97, § 1 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 
provides nevertheless that in case of a merger the parts B1 and B2 of the 
budget of the new entity will be fixed by counting the parts B1 and B2 of the 
separate authorised entities of before the merger. Subsequent to a merger 
it is therefore not the case that the budget of each separate authorised 
hospital before the merger can be simply added to the other hospital in 
calculating a new budget. It is possible that there will be a reduction of the 
BFM after the merger.  
In order to avoid discouraging hospitals from merging, art. 97, § 2 of the 
Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 provides that hospitals that merged on or after 
1 January 2004 can temporarily secure an additional amount through part 
C2. Part C2 of the budget contains the ‘catch-up' amounts for a lack or a 
surplus of revenues in view of the budget fixed for the current year or for one 
M.B., 24 septembre 2013 (première éd.)).-Services d’aide aux familles et aux 
aînés 
204  R. Cuypers, K. Degraev E, M. Tuerlinckx en L. Willems, De financiering van 
de ziekenhuizen, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2013, 69 
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or more previous years (art. 21 Royal Decree of 25 April 2002). For the 
conditions and the methodology for calculating this amount, see art. 97, § 2 
of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002. 
In case of a transfer of activity between two or more general hospitals (with 
the exception of SP-services, SP-services for palliative care, isolated G-
services and units for treatment of serious burns requiring a specialist 
service, a function or a care programme), in the framework of a legally 
formalised agreement of collaboration, the hospitals involved will temporarily 
receive an additional amount through part C2. This can only occur where, 
for the first complete year following the transfer of the activity based on the 
agreement of collaboration, part B2 that relates to this activity is smaller than 
the original transferred part. Part B2 includes a compensation for the costs 
of clinical services, in particular it concerns: 
 the costs of the nursing and caring personnel, with the exception of the 
instrument specialists of the operating room 
 the costs of current medicinal products as mentioned in art. 1, 1° of the 
Royal Decree of 6 June 1960 
 the costs of dressings 
 the costs of medical consumables, products for the care and small 
instruments 
 the costs of storage of blood 
 the costs of rehabilitation with regard to hospitalised patients in the A, 
T , K, G and Sp- services 
 additional costs associated with the social profile of the hospital (art. 13 
KB April 25, 2002). 
Finally, a hospital can on the basis of art. 109 of the Hospital Act temporarily 
receive a specific amount in order to improve the functioning of the hospital, 
if there is a structural reduction of the BFM as a result of an internal 
restructuring of the institution or the result of a collaboration agreement with 
one or more hospitals, which leads to a specialisation or a greater 
concentration of hospital activities. The rules and conditions that apply for 
the grant of the amount are determined in art. 91quater to 91sexiesdecies 
of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002. It is the administrator who must submit 
a request for getting the exceptional grant and who must demonstrate that 
there is effectively a structural reduction of the budget of the hospital in one 
or more of the parts A1, A3, B1, B2, B3 or B5, which is the result of an 
internal restructuring of the institution or the result of a collaboration 
agreement with one or more hospitals leading to a specialisation or a greater 
concentration of hospital activities. 
For this purpose, the administrator inserts the following information with his 
application: 
 the nature and the extent of the measures which lead to the structural 
reduction; 
 the precise list of each of the measures and their impact on the budget 
of the financial means of the hospital. 
The application will subsequently be examined and if the conditions are 
fulfilled for receiving the amount, a contract will be drawn up between the 
Minister of Health and the administrator (s). This agreement shall contain at 
least the following elements: 
 the measures to which the administrator has to conform in accordance 
with the request, the purpose for which the amount was intended, and 
in particular the arrangements for the benefit of personnel covered by 
the internal restructuring measures or taken in the context of the 
collaboration agreement between the hospitals; 
 the mutual obligations to which the hospitals adhere to by a 
collaboration agreement to retain the advantage of the exceptional 
grant (art. 91nonies, § 1 KB April 25, 2002). 
Upon agreement of all parties, the terms of the agreement can be revised at 
the request of a concerned administrator. 
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4.2.7 Transfer of contracts of the health system 
Various private entities (e.g. hospitals, nursing homes) relinquish their 
autonomy to a coordinating body in order to form a closed system. In the 
transition phase, the different entities retain their identity in order to repay 
the debt or to take care of certain ongoing obligations but will eventually 
disappear and only the health system will exist. Below we analyse what 
happens to existing contracts (e.g. with staff and physicians working in an 
institution owned now by the health system).  
4.2.7.1 Contracts of the employees (with statutorily authorised 
rights) 
General 
Concerning the applicability of collective labour agreement83 n° 32bis205 
concerning the transfer of undertakings during the transition, the manner in 
which underlying entities give up their autonomy in favour of the coordinating  
organisation will determine who the employer will be of the staff working for 
the underlying entities. 
Collective Labour Agreement83 n° 32bis is a transposition of a European 
directive.206 The scope of CLA n° 32bis is limited to employment agreements 
within the meaning of the Act on employment and employees who perform 
under an apprenticeship contract.207 This arrangement, if applicable, applies 
only in respect of persons who are employed within the different entities with 
a labour contract. 
                                                     
205  Collective labour agreement nr. 32bis concluded on 7 June 1985 at the 
National Labour Board, betreffende het behoud van de rechten van de 
werknemers bij wijziging van de werkgever ingevolge de overgang van 
ondernemingen krachtens overeenkomst en tot regeling van der rechten van 
de werknemers die overgenomen worden bij overname van activa na 
faillissement, BS 9 August1985. 
206  Directive 2001/23/EG van de Raad van 12 maart 2001 inzake de onderlinge 
aanpassing van de wetgevingen der lidstaten betreffende het behoud van de 
Analysis of the conditions of application of CLA n° 32bis 
CLA n°32bis aims to protect employees against the uncertainty that might 
result with a change of employer. For the application of CLA n° 32bis it is 
required that there is (1) change of employer; a transfer of contract; and (3) 
a transfer of (part of) a company. 
CLA n°32bis shall apply if the employee gets a new legal employer. There 
must be a change in the natural or legal person who operates the 
undertaking and who therefore has obligations to the employees of the 
undertaking.208 This requirement may be satisfied if the overarching body 
that operates the health system becomes the new employer of the staff. If 
there is a concentration or restructuring where the underlying undertakings 
continue to be the employer of their own staff, the use of CLA n°32bis is 
excluded. The commentary accompanying the CLA clarifies that one may 
refer to a transfer in case of, for example, a new company, a cession, a 
merger or an absorption of an undertaking. 
  
rechten van de werknemers bij overgang van ondernemingen, vestigingen of 
onderdelen van ondernemingen of vestigingen, P.B. L 82, 22 March 2001, 
16. 
207  See art. 2, 1° CLA n° 32bis and comments. 
208  See art. 6 and comments, CLA nr. 32bis; C. Engels, ‘Het toepassingsgebied 
van de CAO nr. 32bis normaals bekeken’, Oriëntatie Sociaal Recht, 2014, afl. 
5, 123. 
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The employment agreements are automatically transferred  
Art. 7 of CLA n°32bis means that the existing employment contract passes 
through this transition to the transferee. The transferee should assume the 
obligations arising from the employment contracts existing at the time of the 
transfer.209 The original employment contract concluded by the transferor 
shall be carried out under the same conditions as before, both with respect 
to the transferred employee and the transferee.210 No new employment 
contract will be created. The employee cannot oppose the transfer. If he 
refuses to take up the new employment contract, this is considered by the 
Act as a breach of contract.211 
The transfer of the employment contracts to the new employer is no reason 
for termination of the employment contract of the employee 
A transfer of an undertaking should not in itself constitute a ground for 
dismissal either for the transferor nor the transferee.212 Dismissal remains 
possible if there is a compelling reason that can be invoked, or when there 
are economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the 
workforce. These reasons may be related to the transfer, but this should not 
be the only motive.213 In addition, the contract can be legitimately terminated 
by mutual agreement at any time. 
                                                     
209  R. Parijs en P. Tierens, ‘De arbeidsrechtelijke gevolgen van het faillissement 
en het gerechtelijk akkoord t.a.v. de individuele arbeidsverhouding in geval 
van voortzetting van de activiteiten door wijziging van werkgever’ in H. 
Braeckmans, Faillissement en reorganisatie, 17 July2003, 47, 11. 
210  See Explanation of the FPS Employment, Labor and Social Dialogue: 
http://www.werk.belgie.be/defaultTab.aspx?id=492. 
211  Cass. 6 June 1973, JTT 1973, 203; Arbh. Antwerp 9 January 2007; Arbh. 
Brussels 22 February 2008. 
212  Art. 9 CLA n°. 32bis. 
Maintaining terms of employment after transition 
In principle the working conditions remain after the transition,214 but nothing 
prohibits the transferee and its employee to change working conditions by 
mutual agreement. Unilateral changes of the working conditions by the 
transferee are acceptable, but only when they are in favour of the employee. 
The transferee must also take into account that a significant unilateral 
change can be seen as an implicit dismissal.215 
Joint liability (liability in solidum) between the transferor and transferee 
From the moment of the transfer, the transferee and the transferor are jointly 
liable (liability in solidum) for the payment of the existing debt, which at that 
time results from existing employment contracts. This does not apply to 
debts arising from supplementary regimes of social insurance.216 
Information obligation 
In the presence of employee representatives they are entrusted with 
informing the employees about their rights and the acquisition. If there are 
no employee representatives in the undertakings where neither a company 
council nor a trade union representative exists, the workers concerned must 
be informed in advance of aspects including the date or proposed date of 
the transfer, the reasons of that transition or the acquisition of assets and 
the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer or of the transfer 
of assets to the employees. 
213  Arbh. Luik 5 May 2003, ,not published.; Arbh. Luik 27 June 2006, JTT 2006, 
41. 
214  Except the rights resulting from systems of income supplement concerning 
elderly, survival and disability. These will not be transferred, unless they are 
fixed in a CLA.    
215  Art. 10 CLA nr. 32bis. 
216  See art. 8 CLA nr. 32bis. 
 KCE Report 277 Governance models for hospital collaborations 75 
 
Involvement of public bodies in the transfer 
In Belgian legislation, the public entities do not fall within the scope of the 
Collective Agreement Act, and hence, not within the scope of the individual 
collective agreements.217 According to art. 2, § 3 of the CLA act, the CLA 
Act does not apply for ‘those employed by the State, the Communities, the 
Regions, the Community Commissions, the provinces, the municipalities, 
the subordinate institutions and the public utilities’. It could be argued that 
there is a gap in the Belgian legislation and an incorrect transposition 
regarding what constitutes ‘the public sector with an economic activity’.218 
Directive 2001/23 of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of the rights of 
employees by the transfer of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses indicates that the Directive applies to ‘public and 
private undertakings who exercise an economic activity, whether or not-for-
profit.’ The Belgian courts must always adopt a directive-compliant 
interpretation of the instruments that were transposed from European law.219 
The Court of Justice has already ruled that a particular (public law) company 
which for example offers help at home to those in need, may be considered 
as a ‘public company that exercises an economic activity’.220 
Even if CLA n°32bis is interpreted in conformity with the directive, the CLA 
n°32bis still offers only guarantees regarding contractual employees. The 
ratio legis of Directive 2001/23/EC is that the employees must be protected 
during the transfer of the company where they are employed. Consequently, 
if in the health system there is a transfer of statutory staff, it is possible that 
they may resign from the undertaking and enter into a new employment 
contract with the coordination body of the group. 
                                                     
217  See art. l 2, § 3 CLA-Act. 
218  For more information, see C. Vandersnickt, Overgang van onderneming 
krachtens overeenkomst, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2015, (97) 105. 
The application of different CLAs within the health system 
For each undertaking (i.e., the legal entity involved) there is basically only 
one competent joint committee. Only the CLA concluded within the joint 
committee will then apply. The basis of the Collective Labour Act at sectoral 
level lies in the joint committees, which have their origin in a Royal Decree. 
The King may set up a joint committee for any activity on his own initiative 
or at the request of one or more representative trade unions. The King 
determines which persons, which company division or undertakings belong 
to the jurisdiction of each committee. 
The scope of the joint committee must be determined for each undertaking 
and not at the level of the group to which the undertaking belongs. The 
general rule is that a joint committee is responsible for all workers employed 
by the same employer, regardless of the profession of the employee. 
It is not always clear under which joint committee a company falls. The 
answer to that question is however important as the applicable CLA sets the 
earnings and working conditions within a company. A company may request 
advice from the General Directorate of Collective Labour Relations of the 
FPS (Federal Public Service) Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue. 
Ultimately, it is the labour court that is competent to determine under which 
joint committee a company falls. The scope of a joint committee is in 
principle determined by the main activity of the company, unless another 
criterion is defined in the foundation act. When considering which joint 
committee is competent one should rely on the actual de facto activity of the 
company, i.e., the principle activity carried out by the staff. To determine the 
main activity, the FPS Employment uses the following criterion: ‘the 
economic activity which most working hours are spent on or which employed 
most of the staff.’ Therefore to concretely examine under which joint 
committee the group will fall, it is first necessary to conduct an assessment 
of how many employees exercise which activity. It is then advisable to read 
219  K. Lenaerts en P. Van Nuffel, Europees recht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerp, Maklu, 
1995, 565. 
220  Court of Justice 10 December 1998, Sanchez Hildalgo, C-173/96. 
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the foundation act of each joint committee to verify if a different criterion than 
the main activity is used. 
The principle, however, of a joint committee for each employer remains. 
There are some exceptions to this principle, namely separate joint 
committees for ‘workers’ and ‘employees’ (i.e. with different statutorily 
authorised terms) or when a company carries out various activities without 
a mutual relationship, exercised in different rooms with personnel 
exclusively assigned to each of these activities. 
4.2.7.2 Statutory employees  
Statutory employees are excluded from the scope of the CLA n°32bis.221  
For statutory employees, given the current state of the Act, the best solution 
is to resign of the underlying company and to conclude a new employment 
contract with the coordination body. This requires the individual consent of 
each statutorily employed person. 
4.2.7.3 Contracts with self-employed and with third parties  
For not-for-profit organisations who transferred rights and obligations to a 
new not-for-profit organisation which may for example lead the health 
system and operate the institutions, it is important to create legal certainty 
about the rights and obligations of existing contracts. The question is 
whether for each contract with a self-employed physician working in a 
hospital or for each contract regarding the selling of e.g. medical products 
new contractual clauses have to be written in case of a transfer of activities. 
So the question is whether a self-employed person who had a contract with 
an organisation who transferred its activities to another (or new) organisation 
automatically enters into agreement with the new organisation? Or is an 
express consent or a new contract with the new organisation required? 
                                                     
221  Cass. 2 March 1991, Arr. Cass. 1980-81, 733; R. Blanpain, De collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomst, Bruges, Die Keure, 2011, 59. 
222  Seer Coipel, M., Davagle, M. e.a., Fusions et scissions d’ASBL après la loi 
du 30 décembre 2009, Edi.pro, 2010, 256p. 
Through an amendment to art. 670, paragraph 2 of the Company Code this 
condition has been satisfied.222 It stipulates that art. 770 applies to all legal 
entities, whether or not explicitly intended by this legislation (e.g. not-for-
profit organisations), that explicitly choose the forms mentioned in this art. 
Art. 770 shall specify which agreement is applicable in case of a transfer, 
whether for free or for payment, of the totality or a division of a company. 
Art. 58 of the NPA (not-for-profit associations) Act clarifies, that where 
invoked art. 670, paragraph 2 of the Company Code, art. 770, and the 
articles to which it refers to, apply mutatis mutandis to the transfer without 
payment of the totality or a division of a company by a not-for-profit 
association, a public foundation, a private foundation, an international not-
for-profit association (...), in favour of a legal person belonging to any of the 
preceding categories. Art. 770 of the Company Code provides that in case 
of transfer for free or for payment of the totality or a division of a company, 
within the meaning of the definitions given in art. 678 to 680, the parties may 
subject that transaction to the rules set out in art. 760 to 762 and 764 to 767, 
or described in the scheme described in art. 768.  
If no use is made of art. 670 paragraph 2 of the Company Code, the health 
system must take into account that many hospital physicians are working as 
self-employed physicians. Contracts relating to such rules are often intuitu 
personae, especially contracts concluded at the behest of the involved 
person. There will remain a discussion about whether the totality of such 
contracts are just automatically continued.223  
Another issue when creating a health system is whether a new legal status 
within the health system may simply be imposed on independent hospital 
doctors. In principle, a hospital physician is not obliged to comply with a new 
general regulation regarding the rights and duties of hospital physicians and 
hospital administrators as long as they did not accept the new general 
223  M. Davagle en M. Coipel, ‘Le régime juridique de l’apport gratuit d’universalité 
ou de branche d’activités selon la modification législative de décembre 2009’ 
in M. Coipel, M. Davagle e.a., Fusions et scissions d’ASBL après la loi du 30 
décembre 2009, Luik, Edi.Pro, 2010, 88 ; Gent 25 January 2001, TRV 2004, 
afl. 3, 244, note M. Wauters; 
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regulation.224 Hospitals often want to work with a new regulation with the 
obligations and rights of the physicians and the hospital in case of a change 
of the entity who is in charge of the hospital, for example after a merger. 
Many hospitals provide in the regulation that the physician has to adhere to 
the current general regulation as well as all future modifications of the 
regulation. This clause is often called a ‘perpetual clause’ (a so called 
‘kettingbedingen’/’clause perpétuelle’).225 The notion 'perpetual clause' is not 
really a good term in this context. A perpetual clause is strictly speaking a 
clause whereby a contractor undertakes to impose to a third party a certain 
obligation, if he concludes an agreement with a third party. A clause which 
provides that physicians commit themselves to agree with a set of 
subsequently concluded new general regulations, is actually not a perpetual 
clause but a clause that grant the competence to take a party decision. 
There will be a party decision ‘if a party, by law or by virtue of a contractual 
clause, has the power to determine unilaterally to change an element of the 
agreement.’226 Even if in a general regulation or in an individual contract 
concluded between the hospital administrator and hospital physician a 
clause is provided that allows to take a party decision, a hospital 
administrator cannot just arbitrarily make use of such a clause. It should be 
noted that a court can retrospectively examine the party decision itself and 
thus in this case the changes that the hospital administrator would make to 
the general regulation. Here, the court will consider whether the agreement 
was carried out in good faith and whether the hospital administrator has 
committed an abuse of law.227 The value of the clause described as a 
‘perpetual clause’ must be to our opinion dramatically reduced. In addition, 
a general regulation may only be amended in accordance with the provisions 
of art. 137(1) and 139 and 140 of the Hospital Act. If any changes are 
proposed that are not acceptable, the medical council will thus be able to 
                                                     
224  Cass. 8 april 2002, AR C.00.0118.N; S. Callens, M. Leire, L. Boddez, L. Van 
Leuven en J. Peers, ‘Titel II. Het aanbod in de gezondheidszorg’ in S. 
CALLENS en J. Peers (eds.), Organisatie van de gezondheidszorg, 
Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2015, 91-92 
225  F. Dewallens, ‘Hoofdstuk III. De gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen’ in T. 
Vansweevelt en F. Dewallens (eds.), Handboek gezondheidsrecht, I, 
give a negative (reinforced) advice. The hospital administrator will have to 
follow the conciliation procedure provided in art. 139 and 140 of the Hospital 
Act, if he cannot accept this advice. 
4.2.8 Value added tax issues 
4.2.8.1 Transfer of a universality or of a company division 
If the transfer of a not-for-profit organisation is liable to valued added tax 
(VAT) at varying rates and makes a contribution of the totality or a division 
of a company in favour of a mixed-VAT payer not-for-profit organisation, 
art. 11 of the Code of the VAT can be applied. This article stipulates that a 
‘delivery’ cannot be considered as including the transfer of the totality or a 
division of a company for payment or free of charge, by way of contribution 
in a partnership or otherwise, where the purchaser is a taxpayer, who would 
deduct the tax due by the transfer fully or partially. In that case, the 
purchaser shall be deemed to continue with the identity of the transferor. 
4.2.8.2 Cost-sharing associations in the transition phase? 
Pending the establishment of a health system which is the only legal person 
that operates the various institutions, the various not-for-profit organisations 
that run the institutions during the transition, can operate together. This may 
have an impact in terms of VAT issues if there is e.g. a cost-sharing 
association (‘kostendelende vereniging’/’associations de frais’). 
Since 1 July 2016, the VAT regime of cost-sharing associations has been 
adapted thoroughly. The Act of 26 May 2016 amending the Code of the VAT 
regarding the exemption of services provided to their members by 
Zorgverleners: statuut en aansprakelijkheid, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2014, 
277 
226  See I. Samoy and A. Maes, ‘Concerning the clause that authorizes a party to 
take a decision and whether the inclusion of objective criteria is necessary for 
the validity’ (note under Ghent October 13, 2008), TBBR 2010 , Vol. 6, (309) 
310 
227  I. Samoy and A. Maes, 312 
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independent groups of persons, inserted in art. 44 of the Code of the VAT a 
paragraph 2bis. As the title suggests, it is a modification of the exemption of 
services that independent groups of persons provide to their members.  
The notion 'independent group of persons’ means both an organisation with 
legal personality (such as a not-for-profit association) and an organisation 
without legal personality, can act under their own name as a separate 
organisation or group on behalf of its members in dealing with third parties. 
The group can exist legally independent of its members, but this is not a 
requirement. If the group has no distinct legal existence from its members, 
the group needs to operate under its own name towards its members and 
third parties as a separate entity. 
It should be noted that Belgian administrative practice refers to an 
independent group usually with the notion of a ‘cost-sharing association.’ A 
cost-sharing association is a permanent community of interests founded by 
physical persons or legal entities in order to rationalise and reduce their 
administrative and operating costs. Typically, the expenditure of its 
members occurs communally. The objective of the cost-sharing association 
is to reduce the costs of the exempted or non-taxable activities of their 
members. 
The Act of 26 May 2016 is a partial transposition of Directive 2006/112/EC 
of 28 November 2006 on the common system of VAT. By inserting 
paragraph §2bis in art. 44 of the Code of the VAT, Belgium responds to the 
request of the European Commission to comply with art. 132, paragraph 1, 
item (f) of the European directive 2006/112/EC which provides that ‘services 
supplied by independent groups of persons are exempt from or are not 
subject to tax, with the aim of providing services to their members which are 
directly necessary for the exercise of their activity, where such groups of 
their members only claim reimbursement of their share of the joint expenses, 
provided that such exemption is not likely to cause distortion of competition.’ 
The conditions under which the services of independent groups of persons 
to their members are exempted from VAT are listed under paragraph 2a of 
art. 44 of the Code of the VAT. These four conditions must be met 
cumulatively: 
 members of the group exercise on a regular basis an activity that, under 
art. 44 of the Code of the VAT, is exempted or for which they are not 
taxable. The exempted activities or activities for which the members do 
not pay tax, represent a major part of the activity of the members; 
 the activities of the group consist of the provision of services to its 
members which are directly necessary for their exempt activity or their 
activity for which they are not taxable. If the group also carries out 
activities for non-members, the activities carried out for its members 
represent the majority of the activity of the group; 
 the fee charged to or money recuperated from each member represents 
the reimbursement of its share of the joint expenses incurred by the 
group; 
 the exemption does not lead to distortion of competition. 
The cost-sharing association has an obligation of notification and 
information. At the beginning of its activity, the independent group of 
persons, who carries out only services which are exempt or for which it has 
not the status of taxable person, shall be obliged to make a notification to 
the competent VAT office. This notification must be made within the month 
following the beginning of such activities. In addition, the group must also 
submit to the office a list of its members, as well as the nature of their 
activities. This must happen within the same period. In addition, the group is 
also obliged, by the entry or departure of a member, by modification of the 
activity of the group or any of its members or termination of the activity, to 
inform the VAT office of this within the month following the aforementioned 
event. Although the group exclusively performs services which are exempt 
from VAT or for which it does not have the status of taxable person, based 
on art. 44 §2bis, second paragraph of the Code of the VAT, a notification 
and an information obligation is imposed on the group. Of note is that such 
a group does not fall within the scope of art. 53 of the Code of the VAT. 
An independent group that has mixed VAT rate obligations is obliged to 
report, based on art. 53 of the VAT. The new regime imposes an additional 
notification obligation and information obligation based on art. 44 §2bis third 
paragraph of the Code of the VAT, to submit a list of its members at the start 
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of its operations, as well as the nature of their activity. In addition, this group 
must inform the supervising office of any entry or departure of a member. 
Moreover, this requirement applies for groups that already existed on 
1 July 2016, when the Act came into force. Therefore groups are obliged to 
be transparent about their members and the nature of the activity of their 
members. The King will determine the further practical formalities for the 
notification and information obligation. 
4.2.9 Compliance with competition law by the group 
Agreements of undertakings, like hospitals and decisions of associations, 
networks or groups of hospitals must not hinder competition in the 
healthcare market. An entity that practices an economic activity, whatever 
legal form it has and however it is financed, can be considered as an 
undertaking. 
Where a group brings together numerous hospitals and possibly other 
institutions and becomes a significant major player, the question arises if 
there will be no abuse of dominant position on the Belgian market or on a 
substantial part of this market. Art. IV.2 of the Code of Economic Act 
stipulates that ‘without the need for a prior decision to that effect, the abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position on the Belgian market 
concerned or a substantial part thereof is prohibited’. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist of: 
 directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
 limiting production, markets or technical developments to the detriment 
of consumers; 
 applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
 making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts. 
Not only may a group not abuse a dominant position, it is necessary to seek 
intervention of the competition authority prior to the creation of group.  
According to art. IV.6, §1 of the Code of Economic Law a ‘concentration’ 
shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting basis results 
from: 
 the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts 
of undertakings; or 
 the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of 
securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or 
indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 
Where the undertakings of the group in Belgium surpass a turnover of more 
than 100 million euro and at least two of the undertakings in Belgium surpass 
a turnover of at least 40 million euro, notification of the concentration will be 
mandatory. Prior authorisation of the concentration by the Belgian 
Competition Authority will be necessary. This authority determines whether 
or not the concentration will be allowed (art. IV.9 §1). The decision will take 
into account: 
 the need to maintain and to develop an effective competition in the 
national market, especially taking into account the structure of all the 
relevant markets and the actual or potential competition from 
companies based in or outside Belgium; 
 the market position of the undertakings and their economic and financial 
power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to 
supplies or markets, any legal or factual barriers to market access, the 
development of demand and supply of the products and services, the 
interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers and the 
development of technical and economic progress, to the extent that it is 
to consumers' advantage and does not hinder competition. 
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Concentrations which do not result in a significant impediment of the 
effective competition in the Belgian market or in a substantial part of it, 
including by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be 
declared admissible (art. IV.9. § 3). 
Concentrations have to be notified to the Competition Prosecutor general 
before their implementation and after the conclusion of the agreement, 
publication of the take-over bid or public offer of exchange, or of the 
acquisition of a controlling interest. The parties may however notify a 
proposed agreement provided that they declare explicitly that they intend to 
conclude an agreement which does not differ significantly from the notified 
proposal as regards all the relevant points of the competition act. The 
notification can be made in Dutch or French. As long as the Competition 
College does not pronounce its decision on the permissibility of the 
concentration, the undertakings concerned may not implement the 
concentration. 
The application of the aforementioned competition rules with respect to a 
health system that has a large market share are important. In case of abuse 
of this power there could be distortion of competition, higher prices and/or 
lower quality of care for patients. This may be the case if the group can 
behave differently from its competitors by virtue of its position.  In order to 
verify that there is no question of a dominant position in the relevant Belgian 
market or in a substantial part of it, a product market and a geographic 
market will have to be defined.228 It is assumed that it is unlikely that the 
institution can act independently of others, when an institution has a market 
share of less than 25%.229  With a market share between 25% and 40% there 
may be, under certain circumstances, what is called in the Netherlands 
substantial market share, for example if that institution has control over 
essential facilities, if there are long-term non-market prices, or if market 
share of other market (segments) is used to exercise market power with a 
small market share.230 With a market share between 40% and 55%, it is 
likely that there is a significant market share and with a market share of 55% 
                                                     
228  D. Fornaciari, S. Callens en E. Schokkaert, Ziekenhuizen, mededingingsrecht 
en recht op kwaliteitsvolle zorg, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, 107. 
229  Andersson, Elffers enFelix, Ordening en toezicht in de zorg, 2015, p. 72 
or more, it is assumed that the institution is able to exercise significant 
market power.231  
4.2.10 Evaluation 
4.2.10.1 Adjustment objective and legal form 
A legal entity may operate several institutions. If the health system wants to 
operate, besides hospitals, also residential care centres and nurseries, an 
amendment of certain acts will be required. Certain legal texts describe in a 
strict manner the aim that the legal entity is entitled to pursue, so that it is 
not possible to run hospitals and residential care centres. Some acts provide 
a specific company form, while this is not the case in other acts. However, 
European legislation already allows that a government reserves the right to 
perform certain services, for example, for not-for-profit organisations. With 
regard to general services of economic interest, art. 49 and 56 TFEU 
(concerning freedom of establishment and free movement of services) 
should be respected. The restriction must be justified. According to the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, such restrictions may be justified, 
particularly if this restriction is necessary and proportionate in order to 
achieve certain national social security objectives (GIDS). 
230  Andersson, Elffers en Felix, Ordening en toezicht in de zorg, 215, p. 73 
231  Andersson, Elffers enFelix, Ordening en toezicht in de zorg, 215, p. 73 
 KCE Report 277 Governance models for hospital collaborations 81 
 
4.2.10.2 Need of legal authorisation 
The authorisation of an institution belongs to the administrator 
In Belgium authorisation is granted to the legal person, even though it is 
related to the concrete institution. 
Financing for one institution of the health system must be used for that 
institution.  
Funding by the government to one institution of a health system cannot be 
used for another institution of the health system. The legal entity can receive 
various forms of compensation per institution, but must also have a separate 
accounting, so that it can be clearly demonstrated which government 
funding covers which costs. It will for example not be possible to use 
compensation for hospital A to cover costs at hospital B. 
Specific legal rules for the health system might be needed 
Specific authorisation rules for a health system itself, as described in this 
first model, are lacking. There are rules concerning authorisation for a group 
of hospitals, but not for the health system as described in this report. If the 
legislator wants to make such rules, it will be necessary to do this with the 
conclusion of collaboration agreements between the federal government 
and the communities. Through these new rules, it should be for example 
possible to avoid the abuse of a dominant position, that the establishment 
of the health system does not benefit the quality of care or that the 
establishment of the health system is not supported by patients, physicians, 
employees (see below). 
4.2.10.3 Modifications of the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989  
If a health system wants to create a collaboration between the hospitals of 
the health system, it may be possible to create a group of hospitals as 
defined in the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989. Nevertheless, this Royal 
Decree limits the distance of a group of hospitals to 25 km. Given this, 
hospitals cannot be located more than 25 km from each other. This may 
hinder the creation of health systems with hospitals located in different 
regions.  
Moreover, the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989 does not regulate 
collaboration amongst hospitals and other care institutions, e.g. the homes 
for the elderly.  
4.2.10.4 Collaboration between hospitals within the health system 
General 
The health system model does not lead to collaboration; it only allows one 
legal person to run several institutions (hospitals, nursing homes etc.). In 
reality true collaboration between institutions within the health system can 
only exist, if consultations are held at many levels and 
participation/involvement of numerous employees of the health system and 
users of the services of the health system occurs. It is appropriate that the 
legislation is adjusted so that it provides not only the conditions for the 
establishment of the health system, but also rules which facilitate 
collaboration between institutions of the same health system. It would be 
preferable to avoid a setup whereby for each function in each hospital within 
a health system (e.g. CMO, CEO, etc.) or for each committee or council a 
different person or committee or council is chosen as if the institutions are 
run by separate legal entities (see below). 
Joint committees / councils / functions 
Medical council 
It is possible under the existing legislation, to create a common medical 
committee if two hospitals that are not yet merged. If hospitals work closely 
together, e.g. in a ‘group’ as in the meaning of the Royal Decree of 30 
January 1989, there is the possibility to create one medical council for the 
two hospitals. Model 1 as such does not lead immediately to the creation of 
a common medical committee for all hospitals involved. This will only be the 
case if the hospitals of the health system collaborate or do enter into an 
agreement regarding a group as defined in the Royal Decree of 30 January 
1989. Art. 5, § 6 of the Royal Decree of 10 August 1987 provides that in 
case of different collaborating hospitals, the board and the medical staff may 
send a common and concurrent request at the Joint Committee Hospital 
Administrators and Hospital Physicians (‘Nationale Paritaire Commissie 
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geneesheren-ziekenhuizen’/‘Commission paritaire nationale médecins-
hôpitaux’) at the Federal Public Service of Health to organise elections for 
one single medical council. In deciding whether to consent to this request 
the Commission will look at the integration of governance structures and of 
the medical activities in the hospitals. 
The problem is, however, that the rules of voting for a medical council, do 
not really take into account the fact that a physician may work in several 
hospitals of the health system. Physicians working in various hospitals of the 
health system will have their voting power for the election to the medical 
board limited, especially if each hospital has its own medical board. 
If two hospitals A and B decide to cooperate and, as part of this 
collaboration, organise services on different hospital sites so that physicians 
of hospital A will also work in hospital B, it will be no longer possible for this 
physician – if he/she works fulltime – to have the maximum of 4 votes. 
Instead, he/she will have only maximum 3 votes. Moreover, if he/she works 
at least two half days in the other hospital, he/she will have to decide where 
he/she will vote for the elections of the medical council. If he/she wants to 
vote in both hospitals, he/she will have only 2 votes divided over the two 
hospitals. It is only in case of activities in hospitals which were regrouped in 
a hospital merger, that the activities are counted together in order to 
determine the total activity (and the total number of votes). The above 
mentioned rules are not applicable to a health system where each hospital 
has its own medical council, CMO and general CEO and does not take 
initiatives to merge the hospitals. 
CMOs and heads of medical services working in different hospitals of the 
health system 
CMOs and heads of medical services can under certain conditions work in 
different hospitals of the collaboration. The CMO and the head of a medical 
department have to work normally exclusively in the hospital. However, this 
rule does not apply if they work in several hospitals in a group of hospitals 
according to the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989. In that case, the CMO 
can practice his function as a fulltime role or as a part-time role together with 
other functions in the hospitals of the group. However, as was described 
above, the health system as mentioned in this model 1 does not necessarily 
imply a group of hospitals in the meaning of the Royal Decree of 30 January 
1989.  It is only if the health system has also been authorised as a group in 
the meaning of the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989 that a CMO or the 
head of a medical department can also work in another hospital (of the 
health system) with which a contract of a group was drafted. 
Ethics committee 
Each hospital must have a local ethics committee. In the case of an 
authorised hospital group in the meaning of the Royal Decree of 30 January 
1989, a common ethics committee can be created for all hospitals of the 
group, or separate ethics committees can be created for each hospital. For 
the same rule to apply to a health system in the meaning of model 1, new 
legislation is needed.  
A common ombudsfunction for collaborating hospitals 
Art. 71 of the Hospital Act provides that to be authorised, every hospital must 
have a mediation function. Such a function can be shared between hospitals 
under the conditions described by the King. 
Art. 1 §2 of the Royal Decree on the conditions to be fulfilled by an 
‘ombudsfunction’ in hospitals provides that such collaboration can take place 
through the conclusion of a written collaboration agreement between the 
hospitals. It seems that this rule would allow a health system to have only 
one common ‘ombudsfunction’.  Moreover, it is provided in art. 1, § 3 of the 
Royal Decree of 8 July 2003 that psychiatric hospitals can comply with 
art. 11 of the Act on patient rights (i.e. the right of a patient to file a complaint 
related to his rights before a competent ombudsman) through the 
‘ombudsfunction’ of a collaboration of psychiatric institutions and services 
as consultation platform as mentioned in the Royal Decree of 10 July 1990.  
Medical-Pharmaceutical Committee and Health Committee 
Each hospital of the group is expected to continue to meet the authorisation 
standards that apply to it. Each hospital therefore has to continue to have a 
medico- pharmaceutical committee and a health committee. However, the 
possibility exists for hospitals of a group to organise some unique 
committees. This is particularly the case for local ethics committees (art. N1, 
A, III, 9° d of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 cited above) or hospital 
transfusion committees (art. N1, A, III, 9° d of the Royal decree of 23 October 
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1964 cited above). Such a possibility is not expressly provided for hospital 
hygiene committees or for medico-pharmaceutical committees. 
4.2.10.5 Competition and authority 
It is not appropriate in case of a health system to limit the collaboration with 
other institutions. This does not benefit the free movement of services and 
may lead to infringements of competition law. Based on the above legal 
analysis, it seems appropriate that prior to the establishment of a health 
system, the government must give its approval. In case of a merger in 
principle a notification to the Competition Authority will be required. The 
Competition Authority can also become involved if there is for example an 
abuse of a dominant position by the health system. It could also be argued 
that it is appropriate, following the example of the Netherlands, to provide, 
in addition to the Competition Authority, a specific healthcare institution to 
monitor mergers or, as is the case in this model, a health system. 
The Netherlands has opted to allow the Dutch Healthcare Authority 
(‘Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit’, NZa) to act in a more preventive way where 
there is no market failure. This surveillance by the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority is not based on competition law, but is a specific care control.232 
An institution that offers professional or commercial care with more than 50 
healthcare providers and has the intention to concentrate, cannot proceed 
to concentration without the approval of the NZa. Healthcare providers must, 
under art. 49b of the Act on regulating the market of healthcare (‘Wet Markt 
Ordening Gezondheidszorg’), include with their request a report on the 
expected impact of the proposed concentration. The report should at least 
provide clarification of the objectives of the concentration, the reasons for 
concentration, the structure of the proposed organisation of healthcare or 
healthcare providers, the financial impact of the concentration on the 
healthcare provider or healthcare providers, the impact of the concentration 
on the provision of care to the patient, the risks of the concentration on the 
quality and accessibility of care and how these risks are set off. The report 
also should include the findings and recommendations of clients, staff and 
other stakeholders about the intention to concentrate and how they have 
                                                     
232  Andersson, Elffers en Felix, Ordening en toezicht in de zorg, 215, p. 82 
been able to express, as well as a justification for the way the judgment or 
the recommendations are taken into account in the intention to concentrate. 
Finally, the report has to indicate how and in what time frame the 
concentration will be realised. 
 Within four weeks, the Dutch Healthcare Authority will take a decision. 
It may withhold its consent to the concentration if: 
 clients, staff and other stakeholders who are not closely involved in the 
preparation of the concentration are not informed at least in a timely and 
understandable manner about the content of the concentration plan and 
the way in which judgments or recommendations may be disclosed; 
 the findings and recommendations of clients, staff and other 
stakeholders are not convincingly argued and included in the decision 
to concentration; 
 as a result of the concentration, the continuity of through general 
administrative measures designated types of care are jeopardized;  
 the applicant's report does not provide sufficient insight into the 
expected effects of the proposed concentration on the basis of the 
requirements specified in art. 49b, second and third paragraphs (art. 
49c WMO). 
NZa may impose conditions, regulations or restrictions to be met in order to 
gain approval. If it approves the concentration, it shall make the report public 
(as referred to in art. 49b). Data that is categorical as ‘not for distribution’, 
under art. 10 of the Freedom of Information Act, is not made public. 
The care authority clarifies to the Competition Authority the impact that the 
concentration will have on the affordability, accessibility and on the quality 
of care, according to the findings of the officials of the state supervision. 
In terms of oversight of the concentration, the NZa does not do the same job 
as the Competition Authority. In particular, it controls whether the procedural 
conditions are met and whether crucial care remains available.233 The 
advantage of the method in the Netherlands is that in case of a proposed 
233  Andersson, Elffers en Felix, Ordening en toezicht in de zorg, 215,  p. 83 
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merger, the applicants have to be able to have an internal support for the 
proposed merger.234   
4.2.11 Conclusion 
If the person who operates the hospital receives the authorisation, the 
funding will be provided to whoever has received the authorisation. 
The current funding rules provide the possibility of additional financing in 
case of a merger or a transfer of activities. 
In case of a transfer of an undertaking, the CLA n° 32bis must be applied. 
In principle there is one competent joint committee for each undertaking and 
the CLA concluded within the joint committee is applicable. The scope of a 
joint committee shall be determined by the main activity of the undertaking, 
unless another criterion is defined in the foundation document. 
As soon as a health system exists, i.e. one undertaking with potentially 
different activities, there are no immediate specific VAT issues. This may be 
the case prior to the establishment of the health system, if a transfer will take 
place or if there is a cost-sharing association. 
According to art. 11 of the VAT Code, the transfer of all assets or a company 
division by contribution in partnership or otherwise is not considered as a 
delivery, when the transferee is a taxpayer who could be able to deduct the 
tax in whole or in part, if it would be due under the transfer. In that case, the 
purchaser shall be considered to remain the legal person of the transferor.  
Since 1 July 2016, the VAT system of cost-sharing associations has been 
radically modified by the Act of 2 May 2016. This change applies to 
associations with legal personality as well as unincorporated associations 
acting under their own name or as an individual organisation or group to its 
members and third parties. Under certain circumstances, the services 
provided by independent groups of persons to their members are exempt 
from VAT. It is possible that the group also carries out activities for non-
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members but the activities carried out for the members must represent a 
predominant part of the activity of the group. 
A not-for-profit organisation, or even a for-profit company may be a member 
of another coordinating not-for-profit organisation. In a not-for-profit 
organisation, decisions can be delegated but this mainly concerns the daily 
management. For for-profit companies, the Act on Corporate Governance 
has provided the possibility of setting up a management committee. 
A health system is not allowed to abuse its position, when it has a dominant 
position on the relevant market or in a relevant part of it. Prior to the 
establishment of a health system notification to the Competition Authority 
will be required. 
The not-for-profit organisation structure is not a must for operating hospitals, 
unless the hospital wants to obtain infrastructure grants. 
European State aid rules do not impose specific criteria for the selection of 
a legal form. The Public Procurement Directive of 2014 does allow a 
Member State to reserve tendering procedures for services in the field of 
health to organisations with employee share or active board participation of 
employees and where profits are reinvested with the aim of fulfilling the 
purpose of the organisation. 
It is also possible to restrain, for specific activities and in exceptional 
circumstances, access to certain services for not-for-profit organisations, but 
it must then be justified in the light of art. 49 and 56 TFEU (freedom of 
establishment / free movement of services). 
Some legislation may sometimes limit the statutory purpose of a healthcare 
institution (see e.g. art. 15 of the Hospital Act). Modification of such 
legislation is needed if the legislator would allow that the health system runs 
e.g. also homes for the elderly, homes for young people etc. 
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It is the legal entity responsible for the exploitation that receives 
authorisation. It is also the administrator who requests the authorisation. 
Where an organisation is the registered holder for hospital A and hospital B 
is, it can receive several authorisations, e.g. for hospital A and for hospital 
B. The authorisation will then be provided to a hospital, but such an 
authorisation shall belong to the legal entity that operates the hospital. 
The establishment itself of a health system will not necessarily lead to 
collaboration among hospitals. Each hospital will remain separate, unless a 
group as described in the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989 or an 
association is established, for example between hospitals. It is appropriate 
to ensure that various committees / functions can be set up for the health 
system without the need for them to be present in each hospital of the health 
system. At present, regulation has only been provided for medical councils, 
the ombudsman, ethics committees established for a group of hospitals 
within the health system. 
Concerning collaboration of a health system with other hospitals, it is difficult 
to limit such collaboration in view of competition law. 
It is recommended (following the Dutch example) to subject the 
establishment of a health system, prior to notification of the Competition 
Authority, to a healthcare specific study. Such a study would examine the 
impact of the concentration on the provision of care to the client, the risks of 
the concentration on the quality and the accessibility of care. It would also 
examine whether the clients, physicians, employees, etc. had been able to 
express their views on the potential concentration and whether such views 
played a role to the intention to create a concentration.  
4.3 Legal feasibility of a health network 
4.3.1 In general 
The collaboration within model 2 is through the formation of a network. The 
characteristic of this type of collaboration is that decision making and 
authorisation remain at the level of the participating hospitals and are not 
transferred to the network. Nevertheless, there is permanent concertation 
with persons representing different actors, such as hospital physicians and 
administrators. The network may serve different purposes and may include 
not only hospitals, but also homes for the elderly, GPs, etc. The question is 
whether a network should take care of one or several services or all services 
carried out by hospitals.  
A network as described in this chapter will leave many issues related to the 
decision making regarding hospital services and authorisation mainly at the 
level of the participating hospitals. Consequently, the network itself will 
neither run the hospital services nor will it be officially authorised as a 
hospital.  
Collaboration between hospitals and other health actors of a network can be 
based solely on a contract without the network itself taking the form of a 
legal person. Nevertheless, the network can also operate through the 
creation of a legal person.  
This subchapter analyses the legal feasibility of such arrangements without 
focusing on existing, specific networks. This chapter also takes into account 
the need to look for a network that is not limited to hospitals, although the 
main focus is related to the impact of the hospital legislation. 
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4.3.2 Financing and networks 
The current rules on financing regulate the funding of the legal person 
operating a hospital. The creation of a network will not lead as such to a 
specific budget for a network. As already discussed above, a hospital can, 
on the basis of art. 109 of the Hospital Act, receive a specific compensation 
to ameliorate the internal functioning of the institution if this is the result of a 
collaboration agreement with one or more hospitals, which leads to a 
specialisation or a greater concentration of hospital activities. The rules and 
conditions which are applicable to the grant of the amount are determined 
in art. 91 quarter to 91 sexiesdecies of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002. It 
is the administrator who must submit a request for getting the special fee 
and who must show that there is an effective structural reduction of the 
budget of the hospital within one or more of the sections A1, A3, B1, B2, B3 
or B5, which is the result of an internal restructuring of the institution or the 
result of a collaboration agreement with one or more hospitals leading to a 
specialisation or a greater concentration of hospital activities (art. 91 
quinquies and art. 91 septies KB 25 April 2002). 
For this purpose, the administrator must include the following with its 
application: 
 the nature and the extent of the measures which lead to the structural 
reduction; 
 the precise list of each of the measures and their impact on the BFM. 
Then the application will be examined and if the conditions are met, a 
contract will be drawn up between the Minister of Health and the 
administrator(s). This agreement shall contain at least the following 
elements: 
 the measures which the administrator will put in place in accordance 
with the request and the purpose for which the amount was intended, 
and in particular the arrangements for the benefit of personnel affected 
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by the internal restructuring measures or those taken in the context of 
the collaboration agreement between the hospitals; 
 the mutual obligations to which the hospitals will adhere to in a 
collaboration agreement in order to retain the advantage of the 
particular amount in the future (art. 91nonies, § 1 KB April 25, 2002). 
Upon agreement of all parties, the terms of the agreement can be revised at 
the request of a concerned administrator. 
Art. 107 of the Hospital Act provides that the King may make specific 
financing arrangements to allow, on an experimental basis and for a limited 
time, a prospective financing of care circuits and collaborations, focusing on 
care programmes. This possibility allows a reallocation of existing financial 
resources to develop care circuits and networks. It is a financial technique 
that allows the reallocation of part of the BFM so that resources and 
manpower can be devoted to a specific area of work in order to adapt the 
current supply of care.235  
Based on this article, many projects have been established in psychiatric 
care. Art. 63 §2 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 on the fixing and the 
liquidation of the BFM allows the conclusion of agreements within the 
framework of pilot projects with psychiatric hospitals in particular to allow the 
implementation of art. 107 of the Hospital Act.  
4.3.3 Governing the network 
As explained above, the parties of a network may only have a contract as a 
basis for the network. They can also write articles and create a legal person, 
separate from the parties that are members of the network. The question 
then is under which conditions hospital administrators can start becoming 
members of a network and how decisions will be taken at the level of the 
network once a network operates. 
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4.3.3.1 The role of medical council 
Before a hospital administrator can join a network, the hospital will need to 
consider whether the general regulation of the hospital contains specific 
provisions concerning such a collaboration. In principle, these provisions will 
have to be respected. It is also important to verify what is stipulated in the 
general regulation of the hospital concerning a collaboration with another 
hospital. The general regulation of a particular hospital will likely stipulate 
that an advice of the medical council is required. In such cases a hospital 
administrator will therefore have to ask the opinion of the medical council 
before the hospital can join a network. If the general regulation refers only 
to the Hospital Act or, if nothing is provided in the general regulation 
regarding the creation of a network, then art. 137, 12° of the Consolidated 
Hospital Act of 10 July 2008 has to be complied with. It follows from art. 137, 
12° of the Hospital Act that medical councils should give an opinion when its 
hospital enters into an agreement with another party that may have an 
impact on medical activities. Unless otherwise provided in the General Rules 
of Rights and Obligations of Hospital Administrators and Hospital 
Physicians, the opinion is not reinforced upon the hospital administrator. It 
is therefore up to the hospital administrator to verify whether the applicable 
general rules do not provide for a reinforced opinion before a hospital can 
become party to a network.  
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237  Coordinated Act 10 July 2008 op de ziekenhuizen en andere 
verzorgingsinrichtingen, BS 7 November 2008. 
4.3.3.2 Permanent Consultation Committee - Role and 
Composition 
The network committee at the level of a hospital 
A PCC can be set up at the level of a network. Art. 142 of the Hospital Act236 
defines the notion of a ‘PCC’ as a committee composed of a mandated 
delegation of the administrator and a mandated delegation of the medical 
council. Within this PCC, direct consultation between the administrator and 
the medical council will lead to a consensus. The medical council must, in 
written form, have agreed with this procedure of direct consultation, after the 
administrator has proposed this procedure. This procedure of direct 
consultation replaces the procedures specified in the art. 137 to 140 of the 
Hospital Act,237 namely the procedure whereby the hospital administrator 
asks to give an advice at the medical council before he takes a policy 
decision. If a consensus is reached, the members of the PCC are obliged to 
defend this decision, namely the administrator and the medical council at 
hospital level. A characteristic of the current procedure is that the PCC 
cannot bind the hospital administrator or medical council. 
The above mentioned PCC can serve as a model for the network committee 
that will be established in the context of a network collaboration. This will, 
however, not have the same objectives as the PCC, as defined in art. 142 
of the Hospital Act.238 
  
238  Coordinated Act 10 July 2008 op de ziekenhuizen en andere 
verzorgingsinrichtingen, BS 7 November 2008. 
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Decision-making rights of the network committee  
In order to decide whether the decision making can take place at the level 
of the network committee one has to make a distinction between two types 
of decisions. Decisions related to the operation of a hospital, its services, 
programmes etc., cannot be taken by the network committee if the 
authorisation of the hospital or of its services, programmes etc. is the role of 
the hospital administrator and not the network. By contrast, decisions 
concerning the network can be taken at the level of the network committee 
by representatives of the participating members. With regard to this aspect, 
no formal feedback or decision of the participating institutions will be 
necessary, although it is likely that the members of the network committee 
consult in advance their hospitals to know their opinion. Decisions 
concerning the rights and obligations related to a network itself, can 
therefore be taken at the level of the network by the network committee, 
provided that this type of decision is written down in the contract creating the 
network (or in the articles of the legal person). If the contract describes how 
the network will be run and provides that a network committee can decide 
on certain issues and if it is described how all the parties to the network are 
represented in the network committee, a network committee can take a 
binding decision. If the network would be run by a legal person and each 
partner to the network has an administrator, it is obvious that the decisions 
of board of the network will also be binding for the members of the network. 
Where the network operates as a legal person, it is recommended that 
physicians are also members of the network and are represented at the level 
of the board. The board could be composed as a sort of network committee 
and the decisions of the network committee would then be binding on the 
members of the network, as long as the decisions are solely related to the 
purposes of the network.  
If a network will not have the role of authorisation of hospitals, services etc. 
it is not logical to transfer competence of the board running the hospital, to 
the board or the network committee. This may lead to problems with 
competition rules if the network would be vested with control over the legal 
persons running the hospital(s). If one wants more control over the different 
hospitals of a network it is recommended to work directly with the health 
system framework of model 1. 
Composition of the network committee 
The network committee must be composed of members of all participating 
institutions, so that all participating institutions are represented.  It is 
important to determine in advance how the network committee can 
legitimately assemble, specifically how many members of each institution 
must be present. If other parties beside hospitals belong to the network, it is 
obvious that these parties are also members of the network and are 
represented at the level of the network committee or board.  
It is also important to consider who the participants are and who can be 
designated as a representative on behalf of the participants. For 
participating hospitals this may be the administrator, the general manager, 
the CMO, the chairman of the medical council. The medical staff/councils of 
each hospital should also be represented in the network committee and be 
a member of the network. This may require the creation of a legal person 
representing the hospital physicians. In a network it seems important to 
provide for equality between the different participating members. The 
articles can provide this or clarify this if the legislator would not regulate this 
issue. 
4.3.4 The network vis-à-vis a group or association of hospitals 
Since the objective of a network (see below) may not include running 
hospitals or services solely by hospitals, use of the existing rules on hospital 
groups, as well as the rules on hospital associations is still required. The 
objectives of a network as well as of the parties in the network will often be 
different from the one of a group or an association. Moreover, continuity in 
the organisation of healthcare is important. This is why the existing rules of 
a group or an association should not immediately be replaced by concepts 
of a network. 
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4.3.5 Objectives of the network 
A network can have multiple objectives. This might include, for example, a 
clinical workstation, the organisation of a guard function, the replacement of 
certain physicians, the use of specialised material or – and this is close to 
the aim of an association – the operation of a specific service.  
It is recommended, in the context of the collaboration in a network, to 
underline that the main objective will be to promote the quality of healthcare 
by the joint optimisation of the quality of care within the area of the network. 
The network itself however cannot have the entire control over the hospital 
and its activities will be related to the specific purposes of the network itself. 
Hospitals belonging to a network cannot use it to by-pass or abuse 
competition rules to affect competition in a substantial part of the Belgian 
market. That is why it is so important to clearly define the objectives of a 
network. In that respect, it will be important for a network, if it becomes an 
important market player, not to exclude parties that are willing to participate 
in the network.  
The goal of a network can be high-quality care within a particular area and 
taking into account the local expertise and capabilities of the parties.  
Other healthcare providers can be involved in the development of the 
network, e.g. GPs, home care organisations, patient associations, etc.  
A network can lead to the optimisation of the accessibility and the continuity 
of care for the patient. This occurs if the purpose of a network relates to 
exchange of medical information and/or medical knowledge, the use of 
physicians trained for specific activities (including guard functions), the use 
of specific, cost consuming devices etc. 
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4.3.6 Competition and the network 
Sensitive data 
In case of the launch of a network, it is important to take into account the 
competition rules. Concerning the information sharing, it is not permitted for 
example to share sensitive information. The exchange of information 
concerning sensitive data is anti-competitive. Sensitive data are data related 
to essential elements of commercial policy: prices, discounts, price lists, rate 
and date of rate changes, special abnormalities, overdraft facilities, credit, 
delivery, service, etc. These data may provide network information on sales 
volumes and provide market share that indirectly gives indications about the 
‘commercial’ policies of competitors. The same applies where such data 
concerns industrial information such as production volumes, costs or 
decisions about investments.239 
Concentration  
In addition, the regulation concerning concentrations should be taken into 
account. According to art. IV.6, §1 of the Code of Economic Law a 
concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a 
lasting basis results from: 
 the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts 
of undertakings; or 
 the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of 
securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or 
indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 
Art. IV.6, § 2 of the Code of Economic Law adds that ‘the creation of a 
common undertaking hat on a lasting basis fulfils all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the 
meaning of paragraph 1, 2.’ The control is based on rights, contracts or any 
other means which separately or jointly taking into account all the factual 
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and legal circumstances, make it possible to influence significantly the 
activities of an undertaking, in particular: 1°ownership or the right to use all 
assets of a company or parts thereof; 2°rights or contracts which confer a 
significant influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the company 
organs. This is determined by art. IV.6, § 3 of the Code of economic Act. 
The term ‘control’ was clarified in the European consolidated communication 
on merger control.240 Below some of the provisions of the Commission’s 
Communication are cited.  
Control is defined by art. 3 of the Merger Regulation as the possibility of 
exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. It is therefore not necessary 
to show that the decisive influence is or will actually be exercised. However, 
the possibility of exercising that influence must be effective.241  Art. 3 further 
provides that the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an 
undertaking can exist on the basis of rights, contracts or any other means, 
either separately or in combination, and having regard to the considerations 
of fact and law involved. A concentration therefore may occur on a legal or 
a de facto basis, may take the form of sole or joint control, and extend to the 
whole or parts of one or more undertakings (cf. art. 3(1)(b)). 
                                                     
240  Consolidated Communication of the Commission on division of competences 
on the basis of the Regulation (EC) nr. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings , Pb.C. 95.1. 
241  Judgment in Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission, paragraph 58, 
[2006] ECR II-319 
242  Consolidated Communication of the Commission on division of competences 
on the basis of the Regulation (EC) n° 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings , Pb.C. 95.1.; In Case 
COMP/M.3858 — Lehman Brothers/SCG/Starwood/Le Meridien of 20 July 
2005 the management agreements had a duration of 10-15 years; in Case 
COMP/M.2632 — Deutsche Bahn/ECT International/United Depots/JV of 11 
February 2002 the contract had a duration of 8 years. 
243  Examples of such specific contracts under national company law are the 
‘Beherrschungsvertrag’ in German law or the ‘Contrato de subordinação’ in 
Portuguese law; such contracts do not exist in all Member States. 
Whether an operation gives rise to an acquisition of control therefore 
depends on a number of legal and/or factual elements. Control can also be 
acquired on a contractual basis. In order to confer control, the contract must 
lead to a similar control of the management and the resources of the other 
undertaking as in the case of acquisition of shares or assets. In addition to 
transferring control over the management and resources, such contracts 
must be characterized by a very long duration (ordinarily without a possibility 
of early termination for the party granting the contractual rights). Only such 
contracts can result in a structural change in the market.242 Examples of 
such contracts are organisational contracts under national company law 243 
or other types of contracts, e.g. in the form of agreements for the lease of 
the business, giving the acquirer control over the management and the 
resources despite the fact that property rights or shares are not transferred. 
In this respect, art. 3 specifies that control may also be constituted by a right 
to use the assets of an undertaking.244 Such contracts may also lead to a 
situation of joint control if both the owner of the assets as well as the 
undertaking controlling the management enjoy veto rights over strategic 
business decisions. 245 
244  See Case COMP/M.2060 — Bosch/Rexroth of 12 January 2001 concerning 
a control contract (Beherrschungsvertrag) in combination with a business 
lease; Case COMP/M.3136 — GE/Agfa NDT of 5 December 2003 concerning 
a specific contract to transfer control over entrepreneurial resources, 
management and risks; Case COMP/M.2632 — Deutsche Bahn/ECT 
International/United Depots/JV of 11 February 2002 concerning a business 
lease. 
245  Consolidated Communication of the Commission on division of competences 
on the basis of the Regulation (EC) n) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, Pb.C. 95.1;  Case 
COMP/M.3858 — Lehman Brothers/SCG/Starwood/Le Meridien of 20 July 
2005; see also case IV/M.126 — Accor/Wagon-Lits of 28 April 1992 in the 
context of art. 5(4)(b) of the Merger Regulation. 
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The object of control can be one or more, or also parts of, undertakings that 
constitute legal entities, or the assets of such entities, or only some of these 
assets.246 
The concept of a concentration will be defined in such a manner as to cover 
operations only if they bring about a lasting change in the control of the 
undertakings concerned and, in the structure of the market.247 
Where the undertakings of the network will together reach a turnover of more 
than 100 million euro in Belgium and at least two of the undertakings will 
reach each in Belgium a turnover of at least 40 million euro the notification 
of the concentration will be mandatory.248 
Prior notification of the concentration by the Belgian Competition Authority 
will be necessary. This authority determines whether or not the 
concentration will be allowed (art. IV.9 §1). 
Because a network must avoid having control over other undertakings, it will 
be difficult to argue that the general rights and duties of physicians and 
hospitals administrators of the network must be (to a large extent) identical. 
4.3.7 The network and VAT 
Since 1 July 2016, the VAT regime of cost-sharing associations has been 
adapted in way that will be of importance for networks. The Act of May 26, 
2016 ‘amending the Code of the VAT regarding the exemption of services 
provided to their members by independent groups of persons’ inserted in 
art. 44 of the ‘Code of the VAT’ a paragraph 2a. As the title suggests, it is a 
modification of the exemption of services that independent groups of 
persons provide to their members. This exemption regime applies to 
‘independent groups of persons’. 
                                                     
246  Consolidated Communication of the Commission on division of competences 
on the basis of the Regulation (EC) n° 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, Pb.C. 95.1., 24. 
The notion 'independent group of persons ‘means: an organisation with legal 
personality (such as a not-for-profit association) and organisations without 
legal personality, acting under its own name as a separate organisation or 
group towards its members and third parties. The group can legally exist 
separately of its members, but this is not a requirement. If the group has no 
legal existence distinct from its members, the group needs to operate under 
its own name towards its members and third parties as a separate entity. 
It should be noted that the Belgian administrative practice refers to an 
independent group usually with the notion ‘cost-sharing association’. A cost-
sharing association is a permanent community of interest founded by 
physical persons or legal entities in order to rationalize and reduce their 
administrative and operating costs. Typically, the expenditure of its 
members occurs on a communal basis. The objective of cost-sharing 
associations is to save the costs associated with exempted or non-taxable 
activities of their members. 
The Act of 26 May 2016 is a partial transposition of Directive 2006/112 / EC 
of 28 November 2006 on the common system of VAT. By inserting 
paragraph §2bis in art. 44 of the Code of the VAT, Belgium has fulfilled the 
request of the European Commission to comply with art. 132, paragraph 1(f) 
of the European directive 2006/112 / EC which provides that: services 
supplied by independent groups of persons whose activities are exempt 
from or are not subject to tax, in order to provide services to their members 
which are directly necessary for the exercise of their activity, where these 
groups of their members only claim reimbursement of their share of the joint 
expenses, provided that such exemption is not likely to cause distortion of 
competition.’ 
 
 
247  Recital 20 of Consolidated Communication of the Commission on division of 
competences on the basis of the Regulation (EC) n° 139/2004 of 20 January 
2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings , Pb.C. 95.1, 28. 
248   Art. IV.7 Code Economic Act. 
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The conditions under which the services provided by independent groups of 
persons to their members are exempted are listed under paragraph 2bis of 
art. 44 of the Code of the VAT. These four conditions must be met 
cumulatively: 
 members of the group exercise, on a regular basis, an activity that, 
under art. 44 of the Code of the VAT, is exempted or is not taxable. The 
exempted activities or activities for which the members do not pay tax, 
represent a major part of the activity of the members; 
 the activities of the group consist of the provision of services to its 
members which are directly necessary for their exempt activity or their 
activity for which they are not taxable. If the group also carries out 
activities for non-members, the activities carried out for its members 
represent the majority of the activity of the group; 
 the fee charged to each member only represents the reimbursement of 
its share of the joint expenses incurred by the group; 
 the exemption does not lead to distortion of competition. 
The cost-sharing association has a notification and information obligation. 
At the beginning of its activity, the independent group of persons, who 
carries out only services which are exempt or for which it has not the status 
of taxable person, shall be obliged to make a notification to the competent 
VAT office. This notification must be made within the month following the 
beginning of these activities. In addition, the group must also submit (to the 
same office) a list of its members, as well as the nature of their activity. This 
happens within the same aforementioned period. In addition, a group is also 
obliged, by the entry or departure of a member, by modification of the activity 
of the group or any of its members or termination of the activity, to inform 
the VAT office of this within the month following the aforementioned event. 
Although the group only provides services which are exempt from VAT or 
for which it does not have the status of taxable person, based on art. 44 
§2bis, second paragraph of the Code of the VAT, a notification and an 
                                                     
249  M. Denef, M. Wauters en J. Vananroye, ‘Situering en algemene kenmerken 
van de vzw’, in M. DENEF et al. (ed.), De VZW, Brugge, die Keure, 2015, 55. 
information obligation is imposed on the group. It is noteworthy that such a 
group does not fall within the scope of art. 53 of the Code of the VAT. 
An independent group that has VAT obligations at different rates is obliged 
to report, based on art. 53 of the Code of VAT. The new regime imposes an 
additional notification obligation and an information obligation based on art. 
44 §2bis third paragraph of the Code of the VAT. This requires the 
submission of a list of its members at the start of its operations, as well as 
the nature of their activity. In addition, this group must inform the supervising 
office of any entry or departure of a member. 
Moreover, this requirement applies for groups that already existed on 
1 July 2016, when the Act came into force. Therefore, the groups are 
imposed to be transparent about their members and the nature of the activity 
of their members. The King will determine the further practical formalities for 
the notification and information obligation.  
4.3.8 Transparency and network: a network as a legal person or 
not and its consequences 
It will be important for users of the network to be aware of its legal status 
(i.e. whether it is a legal person or not), its members and its objectives.  
If the members of the network only conclude contractual agreements, they 
should be aware of the legal risks regarding liability of the members of the 
network if activities are carried out by the network. 
The collaboration may or may not have legal personality. A not-for-profit 
association is an organisation with a legal personality. An organisation 
without legal personality is called an incorporated association or a factual 
association (‘feitelijke vereniging’/’association de fait’). The factual 
association is considered to be a collection of its members.249 The Supreme 
Court ruled that a claim set against an association without legal personality 
must be considered as a claim set against its members.250 This means that, 
in case of a liability claim, members shall be held liable. Since its members 
250  Cass. 20 June1988.  
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unite on the basis of a contract and not many legal rules are provided related 
to a factual association, the principle of the autonomy of the free will plays 
an important role. The contract may contain further clarifications. Third 
parties have a direct claim against the members of the association, only if 
there is proceeded in the name of the members together and within the 
scope of the competence of representation.251 Members are unlimitedly 
liable for equal parts.252 The members of the association can be held 
personally liable for the debts of the association.253 The property that arises 
within the association is the collective property: the property which is jointly 
held by the members to achieve the common purpose.254 The common 
purpose determines how the collective property is managed.255 
4.3.9 Conclusion 
In case of a network, the funding remains at the level of the hospitals. Also 
under the current law, the network will in principle not receive any funding, 
if the network itself has no authorisation number. 
The cases demonstrate that collaboration with the medical council certainly 
may lead to many conflicts. To achieve a real collaboration, the statutes of 
the physicians must be conformable to each other. This implies often a 
rather reinforced opinion of the medical councils. If a physician is working in 
several hospitals, the opinion of the medical council will be necessary for an 
appointment. This often makes the procedure very complex.  
If a network wants more impact, control and supervision on the way hospitals 
are operating in the network, and thus on the legal persons who are 
members of the network, then competition rules become important. If there 
is a concentration, the network will have to be reported to the Competition 
Authority. 
                                                     
251  M. Denef, M. Wauters en J. Vananroye, ‘Situering en algemene kenmerken 
van de vzw’, in M. DENEF et al. (ed.), De VZW, Bruges, die Keure, 2015, 57. 
252  M. Denef, M. Wauters en J. Vananroye, ‘Situering en algemene kenmerken 
van de vzw’, in M. DENEF et al. (ed.), De VZW, Bruges, die Keure, 2015, 57. 
If the network wants to exercise a significant degree of control of the 
institutions, it will then be appropriate to transfer to a health system as in 
model 1. 
A network will have to take account of the new regulation about cost-sharing 
associations and VAT. 
It is possible (legally speaking) to provide what type of health actor is 
included in a network committee. If the legislator does not provide this, it can 
also be contractually determined by the members of the network. It should 
be kept in mind however, that the network committee can only take binding 
decisions for the purposes of the network. It cannot decide how the hospitals 
organise themselves, the steps they will take etc. If a network, for example, 
concerns an ICT collaboration then the network committee cannot decide 
about other care issues in hospitals. 
The network model can be complementary to a group (as described in the 
Royal Decree of 30 January 1989) or association, but cannot replace them. 
A network closely resembles an association, except that non-hospitals can 
be part of it. 
Optimisation of a patient pathway may be a target, but the network will also 
continue to be supportive unless it switches to a health system (model 1) or 
a new organisation (model 3). Other objectives of a network may be related 
to the on duty service / ICT collaboration, etc. 
Whether there will be an added value in terms of quality will depend on the 
objective and the realisation of it. The impact of a network on individual 
institutions is likely to be limited, meaning that the impact on quality is also 
likely to remain limited. Communication with patients about the role and 
responsibility of the network is crucial. This communication will be easier in 
case of models 1 or 3. The impact on funding will be limited, given the limited 
role of the network. Whether there is over-consumption will depend on the 
253  D. Van Gerven, Handboek Verenigingen, Kalmthout, Biblo, 2002, 41. 
254  H. De Page en R. Dekkers, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, Bruylant, 
Brussels, 1975, V, 1018-1019. 
255  D. Van Gerven, Handboek Verenigingen, Kalmthout, Biblo, 2002, 42. 
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purpose of the network. Over-consumption is seemingly better addressed 
through models 1 or 3. 
4.4 Legal feasibility of a new organisation 
4.4.1 General  
Model 3 creates a new structure that aims to provide specialised care for a 
certain category of pathologies (hereinafter the new organisation). Hence, 
the hospital landscape is adapted in such a way that centres specialised 
either in pathology, or in a certain category of patients (orthopaedics, 
ophthalmology, paediatrics, etc.) - operate next to hospitals providing 
general care. The direction taken by model 3 is to go further than what is 
currently proposed for healthcare programmes by proposing the creation of 
a new structure of independent health facilities that offer specialised care for 
a limited number of diseases - some of which are not necessarily covered 
by care programmes - and/or for certain categories of patients. 
In today’s hospital landscape, specialised healthcare structures which were 
either created between already existing hospitals256 or on the basis of the 
Hospital Act257already exist.  Certain hospitals work together to share both 
their know-how and materials/infrastructure by means of these specialised 
structures. An ‘association of hospitals’, as described in the Royal Decree of 
25 April 1997,258 is the preferred method of collaboration to develop these 
specialised structures. 
                                                     
256  See for example the Iridium Kankernetwerk vzw 
257  Centre hospitalier universitaire Jules Bordet – Hôpital universitaires des 
enfants Reine Fabiola – different geriatric hospitals or for rehabilitation 
258  Royal Decree of 25 April 1997 houdende nadere omschrijving van de 
associatie van ziekenhuizen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze 
moet voldoen, B.S. 18 June 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Royal Decree of 
25 April 1997’) 
259  See art. 2 Hospital Act 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, it appears that the existing forms of 
collaboration do not always provide the ideal solution. A specialised 
healthcare structure built on the aforementioned model of association can 
currently not exist independently of the hospitals that created it. Art. 67, al. 
2 of the Hospital Act prescribes that ‘only the legal persons who operate the 
hospitals that are part of the association, as well as the natural or legal 
persons nominated by the legal person in question, may be a member of or 
be associated with the legal person who operates this association’. 
Moreover, every institution that meets the concept of being a ‘hospital’, as 
defined by the Hospital Act259, must be approved260 as being such and, as a 
consequence, must meet all the authorisation standards, drafted for the 
operation of hospitals. 261 It is therefore not possible for a healthcare 
institution ‘where specific, specialised medical examinations and/or 
treatments, related to medicine, surgery and possibly obstetrics, can be 
carried out or applied at any time in a multidisciplinary context, in terms of 
medical, medical-technical, paramedical and logistics required and 
appropriate for patients who are admitted and can stay there, because their 
condition requires this care package to treat or alleviate disease, restore or 
improve the health status or to stabilize the injury as soon as possible’262 to 
function without authorisation and without integrating into national planning 
(or programmes). This implies, therefore, that a specialised healthcare 
structure such as proposed in model 3 can currently solely function through 
the pre-existing hospitals. Likewise, the current legislation seems to oppose 
hospital services that function independently from hospitals.263 Art. 72 of the 
Hospital Act prescribes that a hospital service can only be approved when it 
is organised within the hospital itself. Such a restriction also exists for care 
260  Art. 69 Hospital Act 
261  See in particular Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 tot bepaling van de 
normen die door de ziekenhuizen en hun diensten moeten worden nageleefd, 
B.S. 7 November 1964  (hereinafter referred to as ‘Royal Decree of 
23 October 1964’) 
262  Art 2 Hospital Act 
263  Except for the isolated services (see below) 
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programmes that may be authorised only if they are part of a hospital. 
Moreover, a hospital requires in principle minimum 150 beds, which may not 
be the case for a specialised organisation. It also needs to be noted that the 
current funding provided by hospital legislation can only be granted through 
the hospital as an intermediary (or more specifically the legal person running 
the hospital). Indeed, the BFM is set per hospital264 and the legislation does 
not permit separate financing per healthcare service.265 The BFM can only 
be given to a hospital. It is therefore up to the participating hospitals to agree 
upon the financing of these specialised healthcare structures. Such a 
structure can therefore not have financial independence. 
Finally, it is important to note that the current rules on billing activities to the 
RIZIV – INAMI (the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance) 
include specific requirements that must be met for an intervention to be 
reimbursed.266 It is generally accepted that certain activities can only be 
performed within an authorised hospital, for example surgery in order to 
receive a reimbursement of the costs. It will therefore also be necessary to 
modify this regulation in order to develop model 3. 
It would therefore appear that the current legislation does not permit the 
creation of a specialised healthcare institution which coexists independently 
alongside current hospitals and which is financed distinctly. 
The question then arises which modifications will be necessary in order to 
permit the development of a structure such as proposed in model 3. Two 
hypotheses present themselves. The first one would adjust the current 
legislative framework in order to permit such specialised healthcare 
structures to be integrated in the current legislation on hospitals and other 
healthcare establishments. The second one would be to create new specific 
legislation for these specialised structures. For both possibilities, it will be 
necessary to analyse what the specific conditions for creating such a 
structure are (e.g. governing bodies, the decision-making process, the 
                                                     
264  Art. 95 Hospital Act, art. 4 Royal Decree 25 April 2002 betreffende de 
vaststelling en de vereffening van het budget van financiële middelen van de 
ziekenhuizen, B.S. 30 May 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Royal Decree of 
25 April 2002’) 
employees, VAT). But first of all, before explaining these different options 
more in detail, it is important to indicate the general rules which need to be 
applied to create such a new organisation. 
4.4.2 Rules to be taken into account for the creation of the new 
organisation 
The creation of a new healthcare structure demands an analysis of which 
aspects of the legislation need to be taken into account in order to assure 
the compatibility of the structure with the law. This is why, for example, the 
right of competition and the rules concerning the free market in regulating 
the possibility of collaboration between medical institutions require certain 
provisions to be respected. In the same way, the legislation concerning State 
aid prescribes that the financing of a public healthcare structure is subject 
to certain provisions. It also needs to be noted that the principle of free 
movement of services prohibits the limitation of economic development 
without a legitimate reason. Finally, it will be necessary to revise the division 
of competences between the federal state and the communities concerning 
the healthcare organisation to analyse on which level of power it is 
necessary to place the development of a new organisation. 
4.4.2.1 Competition law 
Competition law subjects the collaboration between companies to strict 
conditions in order not to disrupt the market. The question then arises 
whether such rules should be followed by creating and operating as a new 
organisation.  
As explained in 4.2.9 competition rules must be complied with. This means 
that rules concerning the formation of cartels, the abuse of dominant position 
must be complied with. In addition, where the creation of a new organisation 
265  Except for the isolated services (see below) 
266  Royal Decree of 14 September 1984 tot vaststelling van de nomenclatuur van 
de geneeskundige verstrekkingen inzake verplichte verzekering voor 
geneeskundige verzorging en uitkeringen, B.S. 29 September 1984 
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leads to a concentration, the concentration rules of the competition law has 
to be complied with.  
4.4.2.2 Public procurement rules 
The legislation on public procurement subjects the conclusion of a contract 
by a contracting authority to strict rules in order to assure the principles of 
equality, non-discrimination and transparency are respected. The question 
arises whether these rules need to be respected when creating the new 
organisation. A particularly important question is whether the organisation of 
a company between contracting authorities (i.e. legal entities operating 
hospitals) is in compliance with the rules on the free market in the selection 
of a partner. Take the example of a hospital A that wishes to collaborate with 
others in order to create a structure such as the one represented by model 
3. Is the choice of the other hospitals, subjected to the rules on public 
procurement? What if the collaboration is concluded with private partners? 
4.4.2.3 A preliminary remark concerning the organisation of 
healthcare and public procurement  
Before analysing whether public procurement legislation has to be complied 
with when several legal persons operating hospitals want to create a new 
organisation, one must ask whether the Member State has to comply with 
public procurement legislation when it grants an authorisation to a new 
organisation and gives subsidies to this new organisation. Healthcare is 
often provided as a SGEI. The TFEU has declared the importance of such 
SGEIs. Art. 14 TFEU states that without prejudice to art. 4 TFEU or to art. 
93, 106 and 107 of this Treaty, and given the place occupied by SGEIs in 
the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and 
territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each within their 
respective powers and within the scope of application of the Treaties, shall 
ensure that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, 
particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil 
                                                     
267  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Directive 2014/24/EU’), recital n° 7. 
their missions. In Protocol n° 26 on services of general interest it is stated 
that the shared values of the Union in respect of SGEIs include in particular: 
 the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and local 
authorities in providing, commissioning and organising SGEIs as close 
as possible to the needs of the users; 
 the diversity between various SGEIs and the differences in the needs 
and preferences of users that may result from different geographical, 
social or cultural situations; 
 high level of quality, safety and affordability, the equal treatment and 
the promotion of universal access and of user rights. 
Art. 2 of the Protocol n° 26 states also that the provisions of the Treaties do 
not affect in any way the competence of Member States to provide, 
commission and organise non-economic services of general interest. 
Directive 2014/24 on public procurement is without prejudice to the freedom 
of national, regional and local authorities to define, in conformity with Union 
law, SGEIs, their scope and the characteristics of the service to be provided, 
including any conditions regarding the quality of the service, in order to 
pursue their public policy objectives.267 The Directive is also without 
prejudice to the power of national, regional and local authorities to provide, 
commission and finance SGEIs in accordance with art. 14 TFEU and 
Protocol No 26 on Services of General Interest annexed to the TFEU and to 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In addition, this Directive does not 
deal with the funding of SGEIs or with systems of aid granted by Member 
States, in particular in the social field, in accordance with Union rules on 
competition.268 So Member States and public authorities remain free to 
provide those services themselves or to organise social services in a way 
that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example through 
the mere financing of such services or by granting or authorisations to all 
economic operators meeting the conditions established beforehand by the 
contracting authority, without any limits or quotas, provided that such a 
268  Directive 2014/24/EU, recital 7. 
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system ensures sufficient advertising and complies with the principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination.269 Therefore, art. 1, point 4 of the 
Directive 2014/24 states very clearly that the Directive does not affect the 
freedom of Member States to define, in conformity with Union law, what they 
consider to be SGEIs, how those services should be organised and 
financed, in compliance with the State aid rules, and what specific 
obligations they should be subject to. Equally, the Directive does not affect 
the decision of public authorities of whether, how and to what extent they 
wish to perform public functions themselves pursuant to art. 14 TFEU and 
Protocol No 26. In point 5 of art. 1 it is stated that the Directive does not 
affect the way in which the Member States organise their social security 
systems. 
Moreover, agreements, decisions or other legal instruments that organise 
the transfer of powers and responsibilities for the performance of public 
tasks between contracting authorities or groupings of contracting authorities 
and do not provide for remuneration to be given for contractual performance, 
are considered to be a matter of internal organisation of the Member State 
concerned and, as such, are not affected in any way by this Directive on 
public procurement (art. 1.6). 
It follows from the above that a Member State who wishes to create a new 
organisation that will be entrusted with a SGEI will not necessarily be forced 
to apply the public procurement legislation. So it is possible for the Member 
State or the competent public authority to establish in advance the 
conditions for provision of a social service and, after sufficient advertising 
and in accordance with the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination, grant authorisations to all providers meeting these 
conditions.270 Such a system does not specify any limits or quotas 
concerning the number of service providers; all those meeting the conditions 
can participate. Providers which have obtained an authorisation must 
                                                     
269  Directive 2014/24/EU, recital 114. 
270  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled  ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
provide the service at the request of the user, who will thus have the choice 
of several providers, at a price set beforehand by the public authority.   
Vertical and horizontal collaboration  
Collaboration between public authorities is not in principal exempt from the 
application of provisions concerning public procurement. Thus, every form 
of collaboration which has as its object activities, supplies or services, at the 
expense of a contracting authority for the benefit of another, supported by 
consideration – (even as incurred costs) constitutes a public procurement. 
The Court of Justice has however expressed two hypotheses concerning 
activities that are exempted from the application of provisions of public 
procurements.271 On the one hand, there is an ‘in house’ exception (also 
known as vertical collaboration); on the other hand, more recently, there is 
a ‘collaboration contract’ exception (also known as horizontal collaboration). 
These two exceptions aim at two different situations. Where vertical 
collaboration implies the control of one or more contracting authorities over 
another separate legal entity, horizontal collaboration does not necessarily 
imply a contracting authority having control over another, allowing thus 
collaboration on a contractual basis. 
These two exceptions were included in the new European directives 
concerning public procurement. Directive of 2014/24/EU defines for the first 
time explicit rules to establish which procurements can be concluded 
between entities of the public sector without the use of award of contract.  
If the conditions to qualify for an exemption from the rules on public 
procurement are not met, the collaboration between the contracting 
authorities will have to respect the aforementioned rules. 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 100 
271  Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), decision of 18 November 1999, C-107/98, 
Teckal, Rec. 1999 I-08121; CJEU, 9 June 2009, C-480/06, Commission v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, Rec 2009 I-04747 
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Vertical collaboration 
The objective of a ‘vertical collaboration’ is to create a separate legal entity 
which will be controlled by one or more contracting authorities. This 
exception is prescribed by art. 12 of the Directive, which states: 
‘A public contract awarded by a contracting authority to a legal person 
governed by private or public law shall fall outside the scope of this Directive 
where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: 
 the contracting authority exercises a level of control over the legal 
person concerned which is similar to that which it exercises over its own 
departments; 
 more than 80% of the activities of the controlled legal person are carried 
out in the performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling 
contracting authority or by other legal persons controlled by that 
contracting authority; and 
 there is no direct participation of private capital in the controlled legal 
person with the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of 
private capital participation required by national legislative provisions, 
in conformity with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence 
on the controlled legal person’. 
The European legislator has therefore considered that public contracts 
awarded to controlled legal persons should not be subject to the procedures 
provided by the Directive if the contracting authority exercises over the legal 
person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over 
its own departments. This means that the contracting authority exercises a 
decisive influence over both strategic objectives and significant decisions of 
the controlled legal person. 
The control can be exercised by one or more contracting authorities that 
exercise in this case a jointly control. When a contracting authority exercises 
jointly with other contracting authorities a control over that legal person 
                                                     
272  Art. 12, paragraph 3 of the Directive 2014/24/EU 
273  Directive 2014/24/EU recital 32 
which is similar to the control they exercise over their own departments, the 
following conditions must be fulfilled: 
 the decision-making bodies of the controlled legal person are composed 
of representatives of all participating contracting authorities. Individual 
representatives may represent several or all of the participating 
contracting authorities; 
 those contracting authorities are able to jointly exert decisive influence 
over the strategic objectives and significant decisions of the controlled 
legal person; and 
 the controlled legal person does not pursue any interests which are 
contrary to those of the controlling contracting authorities.272 
Public contracts awarded to controlled legal persons should not be subject 
to the application of the procedures provided for by the Directive if the 
contracting authority exercises a control over the legal person concerned 
which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, provided 
that the controlled legal person carries out more than 80% of its activities in 
the performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling contracting 
authority or by other legal persons controlled by that contracting authority, 
regardless of the beneficiary of the contract performance.273 
For the determination of this percentage of activities the average total 
turnover, or an appropriate alternative activity-based measure such as costs 
incurred by the relevant legal person or contracting authority with respect to 
services, supplies and works for the three years preceding the award of 
contract shall be taken into consideration.274 
274  Art. 12, paragraph 5 of the directive 2014/24/EU 
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The European legislator decided not to extend the exemption to situations 
where there is direct participation by a private economic operator in the 
capital of the controlled legal person since, in such circumstances, the award 
of a public contract without a competitive procedure would provide the 
private economic operator with a capital participation in the controlled legal 
person an undue advantage over its competitors. 275 
This exception was implemented in the Belgian legislation through the new 
Act on public procurement of 17 June 2016 (art. 30).276 
Horizontal collaboration 
Next to the situation where multiple contracting authorities decide to create 
a new separate legal entity which they control, the directive also provides 
the possibility for contracting authorities to jointly choose to provide their 
public services by way of a collaboration without being obliged to use any 
particular legal form.277 In this case, the services provided by the different 
participating contracting authorities need not necessarily be identical; they 
might also be complementary.  
A contract concluded exclusively between two or more contracting 
authorities shall fall outside the scope of this Directive where all of the 
following conditions are fulfilled:278  
 the contract establishes or implements a collaboration between the 
participating contracting authorities with the aim of ensuring that public 
services they have to perform are provided with a view to achieving 
objectives they have in common; 
                                                     
275  Directive 2014/24/EU recital 32 
276  BS 14 July 2016 
277  Directive 2014/24/EU recital 33 
278  Art. 12, paragraph 4 of the directive 2014/24/EU 
 the implementation of that collaboration is governed solely by 
considerations relating to the public interest; and 
 the participating contracting authorities perform on the open market less 
than 20% of the activities279 concerned by the collaboration. 
In order to fulfil those conditions, the collaboration should be based on a 
cooperative concept. Such collaboration does not require all participating 
authorities to assume the performance of the main contractual obligations, 
as long as there are commitments to contribute towards the cooperative 
performance of the public service in question. In addition, the 
implementation of the collaboration, including any financial transfers 
between the participating contracting authorities, should be governed solely 
by considerations relating to the public interest.280 
This exception was implemented in Belgian law through the new Act on 
public procurement of 17 June 2016 (art. 31).281 
Application of the rules on public procurement to the new organisation  
A Member State can limit the form of a new organisation to a not-for-profit 
organisation 
As stated already in the foregoing analysis of model 1, it is possible for a 
Member State, under certain conditions, to limit the form of the new 
organisation to a specific type of legal person, e.g. a not-for-profit 
organisation. The Court of Justice has held that, according to the scale of 
values held by each of the Member States and, having regard to the 
discretion available to them, a Member State may restrict the operation of 
certain activities by entrusting them to public or charitable bodies. Any 
279  For the determination of this percentage of activities, the average total 
turnover, or an appropriate alternative activity-based measure such as costs 
incurred by the relevant legal person or contracting authority with respect to 
services, supplies and works for the three years preceding the contract award 
is  taken into consideration (art. 12, paragraph 5, of the Directive 2014/24/EU) 
280  Directive 2014/24/EU recital 33 
281  BS 14 July 2016 
 100  Governance models for hospital collaborations KCE Report 277 
 
measure of this kind must, however, be suitable for guaranteeing the 
achievement of one or more legitimate objectives invoked by that Member 
State and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those 
objectives. National legislation is suitable for ensuring attainment of the 
objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a need to attain it in a consistent 
and systematic manner. In any event, such restrictions must be applied 
without discrimination. 
The Public Procurement rules do not necessarily apply if a Member State 
provides an authorisation to a new organisation 
As written above, Member States and public authorities remain free to 
provide those services themselves or to organise social services in a way 
that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example through 
the mere financing of such services or by granting authorisations to all 
economic operators meeting the conditions established beforehand by the 
contracting authority, without any limits or quotas, provided that such a 
system ensures sufficient advertising and complies with the principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination.282 
                                                     
282  Directive 2014/24/EU, recital 114. 
283  Art. 2, 1°, d) of the Act of 15 June 2006 overheidsopdrachten en bepaalde 
opdrachten voor werken, leveringen en diensten, B.S. 15 February 2007 
284  L’art. 2 de la nouvelle loi du 17 juin 2016 relative aux marchés publics 
indique :  
« Pour l'application de la présente loi, on entend par : 
1° pouvoir adjudicateur : 
c) les organismes de droit public et personnes, quelles que soient leur forme 
et leur nature qui, à la date de la décision de lancer un marché : 
Do the Public Procurement rules apply if several legal persons want to 
create a new organisation? 
Depending on how the new organisation will be created, it will be important 
to discern whether the rules on public procurement are applicable as it is 
clear from the definition of contracting authority that a hospital must apply 
the legislation on public procurement when it concludes an onerous contract 
concerning activities, supplies or services. 
Indeed, next to the State, local authorities and public bodies, the legislation 
on public procurement is also applicable to others, ‘whatever their form, their 
nature, that at the date of the decision to launch the public procurement ’, 
that: 
 ‘were created specifically to meet needs of general interest, not having 
an industrial or commercial character;  
 come with a legal personality;  
o for whom the activity is mainly financed by the authorities or bodies 
mentioned in 1 °, a, b or c; or 
o their management is subject to supervision of those authorities or 
agencies; or 
o more than half of the members of the administrative body, the 
management or supervisory body are designated by such 
authorities or bodies.’283284 
i ont été créés pour satisfaire spécifiquement des besoins d'intérêt général 
ayant un caractère autre qu'industriel ou commercial, et; 
ii sont dotés d'une personnalité juridique, et; 
iii dépendent de l'Etat, des Régions, des Communautés, des autorités 
locales ou d'autres organismes ou personnes relevant du présent point c), 
de l'une des manières suivantes : 
1. soit leurs activités sont financées majoritairement par l'Etat, les 
Régions, les Communautés, les autorités locales ou d'autres 
organismes ou personnes relevant du présent point c); 
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By this definition, a private law status does not constitute a criterion for 
precluding the qualification of a person as a contracting authority.285 This 
means that a private person satisfying these three conditions will be required 
to comply with rules on public procurement. 
A hospital responds thereby to the concept of contracting authority within 
the meaning of the legislation on public procurement.286 Hospitals fulfil a 
mission of general interest287 and receive funding that primarily comes from 
public sources given that their funding comes primarily from the BFM, the 
payment of a number of fees by RIZIV – INAMI, refunds from insurances or 
from the receipt of grants for certain investments such as real estate 
construction.288 
The question then arises whether the collaboration between hospitals for the 
creation of a new organisation may benefit from the exemptions provided by 
public procurement legislation. 
On the basis of analysis of exemptions related to horizontal collaboration, it 
can be concluded that the choice of partner hospitals to create a new 
organisation can be made without following public procurement regulations. 
It would, on the other hand, be different if a private partner was involved in 
such a collaboration concerning what would in effect be a public-private 
partnership. In this case, the selection process would eventually have to 
comply with legislation on public procurement.  
                                                     
2. soit leur gestion est soumise à un contrôle de l'Etat, des Régions, des 
Communautés, des autorités locales ou d'autres organismes ou personnes 
relevant du présent point c); 
3. soit plus de la moitié des membres de l'organe d'administration, de 
direction ou de surveillance sont désignés par l'Etat, les Régions, les 
Communautés, les autorités locales ou d'autres organismes ou personnes 
relevant du présent point c) 
285  CJUE, 15 May 2003, C-214/00, Commission v Spain, Rec. 2003 I-04667 , 54-
57 
It has been assumed for a long time that a partnership agreement and its 
creation were not subject to the application of regulations on public 
procurement. The correctness of this assumption has been discussed 
following a judgement of the State Council of 30 May 2005.289 In this regard, 
the European Commission states in a Communication of 5 February 2008 
on the application of Community law on Public Procurement and 
Concessions to IPPP that if public bodies decide to involve third parties in 
economic activities and if this involvement qualifies as a public contract or a 
concession, the Community provisions for public procurement and 
concessions must be complied with. If the task assigned to the public-private 
entity is a public contract fully covered by the Public Procurement Directives, 
the procedure for selecting the private partner is determined by these 
Directives. If it is a service concession or a public contract not covered by 
the Directives, the selection of the private partner has to comply with the 
principles of the EC Treaty. 
This insight allows us to distinguish two situations. When the social purpose 
of a company of mixed nature is of a general scope, the selection of a private 
partner does not come within the scope of the public procurement rules. In 
other words, this choice should not result in a situation of competition which 
has to comply with the Public Procurement Act. This does not mean however 
that the choice is free. Indeed, as stated by the Court of Justice in the case 
of Coname (275/98 18 November 1999), it is necessary to ensure that the 
procedure achieves a sufficient degree of publicity in compliance with Art 49 
286  Callens, S., Coëffé, M., en Van Leuven, L., ‘Mededinging, 
overheidsopdrachten en gezondheidszorg’, in Organisatie van de 
gezondheidszorg, Intersentia, Antwerpen-Cambridge, 2015, p. 703 
287  Art. 2, paragraph 2 Hospital Act 
288  Bosquet, J., en Lafaut, L., Flexibel aanbesteden in de gezondheidszorg. De 
toepassing van de wetgeving overheidsopdrachten – De rol en de 
beperkingen van de raamovereenkomst en de onderhandelingsprocedure 
voor de verzorgingsinstellingen, MCP 2014, liv. 2, 138 
289  Cabuy, Y., « Le cadre général de la loi du 15 juin 2006 et ses grands 
principes », in Le nouveau droit des marchés publics en Belgique. De l’art. à 
la pratique, Larcier, Bruxelles, 2013, p. 46 
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and 56 of the TFEU for the purposes of respecting the principles of non-
discrimination, equality and transparency. 
On the other hand, when a company's purpose is precise and the choice of 
the private partner is integrated in the project which is to be carried out or, 
in other words, the private partner is selected depending on the proposed 
project, the procedure comes, in principle, within the scope of the public 
procurement rules. The operation of creating a public company of a mixed 
nature is in this case a ‘means’ to conclude an onerous contract which has, 
as its object, the realisation of a work corresponding to the requirements 
specified by the contracting authority. The European Commission strongly 
recommends the application of the regulations on public procurement in the 
establishment stage of the mixed company or the opening of its capital to 
economic operators (Commission Interpretative Communication on the 
application of Community law on public contracts and concessions to public-
private partnerships institutionalized - 5 February 2008). 
The Council of State has stated in a Judgement of 19 June 2009 that 
although it recognizes that the choice of a partner to form a company falls in 
principle outside of the scope of the regulation on public procurement, that 
‘ when it comes to entrusting a partner with services under section 5 of the 
Act of 24 December 1993, with contractual arrangements following the path 
of the partnership agreement, the transaction must be considered a public 
procurement and be subject to Belgian regulations. It is therefore not 
enough, according to the State Council, ‘to carry out activities, supply 
products or provide services through a special purpose company, formed by 
the contracting authority and a private operator to escape public 
procurement rules.’  
Finally, it must be stated that the Directive 2014/24/EU remains very flexible 
in cases where certain public authorities want to organise certain healthcare 
services. In the recitals to the directive it is stated that certain categories of 
services continue by their very nature to have a limited cross-border 
dimension, namely such services that are known as services to the person, 
such as certain social, health and educational services. Those services are 
provided within a particular context that varies widely amongst Member 
States, due to different cultural traditions. Given the importance of the 
cultural context and the sensitivity of these services, Member States should 
be given wide discretion to organise its choice of service providers in the 
way considered most appropriate (Recital 114). In art. 76 of Directive 
2014/24/EU it is provided that Member States shall put in place national 
rules concerning the awarding of contracts subject to this Chapter in order 
to ensure contracting authorities comply with the principles of transparency 
and equal treatment of economic operators and that Member States are free 
to determine the procedural rules applicable as long as such rules allow 
contracting authorities to take into account the specificities of the services in 
question. Art. 76 provides also that Member States shall ensure that 
contracting authorities may take into account the need to ensure quality, 
continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness of 
the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and the involvement and 
empowerment of users and innovation. Member States may also require that 
the choice of the service provider shall be made on the basis of the tender 
presenting the best price-quality ratio, taking into account quality and 
sustainability criteria for social services.  
4.4.2.4 Rules related to State aid 
Above we analysed the impact of public procurement rules on the creation 
of the new organisation. The question then is whether European State aid 
rules apply if public authorities give subsidies to the new organisation. The 
question is important concerning the new organisation if this organisation 
does not receive a public funding as is foreseen for hospitals. If a financing 
method was granted to the new organisation which differs from the one 
applied to hospitals, one would have to clarify the public services performed 
in hospitals in order to justify the aid granted in relation to the new 
organisation which does not deal with such tasks and which could explain 
the non-funding of the new organisation or the different funding.  
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The European rules on State aid determine the possibilities in terms of public 
funding in compliance with certain rules. The State aid rules and the rules 
on public contracts and concessions have different aims and scope.290 The 
State aid rules relate to the conditions for financing Social services of 
general interest (SGEIs) and consequently economic SSGIs and are aimed 
at preventing distortions of competition caused by financing or similar 
benefits granted by the State and its emanations. The rules on public 
contracts and concessions, on the other hand, concern the conditions for 
awarding these services to operators. One of their main aims is to ensure 
equal treatment and transparency in addition to preventing distortions of 
competition that may arise from the management of public funds by the 
contracting authorities when awarding these services.291 Public authorities 
wishing to set up an SGEI must therefore comply not only with State aid 
rules but also with the rules on the award of public contracts or concessions. 
The question then arises as to whether the public financing of a healthcare 
structure (as proposed by model 3) is compatible with the rules on State aid 
matters. It is not because the public procurement principles do not apply, 
that the Member State organizing and financing a new organisation does not 
have to comply with State aid rules when financing the new organisation.  
                                                     
290  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 101 
291  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
Principle 
Art. 107 paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Rome states that: ‘Save as otherwise 
provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the internal market.’ 
Incompatible State aid can thus be defined as any selective advantage that 
the State, sensu lato, grants to an (or several) undertaking(s) that may alter 
the conditions of competition and affect trade within the Union.292 
The concept of State aid 
Since its 1961 ‘Gezamenlijke Steenkoolmijnen’-judgment, the Court has 
considered that the concept of ‘State aid is broader than the concept of 
subsidy because it includes not only positive benefits such as subsidies 
themselves, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the normal 
burdens on the budget of an undertaking and which thus, without being 
subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have 
the same effect.’293 This definition has subsequently been confirmed 
consistently in case law.  
Several conditions have to be met before one can speak of incompatible 
State aid.294 According to the case law of the Court of Justice, State aid 
consists of various constitutive elements under the TFEU, namely the 
existence of an undertaking, the accountability of the measure taken to the 
State, its funding through State resources, the granting of an advantage, the 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, 101 
292  Sabbadini, P-M, Les aides d’Etat. Aspects juridiques et économiques, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2015, p. 29 
293  CJEU., decision of  23 February1961, C- 30/59, Rec., 1 p. 39 
294  Sabbadini, P-M, Les aides d’Etat. Aspects juridiques et économiques, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2015, p. 35 
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selectivity of the measure and its potential effects on competition and trade 
within the Union.295 These are cumulative conditions.296 
 The concept of ‘an undertaking’ and ‘an economic activity’ 
The rules on State aid will generally only be applicable when the beneficiary 
of the aid is an undertaking. An undertaking is defined by the Court as any 
entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity or the way in which it is financed.297 It is therefore the nature of the 
entity's operations that is decisive for the qualification of the entity as an 
undertaking or not. In discerning the difference between economic and non-
economic activities, the Court has consistently held that an economic activity 
is any activity consisting of offering goods or services on a given market.298 
Regarding healthcare, the Court found that hospitals were not acting as an 
undertaking where public hospitals are an integral part of a national health 
service and their operation almost entirely based on the principle of 
solidarity. These hospitals are financed directly by social security 
contributions and other State resources and provide their services free on 
the basis of universal coverage. If the hospital or other healthcare providers 
offer their services against a remuneration received either directly from 
patients or from their insurance, it must be considered that a degree of 
competition exists between hospitals and that the activity can therefore be 
classified as economic. The Court has already considered the medical 
                                                     
295  Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to art. 107(1) 
TFEU, 5 
296  CJEU, 21 March 1990, C 142-87 Belgium v Commission, Rec. 1990 I-00959, 
25 
297  CJEU,  12 September 2000, C-180/98 - C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others, 
Rec. 2000 I-6451, 74 
298  CJEU, 16 June 1987, C 118-85, Commission v Italian Republic, Rec.1987 
I2599, 7 ; CJEU, 18 June 1998, C-35/96, Commission v Italian Republic, Rec. 
1998 I-3851, 36 ; CJEU, 12 September 2000, C-180/98 - C-184/98, Pavel 
Pavlov and Others, Rec. 2000 I-6451, 74 
services that self-employed physicians and other private practitioners 
provide against remuneration at their own risk as economic activity.299  
Whether hospitals can be considered as undertakings may differ from 
country to country. In some Member States, public hospitals represent an 
integral part of a national health service and are almost entirely based on 
the principle of solidarity.300   
In the cases Poucet and Pistre, the Court argued already that organisations 
involved in the management of the public social security system, that fulfil 
an exclusively social function and that have an activity based on the principle 
of national solidarity, that are entirely not-for-profit-making and where the 
benefits paid are statutory benefits bearing no relation to the amount of the 
contributions, do carry out an activity that is not an economic activity. Such 
organisations are therefore not undertakings.301 In the case Fenin it was not 
disputed that the Spanish national health system (Sistema Nacional de 
Salud) ('the SNS') managed by ministries and other organisations, is 
operated according to the principle of solidarity, in that it is funded from 
social security contributions and other State funding and in that it provides 
services free of charge to its members on the basis of universal cover. In 
managing the SNS, the organisations were not therefore considered to be 
acting as undertakings. 302 In many other Member States, hospitals and 
other healthcare providers offer their services for remuneration, be it directly 
299  CJEU, 12 September 2000, C-180/98 - C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others, 
Rec. 2000 I-6451, 75-77 
300  Communication from the Commission on the application of the EU State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest, 22 
301  Court of Justice, 17 February 1993. Joined cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, 
recitals 18 – 19 
302   Court of First Instance 4 March 2003, T-319/99, FENIN, Rec. 2003II-357, 39; 
CJUE 11 July 2006, C-205/03, Rec. 2006 I-6295, 25 -28 
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from patients or from their insurance.303 In such systems, there is a certain 
degree of competition between hospitals concerning the provision of 
healthcare services.  The Court of Justice and the General Court have also 
clarified that healthcare services in which independent doctors and other 
private practitioners provide for remuneration at their own risk are to be 
regarded as an economic activity.304 
 Origin of the measures financed through State resources 
The granting of an advantage, directly or indirectly, through state resources 
in addition to the State’s accountability for such a measure are two separate 
and cumulative conditions for establishing the existence of State aid.305 
 Advantage 
The concept of advantage that determines the existence of aid, must be 
defined in the light of normal market conditions. In order to determine 
whether a particular State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to 
establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic 
advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market 
conditions.306 One must therefore compare the financial situation of the 
company once it has benefited from the measure with the situation that 
would have prevailed in the absence of the measure being granted. 
                                                     
303  Communication from the Commission on the application of the EU State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest, Brussel, OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, 24. 
304  Communication from the Commission on the application of the EU State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest, Brussel, OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, 25. 
305  Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to art. 107(1) 
TFEU Projet de communication de la Commission relative à la notion d’aide 
d’Etat au sens de l’art. 107, paragraphe 1, du TFUE, pt 41 
 Selectivity 
In addition to being a benefit to the company that receives it, State aid within 
the meaning of the TFEU must be selective, that is to say, it must favour 
certain undertakings or certain products.307 Therefore, not all measures that 
promote economic operators necessarily fall within the concept of State aid. 
Only those that confer a selective advantage to certain companies or 
categories of companies or certain economic sectors are concerned.308 It is 
thus important to verify whether the aid leads to an advantage for the 
exclusive benefit of certain undertakings or certain sectors,309 in which case 
the aid would fulfil the condition of selectivity and could therefore be 
considered incompatible, assuming the other criteria are also fulfilled. 
 Effect on trade and competition 
Finally, aid will only be incompatible if it is likely to distort competition and 
affect trade between Member States of the Union. Regarding the impact of 
the advantage on Community trade, the Court considers that when aid 
granted by the State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared 
to other competing companies in intra-community trade, the latter must be 
regarded as affected by the aid, even if the beneficiary undertaking is not 
engaged in export.310 Indeed, when a Member State grants aid to an 
undertaking, domestic production may for that reason be maintained or 
increased with the consequence that the opportunities for undertakings 
established in other Member States to export their products to the market of 
306  CJEU, 11 July 1996, C-39/94, Syndicat français de l'Express international 
(SFEI) and others, Rec. 1996 I-03547 pt 60 et CJEU, 29 April 1999, C-342/96, 
Spain v Commission, Rec. 1999 I-02459,  41 
307  CJEU, 26 september1996, c-241/94, French Republic v. Commission, Rec. 
1996 I-04551, 24,  CJEU, 1 December 1998, C-200/97, Ecotrade, Rec. 1998 
I-07907, 40 
308  Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to art. 107(1) 
TFEU, 118 
309  CJEU, 17 June 1999, C-75/87, Maribel, Rec. 1999 I-03671, 26 
310  CJEU, 17 June 1999, C-75/87, Maribel, Rec. 1999 I-03671 
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that Member State are reduced.311 The case law of the Court reflects the 
fact that the Commission has not the task to establish the need to show a 
real effect on trade between Member States or an actual distortion of 
competition. In reality showing a priori control of State aid is sufficient.312 
In practice, the existence of a distortion of competition will be presumed 
given that state intervention targets a liberalized sector where competition 
could exist. 313 Assistance will be likely to affect trade between Member 
States when it strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with 
competitors in the context of intra-community trade.314 
The Commission has in several cases concluded that activities had a purely 
local character and did not affect trade between Member States, e.g. local 
hospitals aimed exclusively at the local population.315 
Analysis of the compatibility of State aid – the concept of general interest 
services 
When it appears from the analysis conducted by the Commission that a 
selective advantage granted by the State, sensu lato, to an (or several) 
undertaking(s) is likely to alter the conditions of competition and affect trade 
within the Union, such State aid will be incompatible with the Treaty and thus 
illegal. It is worth mentioning that some measures are considered, by the 
Commission, as not fulfilling the condition of effect on trade and competition, 
which are prerequisites for the existence of State aid. These measures, 
called ‘de minimis aid’, should therefore not be notified to the Commission. 
                                                     
311  CJEU, 14 September1994, C-278/92 -C-280/92Spain v. Commission, , Rec. 
1994 I-04103, 40 
312  Sabbadini, P-M, Les aides d’Etat. Aspects juridiques et économiques, 
Bruxelles, Larcier, 2015, p. 52 
313  Court of First Instance, 4 September 2009, T 211-05, Italian Republic v 
Commission, Rec. 2009 II-02777, 157-160 
314  CJEU, 12 May 2005, C-347/03, Fiulia venzia Giulia, Rec. 2005 I-03785,  41 
315  Communication from the Commission on the application of the EU State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
This treatment applies to measures which are awarded to single enterprises 
over a given period (a maximum of three fiscal years) and whose fixed 
amount does not exceed, in principle, 200 000 euros.316 
Art. 107(1) TFEU states that ‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, 
any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market’. The State aid rules therefore only apply in general where the 
recipient is an ‘undertaking’. Whether or not the provider of a service of 
general interest is to be regarded as an undertaking is therefore fundamental 
for the application of the State aid rules.317 
In practice, the analysis will be distinct if the aid takes the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of SGEIs (see below). 
 The concept of SGEI 
Europe has gradually authorised the need for services of general interest in 
order to provide better social cohesion and security for citizens. These 
services, of which the fundamental role is now well authorised within the EU 
(see above), concern different fields such as social welfare, transportation 
or, for example, healthcare. 
economic interest, Brussel, OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, 40 ; see Commission Decision 
in Case N 543/01 — Ireland — Capital allowances for hospitals, OJ C 154, 
28.6.2002, p. 4. 
316  Commission Regulation (EU) n° 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the 
application of art. 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to 
de minimis aid, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, 1-8 
317  Communication from the Commission on the application of the EU State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest, Brussel, OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, 8. 
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Services of general interest (SGI) can consist of economic services or non-
economic services (depending on which activities public authorities class as 
being of general interest and therefore submit them to the rules applicable 
to public services).318 Companies responsible for the management of this 
service of general interest may be private or public in nature.319 The concept 
of ‘general interest’ is not one that is clearly defined and Europe leaves a 
wide margin of discretion to Member States in the definition of services that 
could be classified as being services of general (economic) interest.320 
Authorisation of what constitutes a service of general interest therefore lies 
with the Member States and the European Commission merely has a 
monitoring role in the event of a manifest error as regards the definition of 
services of general (economic) interest.  
In the general category of services of general interest, there is a more 
specific sub-category which comprises SGEI. These services involve 
economic activities, namely the sale of goods or services, that fulfil tasks of 
general interest that would, in the absence of State intervention, be 
                                                     
318  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions of 12 May 2004 entitled ‘White Paper on services of general 
interest’ [COM(2004) 374 final] 
319  In accordance with art. 345 of the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice of the EU (see  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the 
application of art. 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to State 
aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (notified 
under document C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, 2 
320  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of art. 106 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest (notified under document 
C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, 8 
321  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
performed by the market (albeit under different conditions in terms of quality, 
safety, accessibility, equal treatment or universal access). 321 
Art. 106 TFEU322 represents a clear authorisation of the special role of SGEI 
and the need (given the type of general interest for which they are 
responsible), for derogations to some extent from the European rules. 
Therefore, while they are in principle subject to competition rules, SGEIs 
may derogate from them when necessary to fulfil their public interest role.323 
To be able to derogate from certain European rules, the company must have 
been specifically entrusted by the Member State with the operation of a 
particular SGEI.324 The Commission specified in a decision of 20 December 
2011325 the conditions that must be met in order to enjoy protection of this 
derogation. The public service obligations entrusted to the undertaking 
concerned must be clearly indicated in one or more documents issued by 
the competent public authorities of the Member State concerned. The form 
of the instrument may vary from one Member State to another, but the act 
must specify at least the identity of the undertakings concerned, the precise 
content and duration and, where appropriate, the territory concerned by the 
of the Regions of 20 December 2011 entitled ‘A Quality Framework for 
Services of General Interest in Europe’ [ COM(2011) 900 final] 
322  D. Fornaciari, S. Callens en E. Schokkaert, Ziekenhuizen, mededingingsrecht 
en recht op kwaliteitsvolle zorg, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010 
323  Callens, S., Coëffé, M., en Van Leuven, L., ‘Mededinging, 
overheidsopdrachten en gezondheidszorg’, in Organisatie van de 
gezondheidszorg, Intersentia, Antwerpen-Cambridge, 2015 
324  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of art. 106 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest (notified under document 
C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, 13 
325  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of art. 106 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest (notified under document 
C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012 
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public service obligations, any exclusive or special rights that are granted 
and the description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for 
determining compensation and avoiding and recovering any possible over-
compensation.326 In the interest of transparency regarding the 
implementation of the Commission’s decision of 20 December 2011, it is 
also stated that the act of entrustment should also include a reference to 
it.327 
Companies that are engaged in exploiting a SGEI may, because of the 
public service obligations entrusted to them and under certain conditions, 
benefit from financial compensation of public origin. 
 Compatibility of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of SGEI 
The Court of Justice clarified in the Altmark judgment that the qualification 
of granting an advantage for SGEIs can be ruled out if four cumulative 
conditions are met.328  
First, the recipient undertaking must actually be entrusted with the 
implementation of public service obligations and those obligations must be 
clearly defined. Second, the parameters on the basis of which the 
compensation is calculated must be established beforehand in an objective 
and transparent manner. Third, the compensation cannot exceed the 
amount necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in performing the 
                                                     
326  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of art. 106 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest (notified under document 
C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012 ,14 
327  See for a Belgian example: art. 172 of the Act of 10 April 2014 houdende 
diverse bepalingen inzake gezondheid, BS 10 May 2014, has modified art. 
108 Hospital Act to foreseen a reference to the decision of the European 
commission of 20 December 2011 within the communication of the BFM  for 
hospitals 
public service task, taking into account related revenues and reasonable 
profit. Fourth, where the choice of the undertaking which is to perform the 
public service tasks, is not done within the framework of a public 
procurement procedure to select the candidate able to provide these 
services at the lowest possible cost to the community, the level of 
compensation must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs 
which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped in order to 
meet the public service requirements, would have incurred in performing 
those obligations, taking into account the related revenues and what would 
constitute a reasonable profit. The Commission has described these 
conditions in its communication on the application of the rules of the EU 
regarding State aid rules for compensation granted for the provision of 
SGEIs. 329 
If follows from what is written above that if there no economic activity, if the 
measure has no effect on trade between Member States or on competition 
or if one of the four conditions of the Altmark judgment are met, there will be 
no State aid within the meaning of art. 107 TFEU.330 
If this is not the case, there is e.g. an economic activity, then one must 
examine the total amount of compensation. The SGEIs analysis tree 
provided by the Commission (Figure 5) is useful for such purposes: 
 
328  CJEU, 24 July 2003, C-280/00, Altmark Trans, Rec.2003 I-7747, 87-95 
329  Communication from the Commission on the application of the EU State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest, Brussel, OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p.4 
330  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2 
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Figure 5 – SGEI Analysis Tree 
 
Source: Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled « Guide to the application of the European Union rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 28 
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If the compensation does not exceed 500 000 euros spread over three 
years, the measure will not be considered State aid under art. 107 TFEU.331 
If the amount of compensation is higher, one must examine whether it is less 
than 15 million euro or if the compensation relates to a hospital or social 
service. If the latter is the case, the State aid will be compatible if the 
conditions laid down in the Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 are 
met.332 If these conditions are not met, the measure must be notified to the 
Commission which will then analyse whether the aid is compatible. If the 
compensation exceeds 15 million euro or it does not concern a hospital or a 
social service, one has to examine if the conditions of the Framework333 are 
met and if there is no serious distortion of competition. 
Application of State aid rules to the new organisation  
Below we analyse whether the funding of the new structure is compatible 
with the rules on State aid. We also verify whether it is possible to give public 
financing to hospitals and to decide not to fund the new organisation. 
If the latter option were withheld or if a different financing method was 
granted to the new organisation compared to hospitals, one would have to 
clarify the public services performed in hospitals in order to justify the aid 
granted in relation to the new organisation which does not deal with such 
tasks what could explain the non-funding of the new organisation or a 
different funding. 
Currently, the Hospital Act provides that hospitals are entrusted with tasks 
of general interest without precisely defining the tasks involved. It is possible 
to refer to the definition of a hospital which includes some indicator elements 
                                                     
331  Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012, of 25 April 2012 on the 
application of art. 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to 
de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general 
economic interest, OJ L 114/8 26.4.2012 
332  Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of art. 106 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest (notified under document 
C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012 
such as emergency services, continuity of care, multidisciplinarity, overnight 
beds, and numerous other analogous aspects.334 If such missions were also 
entrusted to the new organisation, it would be difficult to grant public funding 
only to hospitals and to refuse it to a new organisation. Similarly, if the 
financing method were different, the additional funding granted to authorised 
hospitals would risk being qualified as illegal State aid. 
With regard to this, it is interesting to refer to the recently issued decision of 
the European Commission through which it authorised public compensation 
to IRIS Brussels hospitals.335 In that case complaints were filed by two 
associations representing private hospitals in Brussels that claimed that the 
IRIS public hospitals were receiving illegal State aid. Since 1996, these 
hospitals have received funds from various municipalities in the Brussels 
region as compensation for registered deficits that were brought about by 
the delivery of health services and social welfare of general economic 
interest. By contrast, private hospitals in Brussels do not benefit from this 
type of compensation. In October 2014, the Commission opened a detailed 
investigation regarding public compensation granted to five public hospitals 
in Brussels, following the decision of the Court of First Instance of the 
European Union which annulled the decision of the Commission on 
7 November 2012. The Court of First Instance had ruled that the 
Commission should collect further information given the doubts expressed 
by the complainants as to the compatibility with the internal market of the 
compensation granted in the form of deficit financing resulting from 
additional obligations performed by IRIS hospitals. 
 
333  Communication from the Commission entitled ‘EU framework for State aid in 
the form of public service compensation’, OJ  C 8/15 11.1.2012 
334  KCE Reports 225Bs,  Correction of refractive errors of the eye in adults – Part 
3: Organisation and legal framework of extramural surgery centres, 
Synthesis, p 12, 
335  Commission decision of 5 July 2016 on State aid, SA.19864- 2014/C, C(2016) 
4051 final 
 KCE Report 277 Governance models for hospital collaborations 111 
 
After a thorough investigation, the Commission found that the IRIS public 
hospitals had to perform a certain number of tasks in addition to the 
minimum obligations imposed on all Belgian hospitals. These additional 
tasks include, for example, the requirement to treat all patients in all 
circumstances (including situations outside of emergency situations), 
regardless of their ability to pay the corresponding fees. They aim to ensure 
that the most disadvantaged inhabitants of Brussels also have access to the 
hospital services they need and to ensure access for all to high-quality 
hospital care. Since the common sources of funding for hospitals, both the 
public and the private sectors, are insufficient to cover the costs of these 
additional obligations, IRIS public hospitals ran up deficits. Through 
compensating these deficits, the Brussels based municipalities allowed the 
concerned hospitals to continue to perform their public service obligations. 
During its investigation, the Commission also found that, in accordance with 
rules on State aid for SGEIs, the IRIS hospitals had not received excess 
compensation, as the funds paid by the municipalities never exceeded the 
actual amount of losses they have registered due to their public service 
obligations. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the funding 
provided since 1996 by the Brussels municipalities to the IRIS hospitals in 
order to cover these deficits was in line with EU rules on State aid.  
If different financing (compared to hospitals) was therefore granted to a new 
organisation, it would be necessary to justify this difference on the basis of 
the specific tasks of general interest with which only hospitals were charged. 
It will also be necessary to analyse whether the new organisation can 
receive funding compared with private initiatives that could be developed 
and do not necessarily receive funding. In this case, one would have to 
justify why the public service tasks that the new organisation fulfils, had not 
been entrusted to private initiatives. 
                                                     
336  Art. 56 du TFEU  
337  CJEU, 9 March 2000, C-355/98, Commission v Belgium, Rec. 2000 I-01221, 
37 
As the Commission rightly stated in its Guide, Member States have a wide 
margin of discretion when it comes to organizing and financing what they 
regard as a SGEI. The Decision of 2011 allows Member States to finance in 
full the net costs incurred in providing SGEIs by their providers, but does not 
oblige them to do so (Guide 61). Member States can, if they wish, decide to 
pay an equal flat-rate compensation to all providers, as long as such 
compensation does not give rise to excess compensation for the operators 
concerned. They are also free to under-compensate, or not compensate at 
all, SGEI providers. In as much as public service compensation granted to 
SGEI providers is calculated on the basis of their effective costs and relevant 
revenues and thus does not exceed what is necessary for discharging the 
SGEI, such compensation can be viewed as compatible within the meaning 
of the state aid rules (Guide 61). When the compatibility of the aid is 
assessed on the basis of the Framework, the method of calculating the 
compensation must be the same for all undertakings entrusted with the 
same SGEI (Guide 62). 
4.4.2.5 The concept of the free movement of services 
TFEU provides that restrictions on the freedom to provide services are, in 
principle, prohibited.336 As a fundamental principle of the Treaty, the freedom 
to provide services may only be restricted by rules justified by the public 
interest and applicable to all persons and undertakings operating in the 
territory of the host Member State.337 Thus, national measures likely to 
hinder or render the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty less attractive, must meet four conditions: they must apply without 
discrimination, they must be justified by compelling reasons of general 
interest, they are suitable for securing the attainment of the objective they 
pursue and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.338 Indeed, any 
restriction on the freedom to provide services must be appropriate, 
proportionate, necessary and indispensable. 
338  CJEU, 4 July 2000, C 424/97, Haim, Rec. 2000 I-05123, 57 ; CJEU, 30 
November 1995, C-55/94 Gebhard, Rec. 1995 I-04165, 39 
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According to Van Den Bossche, access to a service activity may be subject 
to authorisation by the competent authorities as complying with the 
principles of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality. 339  
When a state considers the possibility of creating an institution of specialised 
care needs to comply with its obligation to integrate it in national planning it 
must respect the principles of the Treaty (equality, non-discrimination, etc.) 
and cannot refuse without good reason to issue an authorisation to an 
institution even if it is for example majority owned by private equity. It must 
be noted that this principle does not prevent the possibility for a Member 
State to decide to allow financial means only to certain entities with a specific 
legal form. The Court of Justice considered that such a restriction could be 
justified, in particular, if it is necessary and proportionate in view of the 
attainment of certain social objectives pursued by the national social welfare 
system.340 Therefore a particular activity might, in exceptional cases, provide 
for restricted access to certain services to the advantage of not-for-profit 
organisations. 
The Court of Justice has recognised that requiring authorisation to exercise 
an economic activity constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services.341 Such a restriction may nevertheless be justified if it is an 
indispensable condition for achieving the objective in question. 
Regarding the programming, where a State subjects the granting of an 
authorisation to the integration of activities in national planning 
(programming), the principle of freedom to provide services authorised by 
art. 56 TFEU must be respected. 
It may be possible to argue that the programme creates a measure having 
the equivalent effect of a purely quantitative restriction which is prohibited 
under the articles discussed here, unless it can be justified. According to 
                                                     
339  Van Den Bossche, A.M., ‘Vestiging en overname van zieken- en rusthuizen 
in de interne markt’, T.Gez/Rev.dr.santé, 2008-2009, liv. 4, 282 
340  CJEU, 17 June 1997, -C-70/95, Sodemare SA, Anni Azzurri Holding SpA en 
Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl/ Regione Lombardia, Rec. 1997 I-3395 
341  CJEU, 9 July1997, C-222/95, Parodi, Rec. 1997 I-03899, 31 
European case law,342 such a restriction on freedom of provision of goods 
and services can be justified only if: 
 the measure is prescribed by law; 
 the interference is necessary for the protection of the general interest; 
 the interference is proportionate to the advantage created  by the 
limitation. This means that the authority must maintain a balance 
between the general interest affected by this limitation and the interests 
at stake 
In the Directive of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-
border healthcare,343 it has been pointed out that the Court of Justice has 
found that a planning seeks to ensure that there is sufficient and permanent 
access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital treatment in the Member 
State concerned. In addition, it assists in meeting a desire to control costs 
and to prevent, as far as possible, any wastage of financial, technical and 
human resources. According to the Court of Justice, such wastage would be 
all the more damaging because it is generally recognised that the hospital 
sector generates considerable costs and must satisfy increasing needs, 
while the financial resources made available for healthcare are not unlimited, 
whatever mode of funding is applied. 
It is therefore important to respect these principles when defining the 
operating framework for the new structure of model 3. 
Based on this analysis, it is assessed that it will be increasingly difficult to 
deny private (profitable) companies to have the chance to take on such care 
tasks if they meet all conditions to ensure the safety and the quality of care. 
342  CJEU, 8 May 2003, C-14/02,Atral, Rec. 2003 I-04431; CJEU, 7 June 2007, 
C-254/05, Commission v Belgium, Rec. 2007 I-04269; CJEU, 13 March2008,  
Commission v Belgium, C 227/06, Rec. 2008 I-00046 
343  OJ 4.4.2011, L 88/45, recital 40 
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4.4.2.6 The Competence of the Communities and of the Federal 
state concerning healthcare institutions  
If one opts for the development of entities as provided by model 3, the 
question arises whether it is the federal legislator and / or the Community 
legislator who has the power to participate in the legislative framework for 
these new structures. 
The sixth reform of the state has further modified the distribution of powers 
between the federal state and the Communities concerning health matters. 
The federal state remains competent in particular to ‘organic legislation’ 
(‘organieke wetgeving/’legislation organique’).344 The concept of ‘organic 
legislation’ covers in particular the basic rules and guidelines of the hospital 
policy, as contained in the Hospital Act. 
One of the objectives of the sixth reform of the state was to enable 
communities to effectively exercise the powers transferred to them. Whilst 
the funding and programming remain a federal competence, the 
competence to grant authorisations and the policy concerning specialised 
care provision or care for specific populations belong to the community level. 
When drafting the amendment text for the special Act of 8 Augustus 1980 
on institutional reform under the sixth reform of the state, it has been pointed 
out that the term ‘organic legislation’ should be refined. The concept of the 
‘organic legislation’ now covers the basic rules and guidelines of a hospital’s 
policy, as they are enshrined in the Hospital Act, and aims to ensure the 
minimal coherence that is needed between programming, authorisation and 
financing, when implementing a policy at various levels in a workable way. 
These three policies are, according to the authors of the proposal, to a 
                                                     
344  Art. 5 Special Act of 8 August 1980 tot hervorming der instellingen, BS 15 
August 1980 
345  Explanatory Statement of the proposal of bijzondere wet met betrekking tot 
de Zesde Staatshervorming, Parl.St.Senate 2012-13, nr. 5-2232/1, 35. 
346  What should be considered as ‘basic characteristics‘ is unclear. Depending 
on the interpretation of the 'characteristics' , the reserved power in favour of 
certain extent complementary.345 Funding should be based upon 
authorisation within the scheduled programming.  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the special Act 
concerning the sixth reform of the state the following elements are ‘organic’: 
 the basic characteristics346 of the: 
a. hospitals (including inter alia the provision of hospitals care, split 
over several sites, minimum activity level), psychiatric hospitals, 
university hospitals; 
b. hospital services, wards, hospital functions, medical and medico-
technical services, care programmes, heavy medical equipment, 
networks and care circuits. Basic characteristics can be identified 
as characteristics which have a direct link with the programming 
and / or funding and exhibit a structural nature (e.g. the necessary 
equipment, the nature of the care provided in a hospital or hospital 
service or the target, the minimum personnel framework). 
c. collaboration between hospitals347;  
 the rules regarding the management and decision-making in hospitals, 
including internal advisory organs; 
 the status of the hospital physicians and involvement in the decision-
making of hospital physicians and other healthcare professions; 
 the general rules relating to the structuring of nursing and medical 
activities; 
 the rules for accounting, financial control and reporting of the data; 
the federal authority will have a greater or lesser impact (J. Van 
Nieuwenhove, ‘De bevoegdheidsoverdrachten inzake gezondheidszorg’ in A. 
Alen, B. Dalle, K. Muylle, W. Pas, J. Van Nieuwenhove en W. Verrijdt (eds.), 
Het federale België na de zesde staatshervorming, Brugge, die Keure, 2014, 
394). 
347  Explanatory Statement of the proposal of bijzondere wet met betrekking tot 
de Zesde Staatshervorming, Parl.St.Senate 2012-13, nr. 5-2232/1, 36. 
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 the implications of compliance (or non-compliance) with the basic rules 
for programming or concerning the maximum number of services, 
functions, etc., or with the provisions of the organic legislation; 
 the general rules concerning the consequences of compliance or (non-
compliance) with the authorisation standards of services, functions, 
etc., or the authorisation to set up heavy medical equipment (this 
concerns for example the rule that  ‘no authorisation equates to no 
funding’). 
The explanatory memorandum of the special Act also enumerates what is 
not ‘organic’ and thus what is under the control of the Communities:348 
 the establishment of conditions that must be met or the determination 
of matters to which the minimum standards should cover (this falls 
under the authorisation standards), including rules relating to the quality 
of hospital service, institutions or organisation; 
 the procedures and implementing decisions with respect to the powers 
that do not belong to the federal government (e.g. authorisation 
procedures (provisional authorisation, suspensive appeal, etc.)); 
 in terms of delegated powers, the regulations related to quality 
assessment and developing the quality evaluation (this interferes with 
the authorisation standards). Care characteristics related to the process 
and the result (outcome) should - if necessary - be embedded in the 
authorisation standards; 
 the provision of medical and social establishments, places of sheltered 
living, transit shelters and categorical (Sp and G) hospitals. 
The federated entities have therefore received all powers related to the Sp 
services and isolated geriatric services (see below for more information 
regarding these services). 
                                                     
348  Explanatory Statement of the proposal of bijzondere wet met betrekking tot 
de Zesde Staatshervorming, Parl.St.Senate 2012-13, nr. 5-2232/1, 36. 
If one considers the objective of model 3 is to move towards the 
development of a specialised care structure which fulfils the definition of a 
hospital under the Hospital Act, it seems obvious that this concerns also (at 
least) partially the competence of the federated entities. 
Similarly, if the development of a new organisation will be situated outside 
the notion of a hospital, it seems also that the federal government should be 
involved (at least in part), although according to the Council of State (‘Raad 
van State’/’Conseil d’Etat’) regulating extramural institutions cannot be 
considered as an application of the exception provided by art. 5, § 1er, I, 
1º, a), of the special Act of 8 Augustus 1980 on institutional reform (Advice 
49,795 / VR / 3 of 28 June 2011 Parl.St. Senate 2010-2011 5-62 / 2).349 
In general, it seems that an analysis of the hospital landscape and the 
hospital care provision in Belgium with regard to the new organisation can 
only properly be performed if all levels of government are considered. This 
is what has been decided in the framework of the joint declaration signed by 
nine ministers and members of the federal, community and regional 
governments on 29 June 2015 in order to implement all necessary reforms 
in the Belgian hospital landscape. Through this joint declaration, the nine 
ministers underlined the importance of a shared vision and consensus to 
achieve the necessary changes in the hospital sector. All levels of power 
start with the same vision in order to maintain a logical coherence between 
the powers of the different authorities. The different levels of power have, 
inter alia, also pledged to reach agreements on the distribution of tasks 
within the hospital landscape when necessary. 
  
349  KCE Reports 225Bs,  Correction of refractive errors of the eye in adults – Part 
3: Organisation and legal framework of extramural surgery centres, Synthesis 
p. 11-12 
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4.4.3 Must the new organisation comply with the hospital 
legislation? 
With regard to the way the new organisation will be regulated, the legislator 
must make a choice. Two hypotheses emerge. The first would be to work 
with the existing legislative framework of hospitals in order to enable the new 
organisation to be integrated in the current Hospital Act and therefore meet, 
after the changes made by the legislator, the concept of a ‘hospital’ within 
the meaning of the Hospital Act. The second hypothesis would be to provide 
new specific legislation for a new organisation. Below we briefly describe the 
impact of the two hypotheses. 
4.4.3.1 Scenario 1: Use of the current legislative framework - 
amendment of the Hospital Act 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the possibilities that can be used 
by the Belgian legislator if it decides to use the current legislative framework 
to develop a new organisation. If this option is chosen, this means that a 
new organisation will be considered as a hospital under the Hospital Act and 
must therefore comply with this legislation. 
It is for the legislator to decide what is meant by a ‘hospital under the Hospital 
Act’. When analysing the current Hospital Act, it appears that the legislator 
has already provided specific provisions for small hospitals or for so-called 
categorical hospitals. One possibility would therefore be to use these 
concepts to develop a new organisation. The idea is to enable services or 
care programmes to operate in an isolated manner, respecting the 
applicable authorisation standards and by establishing a functional link with 
one or more of the nearest hospital(s).  
After analysing the current categorical hospitals and the specific provisions 
applicable to them, we assess which the benefits the use of such a system 
                                                     
350  B.S. 7 November 1964 
351  Art. 2, § 1erbis of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
352  Art. 2, §4, Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
could offer. In a final section we emphasize the importance of analysing the 
issues posed by existing hospitals where part of their activity must be 
withdrawn in favour of a new organisation.  
Concept of categorical hospitals 
Categorical or specialised hospitals 
Categorical or specialised hospitals are smaller hospitals that provide 
specific care to a specific target group: they focus on functional rehabilitation 
(hospital with isolated Sp services) or care for the elderly (hospitals with 
isolated G services). The Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 laying down the 
standards hospitals and their services must meet350 determines specific 
standards for the authorised categorical hospitals. 
The current regulation also provides for the existence of hospitals that 
perform both surgical and medical activities exclusively for children or for the 
treatment of tumours.351  
Here it is useful to indicate that currently a maternity ward cannot be isolated 
and must always be part of a hospital including at least one service where 
there is both surgical activity and activity related to the practice of internal 
medicine (C and D services).352 
The geriatric hospitals or isolated geriatric services 
Annex 20353 of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 provides for special 
standards for geriatric services. In addition to the authorised geriatric service 
in a general hospital, there are isolated geriatric services outside a hospital. 
This isolated service must have a functional link with the geriatric service of 
the nearest hospital.  
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989 
353  Art. N20 of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
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Unless the two services concerned belong to the same organizing 
authority,354 the functional link is subject to a written agreement that specifies 
the terms: 
 of the collaboration between the geriatric services, particularly with 
regard to the policy of admission and transfer of geriatric patients; 
 the use of medical-technical services; 
 the medical, nurse and paramedic collaboration, in particular in a 
concertation policy and a continuing education. 
The authorisation standards for the isolated service are the same as for the 
authorised geriatric service in a general hospital. The only difference 
concerns the need for the establishment of a functional link. 
It is also provided that an isolated geriatric service can or cannot be 
associated with a specialised service for treatment and rehabilitation (Sp 
index). 
Rehabilitation hospitals or isolated Sp services 
The specialised service for treatment and rehabilitation is for patients with 
cardiopulmonary diseases, neurological diseases, locomotive diseases, 
psycho-geriatric and chronic diseases, chronic illnesses and multiple 
pathologies requiring curative care and rehabilitation. The affected patients 
require specialised medical treatment, nursing, functional rehabilitation and 
reactivation in a hospital and require active and prolonged support for a 
limited duration. Additionally, this service can be intended for patients 
suffering from an incurable disease that is in a terminal phase and who 
require palliative care.355  
The service Sp is focused on a unit of 20 beds, dedicated to a same specialty 
                                                     
354  Art. N20, 1, paragraph 3, of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
355  Art. N11, 1, of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
356  Art. N11, 3, of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
357  Art. N11, 7, of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
mentioned in the authorisation decision, except for units dedicated to 
patients requiring palliative care that will have at least 6 beds and a 
maximum of 12 beds.356 
Annex 11357 of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 provides that Sp 
services may be located outside a general hospital. If the Sp service is 
implanted outside a hospital, it must have a functional link with a general 
hospital that has at least the services referred to in art. 2 of the Royal Decree 
of 30 January 1989,358 namely: 
 ‘a service where both surgical activity and internal medicine are 
practiced (C-D service); 
 a geriatric service (index G) or a neuropsychiatry service for observation 
and treatment (index A) or a maternity (index M ) or a paediatric service 
(index E).’ 
The functional link must be provided in a written agreement.359 This 
agreement will organise the working arrangements, including the operating 
rules in case of emergencies and transfer of patients.  
An isolated Sp service must meet the same standards as the Sp service 
organised in a hospital.360 
  
358  Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989 
359  Art. N11, 8 of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
360  Art. N11, 9 of the Royal Decree of 23 October 1964 
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Hospitals that perform both surgical and medical services exclusively for 
children or related to tumours 
The Royal Decree of 30 January 1989 provides for the possibility to create 
specific hospitals for children or related to the treatment of tumours.361 For 
these hospitals, the Minister responsible for the authorisation of hospitals 
may grant a derogation in art. 2, § 1, 1°, 2° and 3° of the Royal Decree of 
30 January 1989 setting additional standards concerning the authorisation 
of hospitals and hospital services.362 
Specific provisions applicable to categorical hospitals 
The Hospital Act provides a number of specific provisions applicable to 
categorical hospitals or smaller hospitals that could be applied to a new 
organisation if the new organisations were considered as hospitals as 
defined in the Hospital Act. 
Funding of categorical hospitals 
Art. 96 of the Hospital Act provides that the Minister responsible for public 
health may determine a separate budget, for one or more hospital services, 
hospital sections, hospital functions or hospital care programmes. Such a 
provision could therefore be used by the competent authority to allocate 
separate funding for a new organisation. 
With regards to G- and Sp- isolated services, the King has set specific rules 
for funding in the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 on the fixing and the 
liquidation of the budget relating to the BFM for hospitals.363 This concerns 
                                                     
361  Art. 2, §1bis, Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van 
aanvullende normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en 
ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede tot nadere omschrijving van de 
ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere normen waaraan deze moeten 
voldoen, BS 21 February 1989 
362  Royal Decree 30 January 1989 houdende vaststelling van aanvullende 
normen voor de erkenning van ziekenhuizen en ziekenhuisdiensten alsmede 
tot nadere omschrijving van de ziekenhuisgroeperingen en van de bijzondere 
normen waaraan deze moeten voldoen, BS 21 February 1989 
in particular the calculation of subparts A1, B1, B2, B4 and B5 of the 
applicable budget. 
In a similar manner, the King has set specific rules for specific hospitals for 
children or related to the treatment of tumours.364 Thus, while the costs 
covered by subpart B1 of the BFM are normally financed by means of a lump 
sum budget, the King has decided that these hospitals are excluded from it. 
The operation of categorical hospitals 
In addition to the specific standards which have to be met in order to create 
a categorical hospital, the Hospital Act also provides specific provisions for 
the operation of these hospitals. Art. 7 of the Hospital Act states that the 
King may, in the case of small hospitals, remove (whole or in part) the 
application of Chapters III and IV of Title I, art. 68 and Title IV of the Hospital 
Act. This concerns hospitals 
 which have a very limited number of services and/or beds; or 
 where a very limited number of hospital physicians work. 
For such circumstances specific rules have been provided for the medical 
councils of these small hospitals. The Royal Decree of 10 August 1987 
laying down the rules on the composition and functioning of the Medical 
Council pursuant to art. 24, 25 and 26 of the Act of 23 December 1963 on 
hospitals provides that when a hospital has less than six physicians who can 
vote, these physicians are part of the medical council. Their number, where 
applicable, is completed to a maximum of five members to the Medical 
Council by physicians who cannot vote.365 If the hospital has less than six 
363  See art. 15, 29°; 29, §4, 1°; 43; 47; 56, §1erbis; 65, b) ; 74ter; 75, §2, b) ; 75, 
§5, §6 ; 91; 99 in fine and 100 of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 
364  Art. 33, §1, of the Royal Decree of 25 April 2002 
365  Art. 5, §4  of the Royal Decree of 10 August 1987 tot vaststelling van de regels 
met betrekking tot de samenstelling en de werking van de medische raad in 
uitvoering van de artikelen 24, 25 en 26 van de wet van 23 December 1963 
op de ziekenhuizen, BS 18 August 1987 
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hospital physicians, they constitute the Medical Council without further 
formalities.366 
Advantage of this scenario 
The use of this concept of categorical hospital would have the advantage of 
keeping the supply of specialised care within the notion of a hospital. 
Furthermore, under this hypothesis the necessary legislative amendments 
are limited and would mainly delegate the task of specifying specific 
standards applicable for such categorical hospitals that would operate 
independently of existing hospitals to the competent legislator. In this regard, 
it could provide specific exemptions for certain hospitals. 
Under these specific authorisation standards, the competent legislator 
should for example provide that these hospitals are required to conclude an 
agreement with the nearest hospital to provide a specific support patients in 
case of emergency. It is desirable that the regulation explicitly states the 
need to conclude such an agreement with the nearest hospital in order to 
avoid future discussions during which conflicts of interest could be involved. 
This will avoid that hospitals refuse to sign such agreements.  
Such a scenario could also for example permit new organisations to benefit 
from a hospital pharmacy. 
Implications for existing hospitals 
It will also be important to analyse the situation of existing hospitals if, with 
the creation of a new organisation, the purpose is to remove a part of their 
activity. In such cases it will be necessary to ask whether they still meet 
current standards for authorisation. 
                                                     
366  Art. 5, §5 of the Royal Decree of 10 August 1987 tot vaststelling van de regels 
met betrekking tot de samenstelling en de werking van de medische raad in 
4.4.3.2 Scenario 2: Creation of a new legislative framework 
alongside the Hospital Act 
A second scenario would be to allow the development of certain hospital 
activities outside a hospital under the Hospital Act. Art. 81 of the Hospital 
Act provides in this respect that ‘the King may provide rules concerning 
medical procedures that have to be carried out inside or outside a hospital.’ 
On the basis of this article, it would be possible - taken into account the rules 
on the competence of the federated entities related to healthcare -  to 
provide a list of activities that may be organised outside a hospital, subject 
for example to compliance with a number of authorisation standards. 
Through such regulation, it would be possible to formalize the creation of a 
new organisation. In such a situation, a new organisation would not meet 
the definition of a hospital under the Hospital Act. 
The development of such a structure outside the current hospital framework 
would also require the amendment of the regulations on compulsory health 
insurance in order to provide the reimbursement of services provided within 
such new organisations. It is, in this respect, interesting to examine the eye 
clinics that have been developed in recent years. In addition, the different 
legislative aspects that should be specified in the new framework to allow 
proper operation of these new organisations will be analysed. Finally, the 
advantages of this hypothesis are assessed. 
Example of extramural clinic: eye clinic 
The example of eye clinics is interesting because their development has 
emerged in recent years from a change in the nomenclature of healthcare 
which has expanded reimbursement for acts relating to ophthalmic surgery 
outside an authorised hospital setting. 
  
uitvoering van de artikelen 24, 25 en 26 van de wet van 23 December 1963 
op de ziekenhuizen, BS 18 August1987 
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In principle, the nomenclature provides that surgery provisions must, except 
in cases of force majeure, be performed in a hospital authorised by the 
competent authority and which comprises at least one C or D service if it 
concerns a surgical intervention equal to or greater than K 120 or N 200 or 
I 200. 367  
Since the Royal Decree of 16 February 2009,368 it is provided that this rule 
no longer applies to the interventions listed in art. 14 h) of the nomenclature 
(ophthalmology), if these interventions are performed in an ambulatory 
manner in an extramural environment (that meets the architectural 
standards of a surgical day hospital as described in art. 2 to 6 of the Royal 
decree of 25 November 1997 laying down the standards to be met for the 
‘surgical day hospitalisation’) and that these services are performed under 
local or topical anaesthesia and do not require patient sedation or direct 
home or nursing monitoring needs.  
So when it concerns a reimbursed intervention in a hospital, it is also 
possible to use the legislation on compulsory health insurance to frame 
practices performed outside a hospital. 
It should be noted however that these extramural centres (that are not 
hospitals under the Hospital Act) will not be required to comply with all quality 
and safety standards laid down by the Hospital Act or other rules applicable 
to hospitals, which can be disadvantageous for patients. Moreover, these 
structures can operate without being subject to prior official authorisation.369 
Therefore, if these structures are not integrated into the concept of a 
hospital, it seems important to create a new legislative framework for these 
health facilities in order to better supervise them. 
                                                     
367  Art. 15, §2, of the Annex of the Royal Decree of 14 September 1984 tot 
vaststelling van de nomenclatuur van de geneeskundige verstrekkingen 
inzake verplichte verzekering voor geneeskundige verzorging en uitkeringen, 
BS 29 September 1984 
368  Royal Decree of 16 February 2009 tot wijziging van het artikel 15, § 2, van de 
bijlage bij het koninklijk besluit van 14 September 1984 tot vaststelling van de 
nomenclatuur van de geneeskundige verstrekkingen inzake verplichte 
The new legislative framework 
The organisation of such a framework is needed given that EU legislation 
requires a regulation concerning quality of health in all healthcare 
institutions. Certain specific obligations should thus be placed upon 
healthcare institutions outside hospitals. The purpose of this section is to 
point out certain standards that should be applied to these new 
organisations. 
The directive of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-
border healthcare370 requires Member States to establish a minimum 
framework of quality and safety standards for healthcare provided on their 
territory. The concept of healthcare providers within the meaning of this 
Directive is broad and covers all persons or entities providing healthcare. 
The new organisation created outside the concept of a hospital therefore 
certainly falls under the concept of a healthcare provider within the meaning 
of this Directive.  
The Directive requires such providers to comply with obligations such as 
providing relevant information concerning choice, price, the status of 
authorisation or registration etc. 
It is important that this framework specifically states that the organisation 
defined by the new legislation is excluded from the scope of the Hospital Act 
in order to avoid any confusion between different institutions. It would be 
possible within the new law to make some specific provisions of the Hospital 
Act applicable. This would also make the executed Royal Decree applicable. 
 
verzekering voor geneeskundige verzorging en uitkeringen, BS 16 March 
2009 
369  KCE Reports 225Bs,  Correction of refractive errors of the eye in adults – Part 
3: Organisation and legal framework of extramural surgery centres, Synthesis 
p. 7  
370  OJ 4.4.2011, L 88/45 
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Below some elements are pointed out that should be taken into account in 
the drafting of a new legislative framework in case of the second hypothesis: 
Financing 
At present, the BFM is liquidated per hospital and cannot therefore be used 
to finance an organisation that is not considered as a hospital under the 
Hospital Act. Thus, if the goal is to integrate these new organisations (or 
some of them) in the calculation of the BFM, the rules concerning funding 
should be adapted to allow the administrator of another care organisation 
than a hospital to also receive a part of the budget. 
Another possibility would be to finance the new organisation separately from 
the hospitals and to create a new budget.  
The central responsibility of the new organisation 
The advantages concerning the central responsibility of hospitals for 
patients should also be in place for these new organisations. As the Act on 
patients' rights is applicable to all healthcare professionals, and therefore 
also to the healthcare professionals working in the new organisations, it is 
necessary, in order to facilitate the rights of patients, to allow proceedings 
against a new organisation to be commenced without first determining which 
professional has committed misconduct connected to the damage that they 
have incurred. 
Patient health records  
It should also provide specific standards for the storing and archiving of 
medical files within these new organisations. Whilst specific legislation in 
this regard is not available, it is not obvious for the professionals who work 
in such structures to know whether it is the institution or the healthcare 
professional that is responsible for keeping and maintaining patient health 
records. Furthermore, the minimum content of the medical file is only 
currently defined for hospitals. 
                                                     
371  Art. 20 of the Act of 10 May 2015 betreffende de uitoefening van de 
gezondheidszorgberoepen, BS 18 June 2015 
Collaboration agreement with a hospital for the transfer of patients 
It will be particularly necessary to provide an obligation of collaboration with 
hospitals, for example to provide certain specific care such as emergency or 
intensive care. As discussed above, it seems important to determine which 
hospital will be required to enter into such an agreement in order to avoid 
situations where conflicts of interest could arise or situations where hospitals 
could refuse to enter into such agreement. 
Similarly, if a new organisation is subsidised and has a mission of general 
interest, it will also be important to ensure that the new organisation cannot 
refuse to cooperate with hospitals which are in need of the services of the 
new organisation. 
The provision of medicines and medical devices 
For the functioning of these institutions it will be necessary to provide 
specific rules on the provision of medicines and medical devices. It would, 
in this regard, be possible to use to a certain extent the legislation 
concerning the storage of medical products by physicians. Indeed, normally 
medicines and certain medical devices can only be distributed to patients by 
public pharmacies or hospital pharmacies if it is intended to be used in the 
hospital. 
The current legislation provides that a physician or a dental practitioner may 
be authorised to have a place specific for the storage of medicines. In this 
case, the physician buys medicines and implantable medical devices in a 
pharmacy open to the public or in a hospital pharmacy. In doing so, the 
physician makes an agreement with a holder of a pharmacy open to the 
public or a hospital pharmacy.371 This place for the storage of medicines is 
considered as a pharmacy not open to the public. If the agreement has been 
signed with the owner of a hospital pharmacy, this place will be treated as a 
hospital pharmacy. Medicines and implantable medical devices can only be 
delivered in the framework of a medical procedure. The holder of the place 
for the storage of medicines can either be a physician or a pharmacist-holder 
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appointed by the physician in order to take the responsibility for the 
pharmacy. 
The competent authority will still need to determine the terms and conditions 
of the procurement of the place in question and the management and control 
of these deposits, which are separated from the main medical practice or 
other places where the physician receives and examines patients in order to 
give advice or to provide healthcare.  
Making certain dispositions of the Hospital Act applicable to these structures 
As part of the drafting of the legislative framework applicable to new 
organisations, it is important to analyse what principles of the Hospital Act 
could be transposed to the new organisation. 
Advantage of this scenario 
The application of such a hypothesis would be able to regulate private 
clinics. It would however be necessary to distinguish clinics charged with a 
mission of general interest from others that do not have such a purpose in 
order to justify their funding. It would also be necessary to distinguish the 
structures intended to perform complex care (involving hospitals) from 
others that could be specialised in simpler care practices (e.g. 
ophthalmology or cosmetic surgery) for which a simple contractual 
collaboration with hospitals would be sufficient. 
                                                     
372  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
4.4.4 Implementation of a new organisation in practice 
4.4.4.1 Important points to consider for the establishment of the 
new subsidised organisation 
Designation by Member States of SGEI but limited review by the 
European Commission 
The competent authority shall, if it wishes so, subsidize the new organisation 
and describe the services to be provided by the new organisation as a SGEI. 
The concept of general interest is not clearly defined and the EU leaves a 
wide discretion to Member States to define services that could be classified 
as services of general interest. Authorisation as a service of general interest 
therefore belongs to Member States and the European Commission only 
has a role to check for manifest error of assessment in the definition the 
general interest. 
An important question is whether the possibility for a Member State to qualify 
a service as a SGEI is unlimited. In this respect, the European Commission 
has outlined in its guide to the application of the European Union rules on 
State aid, public procurement and the internal market to SGEIs, and in 
particular to social services of general interest, the possibilities Member 
States have to qualify a service as a SGEI.  
The question thus arises whether a public authority can classify a service as 
SGEI if a similar service is already provided by other operators in the market 
that are not entrusted with an SGEI. 
The European Commission states that where there are other undertakings 
operating under normal market conditions, not entrusted with an SGEI, who 
already provide or can provide a service satisfactorily and under conditions, 
such as price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access to the 
service, consistent with the public interest as defined by the State, it would 
not be appropriate to attach a public service obligation to such a service. 372 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 26 
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Therefore, the Commission explained that it is even more important that the 
Member States clearly specify the characteristics of the service in question, 
in particular the conditions for its provision and its target group. If a service 
is already provided by the market, albeit under conditions that are 
considered unsatisfactory by the Member State concerned, for instance 
because the market cannot provide it at the level of quality or at a price that 
public authorities might consider as being in the public interest (for example 
because transport fares are too expensive for low-income families), such a 
service can qualify as SGEI. This service must be offered on a non-
discriminatory basis. When the service is not already provided by the 
market, the question whether it can be provided by the market is for the 
Member State to decide, while the Commission can only check for manifest 
error.373  
The European Commission has also analysed the question of whether a 
service can be defined as SGEI in the case that the market would be able 
to provide it in the near future.  
In this case, the Commission considered that where the classification of a 
service as SGEI is otherwise justified, the mere fact that the market may be 
able to provide it in the future would in principle not prevent a Member State 
from defining the service currently as an SGEI. However, in cases where it 
is clear that the market will be able to provide the service within a short time 
under the conditions (including price, quality, continuity and access to it) 
desired by the Member State, the public authorities should reduce the 
entrustment period accordingly and monitor the evolution of the market in 
order to be able to decide whether a new entrustment is still needed when 
the previous one expires. If the market is still failing to provide the service at 
the end of the entrustment period, and the Member State considers that the 
service still qualifies as an SGEI, a new entrustment compliant with art. 106 
TFEU is possible. As regards the question of whether it is clear that the 
                                                     
373  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 26 
374  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market will be able to provide a particular service in the foreseeable future, 
the Commission’s task is limited to checking for manifest errors in the 
Member State’s assessment.374 
Discern whether a cross-border element is present 
In principle, it is authorised that personal services (such as healthcare, for 
example) have few cross-border effects, allowing some flexibility in the rules 
applied to them. This follows clearly from rules on public procurement and 
State aid. 
In case a new organisation plays an important role in providing healthcare 
in the Belgian market and if a high amount of subsidy is concerned the cross-
border level may be affected. 
Give more than just an authorisation: care for a real entrustment 
It is important to remember that if the competent authority decides to qualify 
the services by the new organisation as a SGEI, it is necessary that the 
public service obligations entrusted to the concerned organisation are 
clearly indicated in one or more documents issued by the competent public 
authorities. Approval or authorisation given by a public authority to a service 
provider, authorizing the provision of certain services, does not correspond 
to the notion of act of entrustment.375 
The European Commission states that an entrustment in the sense of art. 
106 TFEU and in the sense of the Altmark judgment only requires that the 
act of entrustment takes the form of one or more acts having binding legal 
force under national law. The specific form of the act (or acts) may be 
determined by each Member State, depending inter alia on its political 
and/or administrative organisation. According to the basic rules of 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 26 
375  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 40 
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administrative law, every local, regional or central public authority needs a 
legal basis in order to define a SGEI and finance it. Consequently, the notion 
of an act of entrustment can largely correspond to the legal basis that the 
public authority concerned chooses in each case at its own discretion. It is 
not necessary for this act to bear the title of ‘act of entrustment’. It is also not 
necessary for Member States to establish a special legal framework for 
adopting so-called ‘acts of entrustment’.376 
There is therefore no standard ‘one size fits all’ act of entrustment. However, 
certain elements have to be specified in the entrustment act, such as the 
content and the duration of the obligation, the parameters for calculating, 
controlling and reviewing the compensation and arrangements for avoiding 
and recovering any overcompensation. Where State aid for a SGEI is 
granted under the Decision or the Framework, the requirements for the 
entrustment act are set out explicitly and with additional details in art. 4 and 
paragraph. 16 respectively (i.e. the undertaking and, where applicable, the 
territory concerned; the nature of any exclusive rights assigned to the 
undertaking by the granting authority; a description of the compensation 
mechanisms; reference to the Decision).377  
Care for an appropriate announcement before giving a compensation  
In any procedure used to organise the SGEI, the general principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination laid down by the TFEU, in accordance 
with which equal treatment must be given to all the economic operators 
invited to participate, are applicable to services with a cross-border 
interest.378 
                                                     
376  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 40 
377  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 40 
The procedure used to organise the SGEI does not necessary need to 
be organised in accordance with the public procurement regulation: 
possibility to work with authorization 
The competent public authority may, for example, establish in advance the 
conditions for provision of a social service and, after sufficient advertising 
and in accordance with the principles of transparency and non-
discrimination, grant authorisations to all providers meeting these 
conditions. Such a system does not specify any limits or quotas concerning 
the number of service providers; all those meeting the conditions can 
participate. Providers which have obtained an authorisation must provide 
the service at the request of the user, who will thus have the choice of 
several providers, at a price set beforehand by the public authority.379 
4.4.4.2 How to determine conditions for such collaboration? 
If the Belgian legislature decides to opt for the development of a new 
organisation, one must also analyse the possibilities of creating such an 
organisation. Who can participate in the creation of such a structure? Is a 
bed transfer possible? Can there be a transfer of personnel? Does the 
establishment of such a structure have to go beyond what is provided for 
network-related care programmes? 
  
378  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p. 96 
379  Commission staff working document of 29 April 2013, entitled ‘Guide to the 
application of the EU rules on State aid, public procurement and the internal 
market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social 
services of general interest’, Brussels, SWD(2013) 53 final/2, p.100 
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Establishment and management of the new organisation  
Whether one opts for the use of the possibilities offered by the current 
legislation or the creation of a new legislative framework, it will be important 
to specify for which areas of care such an organisation can be created. Whist 
it is difficult to list the interventions concerned as medicine evolves very 
quickly, it could still be advantageous to provide a framework to regulate the 
areas concerned.  
Creation on a collaborative basis 
The goal is not to create a parallel healthcare supply circuit, but rather to 
enable the hospital landscape to retrain. It therefore seems right that existing 
hospitals should have a role in the creation of the new organisation, in 
particular if it concerns complex healthcare. 
To encourage hospitals to participate in the development of new 
organisations, incentives will be needed. 
Whilst for certain complex forms of healthcare, the use of an existing hospital 
is necessary, it is at the same time necessary to not restrain the use of such 
structures only to hospitals. Doing so in situations where it is not justified 
may infringe the principle of freedom to provide services. 
It would therefore be possible to design a system in which the creation of 
these structures for specified domains could be done without the 
participation of hospitals. One can imagine for example cosmetic or eye 
surgery structures that have already developed without hospitals. For other 
areas, for example for cancer care, it would be necessary to have at least 
the participation of one or two hospitals. 
Besides participating hospitals, it could also be interesting to analyse a 
possible collaboration with private partners or foreign institutions. It would 
be essential to introduce safeguards to avoid any conflict of interest. Imagine 
for example a distributor of medical devices who participates in the creation 
of a specialised care structure pursuing an activity requiring the use of a 
medical device equivalent to the one sold by the distributor. 
                                                     
380  http://www.guberna.be/sites/default/files/general/Gouvernance% 
20intercommunales%20wallonnes_rapport_0.pdf: p. 14 
Which legal form should the new structure have? 
In principle the new organisation should be able to choose any legal form. 
As it is nowadays foreseen for hospitals, the legal form has no effect as long 
as the hospital is authorised. A similar approach could be used for the new 
organisation. The legislator could choose to limit the possibility to obtain 
financial means to a certain legal form. We refer in this regard to the analysis 
done for the health system in model 1. As stated already in the foregoing 
analysis of model 1, it is possible for a Member State, under certain 
conditions, to limit the form of the new organisation to a specific type of legal 
person, e.g. a not-for-profit association. The Court of Justice has held that, 
according to the scale of values held by each of the Member States and, 
having regard to the discretion available to them, a Member State may 
restrict the operation of certain activities by entrusting them to public or 
charitable bodies. Any measure of this kind must, however, be suitable for 
guaranteeing the achievement of one or more legitimate objectives invoked 
by that Member State and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
those objectives. National legislation is appropriate for ensuring attainment 
of the objective pursued only if it genuinely reflects a need to attain it in a 
consistent and systematic manner. In any event, such restrictions must be 
applied without discrimination.   
Independent management 
From the moment the aim is to create a totally independent organisation 
from the entities that collaborate to create it, it is important to provide a 
management that respects the independence of the new organisation. The 
new structure must have a management that will serve its own interests and 
not the interests of those who created it. 
When we take the example of organisations that are co-owned by various 
municipalities in a region (e.g. an intermunicipal company as Vivalia), it 
appears from analyses performed on their management that conflicts of 
interest arise.380 If the role of the general assembly may be to represent the 
member institutions, it must be ensured that managers are not acting in the 
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interest of the institutions they represent, but work well on behalf of the new 
organisation.  
In this respect, it is not necessary that each member is represented in the 
board. Again, it is clear from the example of an intermunicipal company that 
a board of managers comprised of too many managers can harm 
effectiveness by hampering united and effective decision-making. 381 
Staff 
As an independent entity, the new organisation will be able to hire staff as 
an employer. The structure will be able to engage salaried employees as 
well as self-employed personnel. 
Note however that the question of a possible resumption of staff working 
within the participating hospitals may arise. We refer in this respect to 
developments that have been made for model 1. If there is no recovery of 
all staff, whether employee or self-employed, by the new organisation, it will 
be necessary to observe within each hospital the breaking contract terms as 
provided if the personnel cannot work anymore in the hospital. 
Transfer of beds 
To avoid duplication of healthcare provision and stimulate an integrated 
national planning, it may be useful to analyse the possibility for hospitals to 
transfer their beds to create a new organisation. Such a transfer could be 
done via the transfer of a branch of activity (for the legal aspects of transfers, 
see also model 1). 
4.4.5 Evaluation 
As long as the King does not provide a specific regulation, a person that is 
not a hospital cannot receive a BFM.  
                                                     
381  http://www.guberna.be/sites/default/files/general/Gouvernance 
%20intercommunales%20wallonnes_rapport_0.pdf: page 7  
To the extent that the establishment of the new organisation is not part of 
the ‘organic legislation’, the federated entities will also be involved in the 
regulation of the new organisation. 
In addition to procurement legislation, the rules on State aid and abuse of 
dominant position will also play a role. The government will be able to decide 
the form of the new organisation. This need not necessarily occur through 
public procurement legislation at the level of the Member State (or potentially 
at the level of the organisation between hospitals themselves, although the 
recent procurement rules provide flexible formulas for the organisation of 
healthcare services). The State aid rules will however have to be strictly 
respected. It will be important, if support is given, to outline how it includes 
SGEIs with a clear allocation decree that establishes which financial aid can 
be used (and how reimbursement takes place in case of overcompensation). 
The establishment of a new organisation can occur either by an amendment 
of the Hospital Act, or by the establishment of a new legal text. The 
legislation does not have to be limited to care programmes, but will probably 
still require the collaboration of the federated entities. So one should make 
a choice to either adapt the Hospital Act or to adopt new legislation. The 
legislation concerning a new organisation may be a way to provide a system 
of private clinics, regardless of whether this is done by an amendment of the 
Hospital Act (and the extension of the scope) or by a law alongside the 
Hospital Act, although the new regulation will require the collaboration of the 
federated entities (for example to determine the content).  
This form will also be linked to certain conditions such as the presence of an 
Intensive care unit (ICU), emergency department, etc. Agreements will have 
to be concluded with the hospitals that have to work together.  
It is important that the legislation provides clearly, if they have public service 
obligations, an obligation to cooperate with the new organisation. If the new 
organisation is charged with a SGEI, it will be legally obliged to cooperate 
with hospitals.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
If the three models (health system, network and new organisation) find a 
statutory basis, it is appropriate to retain the current legislation on 
associations and groups and possibly even to apply them within certain 
models. For example, the rules about groups (see the Royal Decree of 
30 January 1989) and associations could be applied to a health system or 
rules about associations to a network. For continuity of care, it is advisable 
that the present rules about associations and groups continue to exist and 
can be used, especially when they also apply within the new models (e.g. 
model 1 or 2). Note that some changes are still required in the current 
legislation on groups and associations. For example, the proximity control 
with pooling should be adjusted or it should be possible that non-hospitals 
are part of a group/association, etc. 
For a variety of legislation concerning the three models support from the 
federated entities is required.  
It is appropriate to ensure, at the level of certain organs where decisions are 
taken (such as the network committee in the network), a representation of 
the actors. For medical councils or general meetings this may require that 
they organise this themselves in the form of a legal person. 
Model 3 would best be achieved with a legal person that can recruit its own 
staff. 
Both in a health system (model 1) and in a new organisation (model 3) the 
composition of the board shall be decided by the person who set up the 
health system and the new organisation. In a sense, this will also be the 
case with a network (model 2). However, this network cannot just control the 
members of the network itself in areas that have nothing to do with the 
purpose of the network. The network committee can take binding decisions 
concerning decisions that constitute the subject of the purpose of this 
network. 
A network should avoid market concentration. The exchange of sensitive 
information that cannot be exchanged in accordance with competition rules 
should be avoided. If the parties of a network want more control, the 
establishment of a health system as in model 1 must be chosen. 
The legislators can help to develop the model by determining the objectives, 
conditions for approval, monitoring mechanisms, need for prior consultation 
of actors, etc. To the extent the government intervenes financially 
concerning a SGEI which also receives public money, the objective must be 
regulated clearly and specifically. 
It does not seem appropriate in drafting rules for the 3 models, to provide 
specific rules regarding distance issues. 
Model 2 should not be used to gain control over institutions. In that case, 
there is a concentration and it is advisable to work on the basis of model 1. 
It is possible, if a hospital wants to join a network, to provide that there must, 
in advance, be a favourable opinion of the medical councils. Working with 
one medical council seems only appropriate in case of a group, or in case 
of a health system (model 1, which may or may not take the form of a group). 
In model 1 (health system), it is essential to ensure that, additional to the 
establishment of the health system, attention is paid to collaboration 
between the health system institutions. The establishment of a health 
system alone does not directly imply a true collaboration between the 
institutions of the health system. Only when such collaboration is effective, 
it can lead to quality-oriented and cost-effective care. The establishment of 
the health system should also be discussed in advance with stakeholders. 
Following the example of the Netherlands and the Supervisory Authority, the 
legislator may provide that a sponsor that wants to establish a health system 
must get the approval of the government in advance. 
In model 2, collaboration in specific fields can lead to quality-oriented and 
cost-effective care, e.g. if the collaboration consists of the efficient exchange 
of medical information, realising the on duty care (e.g. via an association). It 
will be important to avoid the creation of a concentration and / or to ensure 
that the roles, liabilities etc. of the network are transparent to other 
stakeholders. 
Model 3 can lead to quality-oriented and cost-effective care if it is clearly 
indicated what will be the tasks of the new organisation and how such 
collaboration can/should take place when hospitals want to redirect patients 
to the new organisation, and when the new organisation wants/needs to rely 
on those hospitals. 
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Key points 
Three models can be facilitated through the legislation, namely:  
A health system: 
 A possible legal form of a health system is a not-for-profit 
association. This is not a must for operating hospitals, unless 
they want to obtain infrastructure grants. 
 In a health system the person who operates the hospital receives 
the authorisation. Hence, the funding will be provided to whoever 
has received the authorisation. 
 The current funding rules in Belgium provide the possibility of 
additional financing in case of a merger or a transfer of activities. 
 Modification of the legislation is needed if the legislator wants to 
allow that the health system runs e.g. also homes for the elderly, 
homes for young people etc. 
 As soon as a health system exists, i.e. one undertaking with 
potentially different activities, there are no immediate specific 
VAT issues. 
A network:  
 Due to the less integrated structure problems are identified, e.g. 
financial problems are not solved with this governance structure. 
The network structure will have to take account of the new 
regulation about cost-sharing association and VAT. 
 Under the current legislation, the network will in principle not 
receive any funding, as the network itself has no authorisation 
number. 
 The impact on individual institutions by a network may be 
limited, meaning that the impact on quality may also remain 
limited. Communication with patients about the role and 
responsibility of the network is crucial. 
 A network committee should be established wherein any type of 
health actor should be able to participate. 
A new organisation: 
 The establishment of a new organisation can be a problem: as 
long as the King does not provide a specific regulation, a person 
that is not a hospital cannot receive funding. The establishment 
of a new organisation can occur either by an amendment of the 
Hospital Act, or by the establishment of a new legal text. 
 The legislation does not have to be limited to care programmes, 
but will probably still require the cooperation of the federated 
entities. So the government should make a choice to either adapt 
the Hospital Act or to adopt a new legislation. 
 The legislation concerning a new organisation may also be a way 
to provide a regulatory framework for private clinics, regardless 
of whether this is done by an amendment of the Hospital Act (and 
the extension of the scope) or by a law alongside the Hospital 
Act. 
Overall conclusions 
 To enhance a smooth transition, it is appropriate to retain the 
current legislation on associations and groups and possibly even 
to apply them within certain models, such as the rules about 
groups (see the Royal Decree of 30 January 1989) and 
associations related to a health system or rules about 
associations related to a network. 
 It should be endorsed (following the Dutch example) to subject 
the establishment of new collaborations, prior to notification to 
the Competition Authority, to a healthcare specific study. 
 The new legislation will require the cooperation of the federated 
entities since also other types of organisations should be 
facilitated. 
  
 128  Governance models for hospital collaborations KCE Report 277 
 
 REFERENCES  1. Beleidscel van de minister van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid. 
Plan van aanpak - Hervorming Ziekenhuisfinanciering. 2015.  
Available from: http://www.vbs-
gbs.org/fileadmin/user_upload/News/2015/nl/Plan_van_Aanpak_Zie
kenhuisfinanciering_Commissie_VG_20150428.pdf 
2. Vandeurzen J. Beleidsnota 2014-2019. Welzijn, Volksgezondheid en 
Gezin. Vlaamse regering 2014.   
3. Vandeurzen J. Nieuw Vlaams ziekenhuislandschap. Focus op de 
patiënt. 2016.  Available from: https://www.zorg-en-
gezondheid.be/sites/default/files/atoms/files/08072016_Nota_Nieuw
%20Vlaams%20Ziekenhuislandschap.pdf 
4. Eeckloo K, Van Herck G, Van Hulle C, Vleugels A. From Corporate 
Governance To Hospital Governance: Authority, transparency and 
accountability of Belgian non-profit hospitals’ board and 
management. Health Policy. 2004;68(1):1-15. 
5. Eeckloo K. Hospital Governance in Vlaanderen: Exploratieve studie 
in internationaal perspectief. Leuven: 2008. Doctoral Dissertation  
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1979/2612 
6. Kettl D. Sharing power: Public governance and private markets. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; 1993. 
7. Milward H. Nonprofit contracting and the hollow state. Public 
Administration Review. 1994;54:73-7. 
8. Salamon L. The tools of government: A guide to the new 
governance. Oxford University Press; 2002. 
9. Adler P. Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge economy and 
the future of capitalism. Organization science. 2001;12(2):215-34. 
10. Olejaz M, Nielsen A, A R, HO B, Krasnik A, Hernández-Quevedo C. 
Denmark. Health System review. Health Systems in Transition 
2012;14(2). 
11. Vrangbaek K. The Danish Health Care system In: Mossialos E, 
Wenzl M, Osborn R, Anderson C, editors. International Profiles of 
Health Care Systems, 2014: The Commonwealth Fund; 2015. p. 33-
42.  
 KCE Report 277 Governance models for hospital collaborations 129 
 
12. L'Enfant R. Samenwerking tussen organisaties. Handvaten voor een 
praktijk van netwerkvorming. In: Desmet A, Baert H, Bouverne-de 
Bie M, L. Verbeke L, editors. Handboek Samenlevingsopbouw in 
Vlaanderen Brugge: Die Keure; (2008).  
13. Bohmer R, Edmondson A, Feldman L. Intermountain Health Care. 
In: Harvard Business School; 2013. 
14. Alexander J, Comfort M, Weiner B, Bogue R. Leadership in 
collaborative community health partnerships. Nonprofit management 
and leadership. 2001;12(2):159-75. 
15. Kim K, Burns L. Success factors in hospital network performance: 
evidence from Korea. Health Services Management Research. 
2007;20(3):141-52. 
16. Klijn EH, Koppenjan JFM. Governace networks in the public sector. 
Routledge: Oxon; 2016. 
17. Kohler-Koch B, Eising R. The transformation of governance in the 
European Union. Psychology Press; 1999. 
18. OECD. OECD principles of corporate governance. 2004. 
19. Desender K, Aguilera R, Crespi R, GarcÍa‐cestona M. When does 
ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior. Strategic 
Management Journal. 2013;34(7):823-42. 
20. Kumar P, Zattoni A. Corporate governance, board of directors, and 
firm performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 
2013;21(4):311-3. 
21. Eisenhardt K. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy 
of management review. 1989;14(1):57-74. 
22. Renz D. Nonprofit Governance and the Work of the Board. Midwest 
Center for Nonprofit Leadership. 2007. 
23. Wiesel F, Modell S. From New Public Management to New Public 
Governance? Hybridization and Implications for Public Sector 
Consumerism. Financial Accountability & Management. 
2014;30(2):175-205. 
24. Hassall. G. Lecture Notes: DG406 Theories of Governance, Session 
4, Network Governance, Slide 18. University of the South Pacific: 
2009  
25. Osborne S. The New Public Governance? 2006.   
26. Stone M, Ostrower F. Acting in the public interest? Another look at 
research on nonprofit governance. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly. 2007;36(3):416-38. 
27. Weiner B, Alexander J. Corporate and philanthropic models of 
hospital governance: a taxonomic evaluation. Health Services 
Research. 1993;28(3):325. 
28. Wilikilagi V. What is Network Governance and its Implications for 
Public Policy Formulation? SSRN Electronic Journal. October 2009. 
29. Preker A, Harding A. Innovations in health service delivery: The 
corporatization of public hospitals. Washington, D.C.: Human 
Development Network Health, Nutrition, and Population Series. 
World Bank; 2003. 
30. Barnett P, Perkins R, Powell M. On a hiding to nothing? Assessing 
the corporate governance of hospital and health services in New 
Zealand 1993–1998. The International journal of health planning and 
management. 2001;16(2):139-54. 
31. Millar R, Mannion R, Freeman T, Davies H. Hospital board oversight 
of quality and patient safety: a narrative review and synthesis of 
recent empirical research. Milbank Q. 2013;91(4):738-70. 
32. Jiang H, Lockee C, Fraser I. Enhancing board oversight on quality of 
hospital care: an agency theory perspective. Health care 
management review. 2012;37(2):144-53. 
33. Veronesi G, Kirkpatrick I, Vallascas F. Clinicians on the board: What 
difference does it make? Social Science & Medicine. 2013;77:147-
55. 
34. Halligan A, Donaldson L. Implementing clinical governance: turning 
vision into reality. Bmj. 2001;322(7299):1413-7. 
35. Campbell S, Sheaff R, Sibbald B, Marshall M, Pickard S, Gask L, et 
al. Implementing clinical governance in English primary care 
groups/trusts: reconciling quality improvement and quality 
assurance. Quality and Safety in Health Care. 2002;11(1):9-14. 
 130  Governance models for hospital collaborations KCE Report 277 
 
36. Willem A, Gemmel P. Do governance choices matter in health care 
networks? An exploratory configuration study of health care 
networks. BMC health services research. 2013;13(1):229. 
37. Van de Voorde C, Van den Heede K, Mertens R, Annemans L, 
Busse R, Callens S, et al. Conceptual framework for the reform of 
the Belgian hospital payment system. Health Services Research 
(HSR). Brussels: Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE); 
2014 26/09/2014. KCE Reports 229 Available from: 
https://kce.fgov.be/sites/default/files/page_documents/KCE_229_Ho
spital%20Financing_Report.pdf 
38. Grubbs J. Can agencies work together? Collaboration in public and 
nonprofit organizations. Public Administration Review. 
2000;60(3):275-80. 
39. Peterson N. Interagency collaboration under part H: the key to 
comprehensive, multidisciplinary, coordinated infant/toddler 
intervention services. Journal of Early Intervention. 1991;15(1):89-
105. 
40. Hodges S, Hernandez M, Nesman T. A developmental framework 
for collaboration in child-serving agencies. Journal of Child and 
Family Studies. 2003;12(3):291-305. 
41. Bailey D, Koney K. Strategic alliances among health and human 
services organizations: From affiliations to consolidations. Sage 
Publications; 2000. 
42. Smith R, Otoo J. Working with a joint venture or consortium 
contractor: getting the best out of the relationship. 13 December 
2011.  
43. Keuning D, Eppink D. Management & Organisatie: Theorie en 
toepassing (7e editie). Houten: Educatieve Partners. 2000. 
44. Campbell D. Giving up the single life: Leadership motivations for 
interorganizational restructuring in nonprofit organizations. 
Administration in Social Work. 2009;33(4):368-86. 
45. Perri G, Goodwin N, Peck E, Freeman T. Managing networks of 
twenty-first century organisations. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan; 2006. 
46. Bazzoli GJ, Shortell SM, Dubbs N, Chan C, Kralovec P. A taxonomy 
of health networks and systems: bringing order out of chaos. Health 
services research. 1999;33(6):1683. 
47. Alexander J, Weiner B, Metzger M, Shortell S, Bazzoli G, Hasnain-
Wynia R, et al. Sustainability of collaborative capacity in community 
health partnerships. Medical Care Research and Review. 2003;60(4 
suppl):130S-60S. 
48. Weiner B, Alexander J. The challenges of governing public-private 
community health partnerships. Health Care Management Review. 
1998;23(2):39-55. 
49. Shortell S. The evolution of hospital systems: unfulfilled promises 
and self-fulfilling prophesies. Medical Care Research and Review. 
1988;45(2):177-214. 
50. Yu S, Chen M. Performance impacts of interorganizational 
cooperation: a transaction cost perspective. Service Industries 
Journal. 2013;33(13-14):1223-41. 
51. Provan K, Kenis P. Modes of network governance: Structure, 
management, and effectiveness. Journal of public administration 
research and theory. 2008;18(2):229-52. 
52. Lowndes V, Skelcher C. The Dynamics of Multi-organizational 
Partnerships: an Analysis of Changing Modes of Governance. Public 
Administration. 1998;76(2):313-33. 
53. Powell W. Neither market nor hierarchy. The sociology of 
organizations: classic, contemporary, and critical readings. 
2003;315:104-17. 
54. Chaskin R. Building community capacity. Transaction Publishers; 
2001. 
55. McEvily B, Zaheer A. Architects of trust: The role of network 
facilitators in geographical clusters. Trust and distrust in 
organizations. 2004:189-213. 
56. Provan K, Isett K, Milward H. Cooperation and compromise: A 
network response to conflicting institutional pressures in community 
mental health. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 
2004;33(3):489-514. 
 KCE Report 277 Governance models for hospital collaborations 131 
 
57. Proenca E, Rosko M, Dismuke C. Service collaboration and hospital 
cost performance: direct and moderating effects. Medical care. 
2005;43(12):1250-8. 
58. Vandeurzen J, Veys A. Samenwerking tussen ziekenhuizen: een 
overzicht van de juridische mogelijkheden. Acta Hospitalia. 
1999;39(2):5-16. 
59. Callens S, Leire M, Boddez L, Van Leuven L, Peers J. Het aanbod 
in de gezondheidszorg. In: Callens S, Peers J, editors. Organisatie 
van de gezondheidszorg. Antwerp: Intersentia; 2015. p. 164.  
60. Vansweevelt T, Dewallens F. Zorgverleners: statuut en 
aansprakelijkheid. In: Handboek gezondheidsrecht. Antwerp: 
Intersentia; 2014. p. 202.  
61. Fornaciari D, Callens S, Schokkaert E. Ziekenhuizen, 
mededingingsrecht en recht op kwaliteitsvolle zorg. Antwerp: 
Intersentia; 2010. 
62. Thiel P. Les hôpitaux en Belgique: fonctionnement et financement. 
Brussels: Kluwer; 2000. 
63. Vercruyssen W. Samenwerkingsvormen in ziekenhuisverband. 
Toelichting en werkdocumenten bij de bepalingen in de 
ziekenhuiswet over groeperingen, fusies en associaties. In: Caritas 
Verbond der Verzorgingsinstellingen vzw; 2001. 
64. Vandeurzen J, Veys A. Samenwerking tussen ziekenhuizen: een 
overzicht van de juridische vormen. Borgerhout: Roels Printing; 
1999.   
65. Neys H. De relaties tussen de ziekenhuisbeheerder en de 
ziekenhuisartsen bij fusie. Borgerhout: Roels Printing; 1999.   
66. Kips J, Michiels K, Verschoren K. Together we count. Naar een 
patiëntgerichte financiering van de algemene ziekenhuizen. Brussel: 
Zorgnet Vlaanderen; 2014.   
67. Callens S, Leire M, Boddez L, Van Leuven L, Peers J. Het aanbod 
in de gezondheidszorg. In: Organisatie van de gezondheidszorg. 
Antwerpen: Intersentia; 2015. p. 165.  
68. Peeters M, Zlotta A, Roucoux F, De Greve J, Van Belle S, 
Haelterman M. National Clinical Practice Guidelines of the College 
of Oncology: clinical practice guideline for colorectal cancer. Good 
Clinical Practice (GCP). Brussels: Belgian Health Care Knowledge 
Centre (KCE). 2006;19(05):2006. 
69. De Laet C, Van den Heede K, R. M. General framework for a 
multidisciplinary quality manual for cardiac care networks. Health 
Services Research (HSR) Brussels: Belgian Healthcare Knowledge 
Centre (KCE). 2013;KCE Reports 213C. 
70. psy107. Guide vers de meilleurs soins en santé mentale par la 
réalisation de circuits et de réseaux de soins. In. p. 8. 
71. psy107. Guide vers de meilleurs soins en santé mentale par la 
réalisation de circuits et de réseaux de soins. In. p. 20-1. 
72. Bossuyt S, Van den Berghe S, Ghesquiere V, Op de Beeck K, 
Basemans M. Ziekenhuisholdings en andere 
samenwerkingsvormen: Samen sterk? In: Klaverblad Zeeland; 
2010-2011. 
73. Vinck I, Paulus D. Correction of refractive errors of the eye in adults 
– part 3: Organisation and legal framework of extramural surgery 
centres. Health Technology Assessment (HTA). Brussels: Belgian 
Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE); 2014 07/2014.  
(D/2014/10.273/49)  Available from: 
http://kce.fgov.be/sites/default/files/page_documents/KCE_225_refr
active_errors%20of%20the%20eye_part%203_Report.pdf 
74. Callens S, Van Leuven M, Leire M, Boddez L. Geneesmiddelen, 
medische hulpmiddelen en andere gezondheidsproducten. In: 
Callens S, Peers J, editors. Organisatie van de gezondheidszorg. 
Antwerp: Intersentia; 2015.  
75. Casteleyn E. Raamovereenkomsten en samenaankoop in de 
zorgsector. Heule: INNI; 2016. 
76. Cuypers R. Ziekenhuisfinanciering en geneesherenhonoraria. In: De 
financiering van de ziekenhuizen. Mechelen: Kluwer; 2013. p. 115.  
77. VOKA. mHealth als sleutel tot kwaliteit en betaalbaarheid van zorg. 
2015.  Available from: 
http://www.healthcommunity.be/sites/default/files/u195/Whitepaper%
20Health%20Community%20'mHealth'_lowres.pdf 
 132  Governance models for hospital collaborations KCE Report 277 
 
78. Callens S, Boddez L, Leire M. Juridische bevoegdheid inzake 
gezondheidszorg. In: Callens S, Peers J, editors. Organisatie van de 
gezondheidszorg. Antwerp: Intersentia; 2015. p. 353.  
79. Goyder DG. Competition law. 4 ed. New York: Oxford University 
Press; 2003. 
80. Callens S, Coëffi M, Van Leuven L. Mededinging, 
overheidsopdrachten en gezondheidszorg. In: Organisatie van de 
gezondheidszorg. Antwerp: Intersentia; 2015. p. 691.  
81. Fornaciari D. De wisselwerking tussen het mededingingsrecht en 
het recht op kwaliteitsvolle zorg van de patiënt. Bruges: Die Keure; 
2011. 
82. Bosschaert M, Coeckelbergh D, Jacobs L. Praktijkboek: De 
vennootschap met sociaal oogmerk. Mechelen: Wolters Kluwer; 
2016. 
83. Clark D, Savitz L, Pingree S. Cost cutting in health systems without 
compromising quality care. Frontiers of health servies management. 
2010;27(2):19-30.  
 
